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Abstract 
The questions "what is revelation ? ", " what does revelation tell us and what 
are its implications on man ?" are important questions which Muslims have been 
attempting to answer since early Islamic times and for which we are still seeking 
answers even today. The answers to these questions would ultimately shape our 
Weltanshauung. 
All Muslims accept revelation. However, they differ on its meaning and 
implication 
. 
For falsafa, its major proponent, al-Färabi, sees revelation as the 
ultimate culmination of the highest intellectual truths transformed and put into a 
symbolic language with power to motivate man to right action. Chapter 1 examines 
how al-Färdbi conceives of revelation as being the culmination of the highest 
intellectual truths transformed into moving expressions able to be understood by all 
and to drive all to action. Thus, revelation is an extension of reason, an expression of 
reason. Chapter 2 examines the role of reason in the works of al-Fübi in 
discovering knowledge by itself and the role of reason vis ä vis revelation. 
The rest of the thesis deals with al-Ghazäli's understanding of revelation. Al- 
Ghazäli as a representative of a major school of kaläm, the Ash'arites', saw 
revelation as an expression of God's will. Al-Ghazäli sought to place God's power 
and will as absolutes above . everything. 
He rejects any notion that it was necessary 
for God to act in a certain manner for it would be an impingement on God's power 
and will. Chapter 3 examines al-Ghazdli's direct discussions on revelation. Chapters 
4,5, and 6 attempt to obtain al-Ghazäli's understanding of revelation through 
indirect means by deducing from his positions on religious issues his perception of 
revelation. Chapter 7 examines the role of reason in al-Ghazäli in discovering 
knowledge by itself and the role of reason vis d vis revelation. 
ix 
Introduction 
Discussions on revelation in any revealed religion have never been an easy 
subject to deal with. Issues surrounding the concept of revelation such as what is 
revelation, i. e. what kinds of knowledge does it actually give us and more 
importantly, what is the ultimate purpose of this revelation revealed to man are rarely 
discussed by religious scholars in any systematic manner. This lack of discussion is 
surprising since a religious scholar's position on any subject must inevitably be 
influenced and shaped by his/her understanding of revelation. However, any 
religious scholar's position on revelation can still be obtained, albeit with difficulty 
and through an indirect route by careful study of his/her position on other religious 
issues. From his/her opinion on these related issues, we can carefully derive and 
draw conclusions on his/her views of revelation. 
In the Islamic religious tradition, a Muslim religious scholar's opinion on the 
issues surrounding revelation is very difficult to obtain and point out clearly. Muslim 
religious scholars seem to discuss endlessly in minute detail every subject under the 
sun but they tiptoe ever so carefully- around the fundamental subject, revelation, the 
source from which all their endless debates is supposed to spring , or at 
least have its 
grounding in. 
The Muslim philosophers at least fare much better on this issue. They 
discuss the issues surrounding revelation because it is essential in their discussions on 
how to obtain certainty in knowledge and to their claims of possessing certain 
knowledge. So, the Muslim philosophers make some systematic attempts to explain 
the issues surrounding revelation. The Muslim philosophers were confident that they 
must and could interpret and assimilate philosophy, i. e. Greek philosophy, into the 
Islamic ethos. The Muslim philosophers' reasoning on why it was necessary to 
incorporate philosophy into the Islamic ethos is because philosophy provided the 
proofs for theoretical opinions in religion. The Muslim philosophers also felt 
1 
confident that they could make philosophy acceptable to their Muslim audience. 
This is because of their conviction of the universality of the human condition, both 
physical and spiritual. Man's rationality and sociability are viewed as part of a 
universe which is eminently and naturally ordered and benign. 
I In order to reconcile 
philosophy into a religion which is revelation-centric, they had to find a formula on 
how to incorporate revelation in philosophy. Their attempt to incorporate revelation 
into philosophy resulted into one of the Muslim philosophers' major contributions to 
the advancement of philosophy. 
All other Muslim religious thinkers apart from the philosophers seem to have 
accepted revelation as a given source of knowledge, needing neither further 
explanation, examination nor study. Rather they saw their task only as the 
transmitters of this knowledge through explaining and elaborating the content of the 
revelation and how to apply it in practice, i. e. daily life. However, it is from their 
explanation and elaboration of their religious positions derived from their 
understanding of revelation that we can derive and spell out their concept of 
revelation. Instead of trying to find a direct and systematic discussion of their concept 
of revelation, because such a discussion is extremely scarce, and on the rare occasion 
when it does appear, it is only in passing and usually incoherent, we will have to 
resort to an analysis of their religious positions derived from their understanding of 
revelation in order to shed some light on their concept of revelation. 
To explain, examine and study all Muslim religious scholars' concept of 
revelation individually is an impossible task and one which might yield somewhat 
confusing results since it might fail to produce any pattern of thought on this subject. 
But, rather it might only yield individual preferences and subtleties resulting in a 
hodge-podge of subtle opinions. It would appear to be more beneficial for us to 
examine one great individual representative of Muslim religious scholars. 
`Alfred L. Ivry, "Al-Färäbi", in Religion. Learning and Science in the Abbasid 
Period- ed. M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 1990), 384. 
2 
In order to explain, examine and study how the Muslim philosophers tried to 
reconcile philosophy into religion through incorporating the concept of revelation into 
philosophy, we will examine al-Fdräbi's ((AD. 870-950) concept of revelation. Al- 
Fdräbi serves as an excellent choice to represent the philosophers on explaining their 
concept of revelation because not only, as Badawi points out, did all later Islamic 
philosophy find its sources in al-Fdräbi1 and thus, al-Färäbi set the tone for all the 
discussions in Islamic philosophy but also because al-Färäbi extensively developed 
and integrated his concept of revelation into his philosophical system. 
In contrast to the approach of the philosophers to the concept of revelation, 
we will study and examine al-Ghazdli (d. 50511111) as a representative of the 
traditional Islamic thinkers. Al-Ghazdli was an extremely versatile scholar whose 
area of knowledge and writings2 encompassed all areas of Islamic religious thought. 
He was not only an outstanding jurist, theologian and Sufi but also an ardent critic of 
philosophy. Al-Ghazäli being conversant in all these different areas makes him 
serve as an excellent choice to represent the religious thinkers outside the 
philosophers. However, because al-Ghazäli did not sytematically deal directly with 
the issues surrounding the concept of revelation, we will begin with firstly examining 
his direct writings on the issue which are very terse and usually in relationship to 
other discussions, but we will have to resort to deducing his views on revelation 
indirectly from his position on other religious issues. 
The purpose here is to study al-Färabi and al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation. 
I will seek answers to the following four questions surrounding the concept of 
revelation which are: 1. what is revelation?: what kinds of knowledge does it actually 
give us?: 2. how is this knowledge ultimately transmitted to us?; 3. by whom is it 
transmitted to in order to ensure its purity and originality?; 4. and most importantly, 
what is the ultimate purpose of this revelation revealed to man? 
'Abd al-Rahman Badawi, Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam, (Paris, 1972) vol. 2. 
575. 
'For a list of al-Ghazäli's writings see, A. Badawi, Mu'allafät al-Ghazzäli 
(Cairo, 1961), G. F. Hourani, The Chronology of Ghazäll's Writings, " 
Journal of American Oriental Society, (1959), 79: 225-33 . 
3 
It would seem somewhat wanting if we did not at least contrast both these 
thinkers' understanding of revelation with their understanding of the role of reason. 




AL-FARABI'S CONCEPT OF REVELATION 
Introduction 
Muslim philosophers in spite of the variety of places in which they lived and 
wrote their works have an undeniable unity in the themes of their writings and in the 
questions which they raised and attempted to answer. Anawati points out three major 
factors that unite the themes of Muslim philosophers: 1) they had the same starting 
point viz. the Qur'änic truths, and the everyday teachings of Islam, 2) they saw their 
philosophy as a continuation of past wisdom, 3) they were convinced of the oneness 
of all knowledge, crowned by metaphysics or Iiiähiyyäti . 
Muslim philosophers never challenged or doubted the teachings of the Qur'än 
but rather resorted to an allegorical interpretation of the Qur'an; for example on the 
issue of creation in time, or the resurrection of the body when it seemed that the literal 
interpretation of the Qur'an conflicted with their views2. In any case, as far as the 
Muslim philosophers were concerned, they were the ones with the right 
understanding of the revealed text i. e. the Qur'an because they held the right 
interpretation of it. 
Muslim philosophers had gained much of their knowledge from non-Muslims 
and especially from the Greek philosophers. They considered that God had given 
wisdom to all men both through the use of his intellect and that since the beginning of 
'George Anawati, "Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism", in The Legacy of Islam, 
ed. Joseph Schacht with C. E. Bosworth, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) 356-7. 
2George Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy-, A 
translation with introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd's Kitäb fast at-magal. (London: 
Messrs. Luzac & Co., 1967), 50-71. Here Ibn Rushd resorts mainly to allegorical interpretations of Scripture to justify some of the controversial positions of the 
philosophers. See also Iysa Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between 
Philosophy and Orthrodoxv (Ijmä' and Ta'wil in the Conflict Between al-Ghazäli and Ibn Rushd) (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1989). 
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man God had sent through His continuous line of prophets to all peoples and all 
nations enlightening them, culminating in the last prophet, Muhammad. The Muslim 
philosophers saw no problems in accepting truth from wherever it came. They saw 
the Qur'änic revelation as the consummation of this wisdom. 
The Muslim philosophers were convinced of the oneness of knowledge. In his 
book, Ihsä' al-'ulvm (Categories of the Sciences), al-Färäbi lists and describes the 
various sciences and argues that philosophy raust be their head because it ensures the 
certainty of all knowledge through the use of apodeictic reasoning. I 
The Muslim philosophers were confident that they must and could interpret 
and assimilate philosophy, i. e. Greek philosophy, into the Islamic ethos. The Muslim 
philosophers' reasoning on why it was necessary to incorporate philosophy into the 
Islamic ethos is because philosophy provided the proofs for theoretical opinions in 
religion. Al-Färäbi says, " Theoretical opinions in religion have their proofs in 
theoretical philosophy, while they are taken in religion without proof. 2 
The result of this assimilation of philosophy into the Islamic ethos is the 
development of man's reasoning from the lesser forms of reasoning--rhetoric, 
dialectic and sophistry to the highest form, demonstrative reasoning. 3 The Muslim 
philosophers also felt confident that they could make philosophy acceptable to their 
Muslim audience because of their conviction of the universality of the human 
condition, both physical and spiritual. 4 
In order to reconcile philosophy into a religion which is revelation-centric, 
they had to find a formula on how to incorporate revelation into philosophy. Their 
attempt to incorporate revelation into philosophy resulted into one of the Muslim 
philosophers' major contributions to the advancement of philosophy. The Muslim 
philosophers, using the materials from late Hellenistic thought pressed and shaped it 
1George Anawati, Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism, in The Legacy of Islam, 
357. Al-Färäbi, Ihsä al 'ulürn. (ed. ) 'Uthmän Amin, (Cairo, 1949). 53-4. 
tal-Färäbi, Kitäb al-millah wa nubs ukhrä, ed. M. Mahdi, (Beirut, 1968), 47. 
3Alfred L. Ivry, al-Färäbi, 'in Religion. Learning and Science in the Abbasid Period. 
ed. M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 384. 
4Ibid. 
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into a new direction so that a novel, original pattern emerged from theme. This 
incorporation of revelation is major because it led the way for incorporating 
philosophy into religion and influenced the way for both medieval Jewish2 and 
Christian3 philosophers on how to reconcile philosophy into religion. 
This attempt to reconcile philosophy into religion was a dynamic process . 
The philosophers were not only inheritors of and preservers of earlier philosophical 
truths, but were also Muslims, believers in a faith in which revelation pervaded all 
aspects of life. The Muslim philosophers viewed their task to reconcile philosophy 
into the Islamic religion not simply to accommodate religion but, rather as the 
correct understanding of religion. Marmura explains how the philosophers perceives 
this task as follows: 
They (these philosophers) viewed themselves as we had mentioned 
earlier, not only as inheritors and preservers of earlier philosophical 
truths, but as continuing the quest after the true nature of things. At 
the same time , they were part of a culture that was Qur' äno-centric, a 
culture whose ethos was religion. The Qur'an and the mission of the 
prophet were the central fact of their history. As metaphysicians they 
could not bypass such facts. Here they were in search of "the true 
nature" of what was at the core of their way of life. Their 
1Fazlur Rahrnan, Islam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 119 2For al-Färäbi's influence on Maimondes, see, Lawrence Berman, "Maimondes the 
Disciple al-Färäbi", Israel Oriental Studies 4 (Tel Aviv, 1974) 154-178. For a 
general discussion of Maimonides' relationship to al-Fä bi, see also, Shlomo Pines, 
"Translator's Introduction" in Moses Maimonides the Guide of the Perplexed 
((Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). xxviii-xcii. Maimonides describes 
al-Färdbi's contribution and influence by saying, " I tell you: as for the works of logic, 
one should only study the writings of Abil Nasr al-Färäbi. All his writings are 
flawlessly excellent. One ought to study and understand them. For he is a great man. Though the works of Avicenna may give rise to objections and are not as [good] as 
those of Abn Nasr al-Färäbi, Abü Bakr al-Sä'igh [Ibn Bajja] was also a great 
philosopher, and his writings are of a high standard. " Moses Maimondes the Guide 
of the Perplexed , lx. 3See Robert Hammond, The Philosophy of al-Färäbi and Its Influence on Medieval 
Thought- ( New York, 1947)). In this book, especially in the chapters on Proof on God's Existence, Epistemology, the author tries to show how much St Thomas 
Aquinas was influenced by al-Fdräbi. See also, Etienne Gilson-The Elements of Christian Philosophy. ( New York, 1963). See also, Etienne Gilson, Etudes de 
philosophie medievale French trans. by Roland Huret, Strasbourg, 1921). Gilson 
describes Averroes' treatise Agreement of Philosophy and Religion as a landmark in 
the history of Western civilization. Etudes de Philosophie medievale, 51. 
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interpretation of Islamic philosophy must hence be viewed in part as an 
attempt at self understanding. I 
Their attempt to incorporate philosophy into the Islamic religion must not be seen as 
superficial, and there is no compelling reason to doubt that they were fully 
convinced2 that not only was their concept of Islam in harmony with the Qur' än but 
it was also the true interpretation of the Qur' än and hence the true interpretation of 
Islam. 
In order to illustrate how the Muslim philosophers tried to reconcile 
philosophy into religion through incorporating the concept of revelation into 
philosophy, we will examine al-Färäbi's (AD. 870-950) ideas on this issue. Firstly, 
we will examine al-Fazdbi's epistemology because understanding it is an essential key 
to understanding his concept of revelation. Next we will examine al-Fdräbi's 
definition of revelation. In examining this definition, we will discuss four issues; 1. 
what is revelation?; 2. how is revelation received?; 3. who receives revelation , 
i. e. 
prophets?; and 4. finally and most importantly, what is the purpose of revelation? 
After examining al-Färäbi's concept of revelation, I will show that for al-Fdräbi, 
revelation is not only an important but an essential factor for the fulfilment of the 
purpose of philosophy. I will argue that for al-Färäbi, the importance of philosophy 
is to benefit not just the individual but others i. e. society. Thus, in order for 
philosophy to benefit not just the individual it must pass from the theoretical to the 
practical. This transformation of theoretical truths into practical actions is done 
through the power and convincing force of revelation. Therefore, for al-Färdbi, 
revelation is neither superfluous nor inferior to philosophy but actually fulfils one of 
'Michael Marmura, " The Islamic Philosophers' Understanding of Islam, in Islam's 
Understanding of Itself, Richard Hovannisian and Speros Vyronis (eds. ), (California: 
Undena Publication, 1983) 101-2. 
2A1-Ghazäli. Tahäfut al-faläsifa. ed. Suläymaa Dunyä (Cairo, 1987), translated into 
English by Sabih Ahmad Karnali as, al-Ghazali's Tahafut al- alasifah, (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1974). In this book , al-Ghazali criticizes the philosophers in general and al-Färäbi and in Ibn Sina in particular for 
misunderstanding certain key. concepts in Islam which might even cause one to become an infidel. But he never accuses them of insincerity or disbelief but rather of 
gravely wrong misunderstanding. 
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the essential missions of philosophy, to transcend the individual philosopher and 
influence and shape society. 
Al-Färäbi's Epistemology: The Soul and Its Cognitive Powers 
AbÜ Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhän ibn Uzaläj al-Färäbi 
(258/870-339/950) better known in the traditional Islamic sources as simply Abt 
Nasr, the second outstanding representative of the Muslim peripatetic (mashshä'i) 
school of philosophy after al-Kindi (185/801-260/873), gave Islamic philosophy its 
directions. Al-Färdbi is celebrated as a great commentator on Aristotle and is called 
with enormous affection and appreciation "the second teacher", the successor to the 
great Aristotle, the first teacher. Netton points out that Ibn Khallikan claimed that 
al-Färäbi is the greatest Muslim philosopher and underlines the great debt the great 
Ibn Sinä owed to him. 2 In present times, Netton points out the opinion of Badawi 
who claims that all later Islamic philosophy found its sources in al-Hr-lb-13, and thus it 
is not only the Muslims who are indebted to him, but also the West through the works 
of al-Färabi and other Muslim philosophers translated into Latin in the Middle Ages. 4 
1Michael Marmura, " The Islamic Philosophers' Understanding of Islam", ins 's 
Understanding of Itself, 93. For al-Fdräbi's place and role in establishing the main 
framework of Islamic philosophy, see, Muhsin Mahdi, "A1=F5rdbi and the Foundation 
of Philosophy", in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. by Parviz Morewedge 
(New York: 1981). 3-22. 
2Ian Netton, Alläh Transcendent. (Surrey, 1994), 99. Ibn Khallikän, Wafayät al- 
a'vän wa anbä abnä' al-zam n, vol. 5 (Beirut, 1977). 153-4. 
3lan Netton, Alläh Transcendent. 99. Abd al-Rahmar Badawi, Histoire de la 
Philosophie en Islam, (Paris, 1972) vol. 2.575. 
41an Netton, Alläh Transcendent. 99. Robert Hammond, The Philosophy of AlFarabi 
and Its Influence on Medieval Thought, (New York, 1947). 54-4. 
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Muslim philosophers including al-Färäbi attempted to reconcile philosophy 
with religion through incorporating the concept of revelation into philosophy, this 
constitutes a central point of mutual confrontation between the traditional Islamic 
thought and the Muslim philosophers. Al-Färäbi's attempt to incorporate revelation 
into his philosophy must not be seen as superficial or as an afterthought, for this 
would be a major mistake, since his theory of prophethood and revelation occupies a 
central role in the structure of his philosophy, because without revelation the 
philosopher would be incomplete since he would be unable to enlighten and motivate 
others. I For al-Färäbi, true philosophy must not only benefit the philosopher, but 
transcend him to encompass all and benefit everyone in accordance with their capacity 
to receive understanding. 
Al-Färäbi's theory of revelation is built upon his theory of the soul and its 
powers of cognition. Therefore, al-Färäbi's theory of the soul and its cognitive 
powers, i. e. his theory of knowledge, is pertinent and essential to understand in 
order to comprehend his theory of revelation. In his treatment of revelation through 
the medium of the prophets, he connects prophecy with an innate faculty of the soul 
itself and does not describe it as a state of possession by supernatural power. 2 
However, he qualifies this statement that it is not a state of possession of supernatural 
power by pointing out that this innate faculty must be endowed and cannot be 
acquired by learning. 3 Thus, for al-Färabi, although prophecy is not a possession of 
a supernatural state, it cannot be sought to be acquired through exertion of effort but 
'Al-Färdbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, ed. Ja'afar Yasin, (Beirut, 1981). Translated into 
English by Muhsin Mahdi entitled, AlFarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 
(Ithaca, 1969. Hereafter, referred to as Al-Faabi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, (Arabic text 
page), Mahdi (trans. text page). Al-Fdrdbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, 94-96. Mahdi, 48-9. 
2Richard Walzer, "Al-Färäbi's Theory of Prophecy and Divination", ou ao 
Hellenic Studies 27,1957,142. 
3A1-Färäbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madaniyya) Partially translation into 
English by Muhsin Mahdi entitled, Al-Färäbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa a! - 
madaniyya) Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi ed., in Medieval Political 
Phil osophy, (New York: Cornell; Universtiy Press, 1986). Where partial English 
translation is available, I will cite both the Arabic text and the English translation and 
simply refer works as Al-Färäbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madani, yy , (Arabic text page), Mahdi. (English translation page). Al-Färäbi's The Political 
Regime al-Siyäsa al-madaniyya), 79. Mahdi. 36. 
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still remains a unique gift of God to certain individuals who are chosen by God, 
therefore, such individuals are given special qualities which are necessary in order for 
them to receive revelation and hence become a prophet. 
For al-Färdbi, these necessary special qualities in order to receive revelation 
lie in the perfection of the innate faculties of the soul. The perfection of the innate 
faculties of the soul lies in its ability to gain knowledge. He gives a detailed 
description of these faculties of the soul in his magnum opus, Mabädi' ärä' ahl a! - 
madina al-fädila, by saying: 
Once a man comes to be, the first thing that arises in him is the faculty 
by which he takes nourishment, namely the nutritive faculty (al- 
quwwa a1 gh dhiya) [also known as the vegetative faculty], then 
afterwards the faculty by which he perceives the tangible like heat and 
cold and the other tangibles; and the faculty by which he perceives the 
objects of taste; and the faculty by which he perceives scent, and the 
faculty by which he perceives sound; and the faculty by which he 
perceives colour and all visible objects like rays of light. Together 
with the senses another faculty arises which consists in an appetition 
towards the object of perception so as to desire or to dislike them. 
Then afterwards another faculty arises in him by which he retains the 
imprint of the sensibles in the soul when these sensibles are no longer 
perceived, this being the faculty of representation (al-quwwa a! - 
mutakhayyila). By this faculty, he connects some of the sensibles 
with each other and disconnects others in different connections and 
disconnections, some being false, some true. An appetition towards 
the object of representation is joined with this faculty as well. Then 
afterwards the rational faculty (ai-quwwa al-nätiga) arises in man; by 
it he is able to know the intelligibles and by it he distinguishes good 
and evil and by it he grasps the arts and sciences. An appetition 
towards the object of reasoning is joined with this faculty as well. i 
The objective of this rather lengthy quotation from al-Färäbi is to show that for him 
the human soul undergoes a development. The order of development of the faculties 
of the human soul is the vegetative, next the sensitive (al-quwwa al-bässa), the 
appetitive (al-quwwa al-nuzü'iya), the imaginative (al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila) and 
finally culminating in the rational faculty (al-quwwa al-nätiga). This order of the 
development of the soul is important to establish al-Färäbi's idea of the hierarchy of 
'Richard Walzer (Arabic text with translation), Al-Färäbi on the Perfect State: Abu 
Nasr al-Färäbi's. Mabädi ärä. ' ahl al-madina al-fädila, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), 164-5. 
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faculties of the soul, since each faculty exists for the sake of the one above it, with the 
rational faculty being the highest because it rules or orders all other faculties. 
Al-Fdräbi in his book Risäla fl-al-'Aql divides the intellect according to 
Aristotle's description in the De Anima into four intellects , potential intellect (al-'aql 
bi-al-quwwa), actual intellect (al-'aql bi-al-fi'1), acquired intellect (al-'aqi al- 
mustafäd) and the external intellect, the Active Intelligence (al-'aql al-fa'äI). 1 
According to al-Färäbi, all human beings share a natural disposition or an 
initial capacity which he called the potential intellect, also known as the "rational 
faculty", "material intellect", and the "passive intellect"2 He defines the potential 
intellect as follows: 
The intellect which is in potentiality is some soul, or part of a soul, or 
one of the faculties of the soul, or something whose essence is ready 
and prepared to abstract the quiditties of all existing things and their 
forms from their matters. 3 
As long as there is no knowledge (universals, intelligibles or form) in the potential 
intellect, it remain in its potentiality. 
The potential intellect is actualised in men who begin to acquire knowledge. 
What kind of knowledge is al-Färäbi talking about here and how is this knowledge 
then acquired? The knowledge that al-F&rabi is discussing here is not knowledge of 
particular things but rather the essences of things i. e. the knowledge of universals, 
intelligibles or forms (ma'gnlät). 
1 Al-Fdräbi, Risala fi al-'agl, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut, 1983). Al-Färdbi, Risala 
1i al-'a ,_ partially translated into English by Arthur Hyman, entitled, Al-Faräbi's Risala ff al-'aql, in Philosophy in the Middle Ages , ed. Arthur Hyman and 
James 
Walsh, (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1973). Al-Färäbi, Risala ft al-'aal, 12. 
Hyman, 215. Al-Färäbi says: 
"Aristotle set down the intellect which he mentioned in the De Anima according to the 
four senses, potential intellect, actual intellect, acquired intellect and Active 
Intelligence". 
See also Introduction to Aristotle, trans by Richard McKeon with general 
introductions and introductions to the particular works, (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1947), De Anima 3.5.430a, pp. 219-220. 
2Risala fi al-'aql, 215. I have taken a number of quotations on al-Färdbi's concept of 
intellect from this treatise, Risala ft al-'agl, because it serves as an excellent summary 
and has an overall structure of a lexicon and thus should be seen as an end product of 
his thought on this matter. 
3A1-F&äbi, Risala ft al-'agl 12. Hyman. 215. 
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Universals, intelligibles or forms are essences of a thing abstracted from their 
matter. He describes universals, intelligibles or forms as follows: 
But when they become intelligibles in actuality, then their existence 
insofar as they are intelligibles in actuality is not the same as their 
existence insofar as they are forms in matter. .... Now, their existence 
in themselves (as forms in matters) follows the rest of that which is 
joined to them, namely, sometimes place, sometimes time, sometimes 
position, at times quantity, at times being qualified by corporeal 
qualities, at times acting and at times undergoing action. But when 
these forms become intelligibles in actuality, many of those other 
categories are removed from them , so that their existence 
becomes 
another existence, different from this existence. I 
How does the potential intellect acquire these intelligibles? For the potential 
intellect to acquire these intelligibles, and thus be actualised, it requires an outside 
external factor, the Active Intelligence (a! -'aql al-fa'al). The Active Intelligence 
(which according to Muslim philosophers is the last and lowest of the series of tent 
intelligences3 emanating from God) sends out light which transforms the images of 
sensible(particulars) things, stored up in man's imaginative faculty, it(Active 
Intelligence) abstracts them (the particulars) and transforms them (the particulars) 
into intelligibles or universals. 4 
1A1-Färäbi, Risala fl al-'agl. 16-7. Hyman. 216 However , there are also 
forms 
which were never in matter Here, he is referring to the First Cause(God) and the 
whole hierarchy of separate intelligibles. He says in this book: 
" But if there exist things which are forms which have no matter, it is not at all 
necessary that this essence[the intellect in potentiality] abstracts them from matters, 
but it encounters them as abstracted and thinks them just as it encounters itself". 
Al-Fdr-dbi, Risala f1 al-'agl. 20. Hyman. 217. 
2The reason why there are ten intelligences has to do with the number of planets in 
the solar system. We must understand that people in al-Färäbi's time had no 
conception of centrifugal force nor gravity. So, they assumed these planets are living 
being which have rational souls. Herbert Davidson in his book , Alfarabi. 
Avicenna. 
and Averroes on Intellect. ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 45-6 . He says: " The universe envisioned by al-Färäbi is fashioned of Aristotelian bricks and of 
mortar borrowed from Neoplatonic philosophy. Aristotle, who of course had no 
notion of cetripital or centrifugal force, had pictured the universe in which the 
heavenly bodies are continually borne around a stationary earth by rotating spheres. 
And he had concluded that the unceasing movements of the celestial spheres must 
depend on the inexhaustible source of power, and hence upon an incorporeal mover, 
that in fact each distinct circular movement distinguishable or inferable in the heavens 
must be due to a distinct sphere with its own incorporeal mover...... each celestial 
sphere also has a rational soul, and the continual motion proper to each sphere is an 
expression of that desire that the sphere's soul has to emulate the perfection of the 
incorporeal mover. " 
3For an excellent graphic display of these ten intelligences, see Figure 2: Emanation 
and al-Färäbi, in Ian Netton, Allah Transcendent, 116. 
4 A[-Fdndbi on the Perfect State, 200-1. Al-Färdbi says: 
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For al-Fdrdbi, the potential intellect cannot be actualised by its own self. The 
potential intellect requires an actual intellect, the Active Intelligence to transform all the 
potential intellect's efforts to gain images of sensibles and particulars and transform 
these particular images in a miraculous leap into concepts, universalising these 
particulars. Without the assistance of the Active Intelligence the potential intellect 
would never gain true knowledge or be actualised. Al-Färäbi equates the Active 
Intelligence with the malakut and the rvb al-amin (the Trusted Spirit) or the rah al- 
qudus (the Holy Spirit), i. e. the angel of revelation. I Thus, it is ultimately this 
Active Intelligence, the angel which transforms man's knowledge of particular into 
true knowledge, knowledge of universals. 
The forms which flow from the Active Intelligence are to render both the 
sensibles and the potential human intellect 'luminous'. Al-Färabi says: 
When, then, that thing which corresponds to light in the case of sight 
arises in the rational faculty from the Active Intelligence, intelligibles 
arise at the same time in the rational faculty from the sensibles 
preserved in the imaginative faculty ( al-quwwat al-mutakhayyila). 2 
When this happens, the potential intellect thus becomes one with the abstracted 
intelligibles3 and becomes actual i. e. the actual intellect. 
The Active Intelligence actualises the potential intellect in two ways. Firstly, 
the emanations of the Active Intelligence upon the potential intellect provide the 
potential intellect with the first axioms of thought (a1-ma'gvlät al-awwal al- 
mushtaraka), primary knowledge. The result is that the Active Intelligence puts into 
"They are in need of something else which transfers them from potential to a state in 
which (the intellect) can make them actual. The agent which transfers them from 
potentiality to actuality is an existent. Its essence is an actual intellect of a particular 
kind and separate from matter. " 
1A1-Färäbi's The Political Regime (al-Siydsa al-madaniyya), Arabic text, edited with 
Introduction and Notes by Fauzi Najjar, ( Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964). 32. 
2A1-Färabi on the Perfect State. 203. 
3Al-Fdräbi, Risala if al-'agl 14. Hyman, 215. Al-Färdbi uses the example of wax 
to demonstrate the abstraction of essence from matter. He says: 
" That essence is like matter in which forms come to be. Now, if you imagine some 
corporeal matter, for example a piece of wax on which an impression is stamped, and 
that impression and that form comes to be in its surface and its depth and that form get 
possession of all matter so that matter in its complete totality becomes that form 
because the form is spread out in it- then your imagination is close to picturing the 
manner in which the form of things come to be in that essence which is like matter and 
substratum for that form. " 
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the potential intellect the first principles of thought common to all men and given to all 
men. Examples of this primary knowledge are that everyone knows intuitively 
without question or in need of any further examination that the whole is greater than 
its parts, and that things equal in size to one and the same thing are all equal to one 
another. I These kinds of intelligibles are acquired by all individuals without any 
inquiry or prior desire to know them. In fact, individuals are unaware of how and 
when these intelligibles come to exist in their intellect. 
Secondly, this emanation of the Active Intelligence gives secondary truths 
which are deduced from the primary, the knowledge of the middle term of a 
syllogism and the universal concepts. This is done by transforming the perceptions 
stored up in the imaginative faculty into principles. Al-Färäbi says: 
In giving [these perfections] to man, the Active Intelligence 
follows a course similar to that followed by the celestial 
bodies. First, it gives him a faculty (quwwa) and a principle 
(al-mabda') with which, of his own accord, he seeks, or is 
able to seek, the remaining perfections. That principle consists 
of the primary knowledge (a! -'ulvm al-awwal) and the first intelligibles (al-ma'giWit al-awwai)) present in the rational 
part of the soul; but it gives him this kind of knowledge and 
those intelligibles only after man; (a) first develops the 
sensitive part of the soul and the appetitive part, which gives 
rise to the desire and aversion that adheres to the sensitive 
part..... (b) Next, there has to develop the imaginative part of 
the soul, and the desire that adheres to it..... After these two 
wills develop, it becomes possible for the primary knowledge 
that emanates from the Active Intelligence to the rational part to 
take place. At this point a third kind of will develops in man- 
the desire that follows from intellecting-which is specifically 
call "choice" (ikhtiyär). This pertains specifically to man, 
exclusive of all other animals. By virtue of it , man is able to do either what is commendable or blameable, noble or base; 
and because of it there are reward and punishment. 2 
After man has developed the sensitive, appetitive and imaginative part of his soul, 
man will be able to utilise the primary knowledge (al-'ulüm al-awwal) and the first 
intelligibles (al-ma'qülät al-awwal) present in the rational part of the soul bestowed 
by the Active Intelligence and he seeks or is able to seek the perfection of this faculty, 
1Al-F5räbi on the Perfect State. 202-3. 
2A1-F5räbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyisa al-madaniya). 71-2. Mahdi. 33-4. 
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the rational faculty and principles stored in it. The result of the activities is that the 
Active Intelligence bestows upon man these principles which consist of the 
principles of mathematical sciences, principles of ethics or practical reason and the 
principles of physics and metaphysics. Al-Färäbi explains the results of the process 
as follows: 
The first common intelligibles (al-ma'gnlät al-awwal al-mushtaraka) 
are of three kinds, (a) the principles of productive skills (awä'il al- 
mihan al-'amaliyya) [principles of mathematical sciences], (b) the 
principles by which one becomes aware of good (al jamil) and evil 
(al-gabib) in man's actions[principles of ethics], (c) the principles 
which are used for knowing the existence which are not the objects of 
man's actions, and their primary principles and ranks(principles of 
physics and metaphysics): such as the heavens and the first cause(al- 
sabab al-awwal) and the other principles (sä'ir al-mabädi') and what 
happens to come to be out of those primary principles. I 
Al-Färäbi does not mean to say here that the Active Intelligence bestows all these 
principles on the potential intellect at the outset or at one time. Rather, the Active 
Intelligence provides general principles at the start, and then consequently provides 
the principles of the individual science to men at the appropriate time when a man has 
prepared himself and is capable of receiving it. 2 Unlike the first principles of thought 
which are given by the Active Intelligence to all men, these principles of mathematical 
science, principles of ethics or practical reason and the principles of physics and 
metaphysics must be deliberately sought out by man. These principles arise in man's 
intellect only as a result of man's inquiry and experiences which are stored up as 
sensibles in man's imaginative faculty which man obtained through his own initiative 
by hard work and effort and are then transformed by the Active Intelligence. 
Al-Fdräbi defines the actual intellect as the transformed potential intellect and 
the actual intelligibles which become the content of the actual intellect as the 
transformed potential intelligibles. He says: 
1A1-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 202-5. 
2A1-Fitäbi's The Political Regime al-Siyäsa al-madaniyya). 71-2. Mahdi. 33-4 
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And as long as there is not within it any forms of existing things, it is 
potential intellect. However, when there come to be in it forms of 
existing things,...... then that essence becomes actual intellect. This is 
the meaning of actual intellect. And where there comes to be in it the 
intelligibles it abstracts from the matters, then those intelligibles 
become intelligibles in actuality. Before they were abstracted from 
their matters, they were intelligibles in potentiality, but when they were 
abstracted they became intelligibles in actuality, because they became 
form for that essence. I 
When this happens, the potential intellect thus becomes one with the abstracted 
intelligibles and becomes actual. Before the potential intellect and the potential 
intelligibles become actual, their existence was in matter, not separate, but once 
actualised they take on a new career as a separate entity. 2 
The actual intellect, however, will remain partially a potential intellect until it 
has in it all the intelligibles and is in no need of thinking of existing things outside 
itself. Al-Färabi says: 
Now, it is in the nature of all existing things that they can be thought 
and that they can become forms for that essence (potential intellect). 
Since this is the case, it is not impossible that the intelligibles insofar 
as they are intelligibles in actuality, and this is the actual intellect, can 
be thought. And that which is thought is then nothing but that which 
is in actuality an intellect. However, that which is in actuality an 
intellect because some intelligibles has become a form for it, is only an 
intellect in actuality in relation to that form, but it can be an intellect in 
potentiality in relationship to some other intelligibles which has not yet 
come to it in actualty. 3 
However, al-Färäbi argues that every intelligible thing can be thought by the 
actual intellect by receiving its form, and ultimately the actual intellect can acquire all 
the intelligibles until all the intelligibles are within it and it requires to contemplate 
nothing outside itself4. He says: 
lAl-Fdriibi, Risala ft al-'ac 1,15. Hyman. 215-6.. 
2A1-Far ibi, Risala ft al-'aql. 18 Hyman. 216. He says: 
When ( the intelligibles) become intelligibles in actuality, they become, then, one of 
the thing existing in the world, and they are counted insofar as they are intelligibles, 
among the totality of existing things. " 
3AI-Färäbi, Risala fi al-'agl. 18. Hyman. 216. 
4Herbert Davidson in his book , Alfarabi. Avicenna. and Averroes on Intellect. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 49. Herbert Davidson attributes this 
confidence that man can know everything to medieval mentality. Davidson says: 
"To gain all possible thoughts is no small enterprise for a man of flesh and blood, the 
medieval intellectual universe, like the medieval physical universe, was finite, and al- 
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And when it becomes an intellect in actuality in relation to all 
intelligibles and it becomes one of the existing things because it 
became the intelligibles in actuality, then, when it thinks that existent 
thing which is an intellect in actuality, it does not think an existenting 
thing outside of itself [ or: its essence ] but it is only thinking of itself 
[or: its essence ]. It is clear that if the intellect thinks itself [ or: its 
essence ], insofar as itself [ or: its essence ] is an intellect in actuality, 
there does not come to it from that which it thinks of itself [ or: its 
essence ], some existing thing whose existence in respect to itself [ or. 
its essence ] is different from its existence, namely as an intelligible in 
actuality; but it thinks of itself [ or: its essence ], some existing thing 
whose existence namely as an intelligible, is its existence in itself [ or: 
its essence ]. 1 
He argues here that not only can the actual intellect ultimately became self contained, 
i. e. all the intelligibles exist within it, but also that it becomes self intellective because 
when it thinks anything, it is thinking of itself. When the intellect becomes both self 
intelligible and self intellective, it becomes a form of forms and it becomes in al- 
Färäbi's terminology an acquired intellect ('aql mustafäd )2 . 
For al-Färäbi the acquired intellect is the developed and final form of the 
human intellect . Al-Färäbi in discussing the hierarchy of the human intellect, states 
that the highest form of the human intellect is the acquired intellect, the actual intellect, 
and the lowest is the potential intellect. He says: 
However, these forms can only be perfectly thought after all 
intelligibles or most of them have become thought in actuality, and the 
acquired intellect has come into being. Now, the acquired intellect is 
like a form for the intellect which is in actuality, and the intellect in 
actuality is like substratum and matter for the acquired intellect, and the 
intellect in actuality is like a form for that essence [the intellect in 
potentiality] and that essence is like matter. With that the forms begin 
to descend to the corporeal, material form, while before this they 
ascended little by little until they were separated from matter one after 
another little by little. 3 
After establishing the acquired intellect as the highest point of development of 
human intellect, al-Färäbi goes on to compare the acquired intellect with the Active 
Färabi here assumed that the wholly comprehensive knowledge does lie within man's 
power". 
'Al-Fazdbi, Risala fit al-'agl. 18-9. Hyman. 216-7. 
2A1-F&äbi, Risala fi al-'agl 19-20. Hyman. 217. 
3A1-Färäbi. Risala fit al-'agl. 22. Hyman. 217 
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Intelligence since both are form of forms because they both are self intellective and 
self intelligible. He defines the Active Intelligence as: 
The Active Intelligence which Aristotle mentioned in the third treatise 
of the De Anima is a separated form which never existed in matter nor 
will ever exist in it, and it is in a certain manner an intellect in actuality 
close in likeness to the acquired intellect. And the Active Intelligence 
is the principle which makes that essence which was an intellect in 
potentiality, an intellect in actuality and which makes the intelligibles in 
potentiality, intelligibles in actuality. I 
After stating that the Active Intelligence is the principle or agent which 
actualises the human intellect, al-Färdbi argues that the Active Intelligence is higher in 
rank than the acquired intellect not only because it is the principle which actualises the 
potential intellect into the acquired intellect and therefore logically must exist prior to 
the acquired intellect, but also because it contains intelligibles in a simple way (basit) 
and not as a plurality. 2 He argues the Active Intelligence thinks in the opposite 
manner to the human intellect because the Active Intelligence thinks from the most 
perfect existing things. He says, 
Therefore, it is necessary that the order of existing things in the 
intellect in actuality is the opposite of that which is in the Active 
Intelligence (al- `aql al-fa'a). And the Active Intelligence thinks first 
the most perfect of existing things,. The forms which here are in 
matter are in the Active Intelligence abstract forms, but not such that 
they first existed in matter and then were abstracted, but those forms 
never cease in its actuality. And it[the Active Intelligence] is imitated 
in the realm of first matter and of other matters, because they [the 
matter] were given in actuality the forms which are in the Active 
Intelligence. 3 
In addition, the Active Intelligence also thinks in a holistic manner and is able 
to grasp the relationship of everything to each other rather the manner the acquired 
1Al-Färabi, Risala fi al-'a 24. Hyman. 218. 
2A1-Fdräbi, Risala 11 al-'aal 29. Hyman. 219. It must be noted that in Greek 
philosophy, simple has a very positive implication rather than in modern times where 
simple means unsophisticated and naive. Simple in this context is understood as the 
ability to see everything as interelated, integral and as a whole, rather than in a fragmented and disassociated manner. 
3A1-Färäbi, Risala fi al-'aal. 28-9. Hyman. 219 
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intellect must think which is in a piecemeal manner. Al-Färabi explains the manner in 
which the Active Intelligence thinks as follows: 
In the Active Intelligence, forms are indivisible, while in the first 
matter they were divisible. And it cannot be denied that the Active 
Intelligence which is indivisible or whose essence consists of things 
which are indivisible gives matter a likeness of that which is in its 
substance, but [matter] does not receive it except as divided. I 
The main differences between the Active Intelligence and the acquired intellect 
then are four. 1. the Active Intelligence is prior in existence to the acquired intellect; 
2. the Active Intelligence actualises the acquired intellect; 3. the manner of thinking of 
the Active Intelligence is opposite the acquired intellect; 4. the Active Intelligence 
thinks in a simple holistic manner while the acquired intellect thinks in a piece meal 
manner. Thus the Active Intelligence is always a separate entity from the acquired 
intellect. 
The task and function of the Active Intelligence is to seek out to rational 
animals and transform them to reach the highest level of perfection that man is able to 
reach. 2 But how does this Active Intelligence seek out this rational animal to 
enlighten? Does the Active Intelligence enlighten everyone or is it selective in who it 
enlightens? 
In order to understand how the Active Intelligence enlightens man, we must 
recall our discussion on the potential intellect which exists in all men. 3 According to 
al-Färäbi, the potential intellect which exists in all men is only capable of obtaining 
knowledge of particulars obtained from its senses and then stored up in its imaginative 
faculty. The task of the Active Intelligence is to use the knowledge of particulars 
stored up in each man and transform it into knowledge of universals. It must be 
emphasised here that without the help of the Active Intelligence, man can only have 
knowledge of particulars which is not really knowledge, because al-Färäbi following 
1A1-Färdbi, Risala fi al-'aat 28-9. Hyman. 219 
2A1-Fär5bi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al Madaniya). 32. 
3See above, 13-15. 
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Plato', states that particular objects are constantly changing or in the state of flux and 
therefore no one can know a particular object because the object is never the same. 
Thus, to have knowledge of a particular is to have no knowledge at all. Without the 
Active Intelligence, man can only have knowledge of the particulars and thus 
inevitably man has no knowledge at all. 
Is the Active Intelligence selective about which man it enlightens and to whom 
it gives knowledge? Al-Färabi answers a firm negative. According to al-Färabi, the 
Active Intelligence enlightens anyone and everyone who is in tune with it. The Active 
Intelligence transforms the particulars stored up in man's imaginative faculty and 
changes them into universals. Al-Färäbi uses the example of wax which serves as 
the potential intellect which is then moulded by the Active Intelligence into a shape, 
thus transforming the unmoulded wax into a form. To use a rather modern example 
given by Ralph Learner in one of his class lectures at the University of Chicago on al- 
Färäbi, he states that the Active Intelligence acts like a radio station which is 
broadcasting its radio waves to all. But only the few who are tuned to the right 
frequency will receive its broadcast. Thus it depends on the individual to be prepared 
to receive this information. Like the radio station, the Active Intelligence is constantly 
illuminating intellects which are tuned to it and not a selective group of people but 
rather anyone prepared to be enlightened. 
It is important to note here that by using the emanation theory of the Active 
Intelligence2 which is responsible for enlightening the human intellect ,I think al- 
Fdräbi was trying to integrate the Greek conception of God as mind with the Islamic 
'Francis M. Conford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (1he Theaetetus and the Sophist 
of Plato), ( New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company Inc., 1957), 202-248. See also 
Book V of the Plato's Republic. 
2 Fazlur Rahman explains the conscious choice the Muslim philosophers made to 
adopt this concept of Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation rather than Aristotelian 
concept of God was because it was more in line with their understanding of God . He says: 
"In the making of this doctrine of emanation, it (the Muslim philosophers) sought the 
help of the monistic Neo-platonic doctrine of emanation and discarded the Aristotelian 
theory of dualism between God and matter. Matter, therefore, 'instead of being an 
existence per se independent of God, was derived ultimately from God at the end of 
the emanation process. " 
Fazlur Rahman, Islam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 118. 
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concept of God as creator, caretaker and provider of His creation. In Greek 
philosophy, the conception of perfections is that there must be no change2, because 
there must be some reason for change. If something was perfect, why would it then 
change ? If it were to change, than it would mean that it was changing from one 
perfection to another perfection and that is illogical. Thus Aristotle's God3 which is 
pure perfection never changes and therefore never does any activity except think of 
itself. Because Aristotle's God never does any other activity except think of itself, 
even to the extent that it does not know of anything except itself, it does not create 
anything and thus is totally passive with regard to everything outside itself. 
However, Aristotle's God indirectly causes all change by influencing uncreated 
eternal matter to change itself by trying to imitate the beauty and perfection of God. 
God, then indirectly is the cause of all change and all movement but He Himself does 
not change nor move. Thus from this we obtain Aristotle's idea of God as the 
Unmoved Mover. This conception of Aristotle's God, which does not do any activity 
other than think of itself and does not create, is totally unacceptable to the Quranic 
concept of a God4 which is not only omniscient but also active through creating, 
being compassionate and caring, having power, will, speech, hearing and seeing. 
Thus, as I see it, in order to solve this inherited Greek problem of perfection 
meaning not changing, and thus positing God as inactive, with the Quranic concept of 
an action oriented God, al-Färäbi accepted the theory of emanation. This emanation 
theory makes God ultimately responsible for everything that happens through the 
activities of the Active Intelligence which God indirectly created through His 
emanation. However, because it remains the activity of the Active Intelligence that 
does all this activity, God remains unchanged and thus perfect. 
1H. P. Owen, "Perfection" in Encylopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, (New 
York, 1972), vol. 5-6', 87. 
2Milic Capek, "Change" in Encylopedia of Philosophv, ed. Paul Edwards, (New York, 
1972), vol. 1,75-6. 
3Richard McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle, (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), 
238-297. 
4Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Our'än. (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca 
Islamica, 1980), chapter I. 
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Al-Fdrabi's epistemology is based upon the theory of emanation with its main 
players the Active Intelligence and the recipient the human intellect. By putting forth 
this theory of epistemology, al-Fdrdbi has egalitarianised the acquisition of knowledge 
because the Active Intelligence enlightens anyone and everyone who is prepared to 
receive its illumination. Thus, anyone who struggles hard is able to better 
himself/herself and acquire this highest degree of knowledge. We can deduce that for 
al-Färäbi, anyone can reach the highest form of human perfect, i. e. intellectual 
perfection which is the acquired intellect. 
Revelation the Transmission of Revelation . Prophets and Prophecy 
(1) Revelation Defined 
From al-FRäbi's doctrine of the intellect, we can surmise that for al-Färäbi the 
soul obtains real knowledge from looking up, i. e. to the Active Intelligence, and not 
from looking down, i. e. to the natural world. It is the Active Intelligence which 
actualises man's potential intellect through providing it firstly with the first principles 
of thought i. e. the axioms and secondly by transforming the perceptions stored in the 
imaginative faculty into principles i. e. principles of science, principles of ethics or 
practical reason, and the principles of physics and metaphysics. 
The first principles of thought are given to all men except idiots at the outset or 
all at one time. However, the second principles are only obtained through the 
enlightenment of the emanation of the Active Intelligence after man deliberately seeks 
it out through his/her own initiative. Thus for al-Fdräbi, all of man's knowledge is 
obtained through the assistance of the Active Intelligence. Therefore, in a way, for al- 
Färäbi, all human knowledge is of divine origin via the Active Intelligence. We 
would be correct to make this radical conclusion that for al-Färdbi, all human 
knowledge is obtained from God via the Active Intelligence, i. e. the Archangel of 
divine revelation, and thus using the jargon of religion, revealed. Thus, for al- 
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Färäbi, all human knowledge in a way is revealed to him/her. The intellectual link to 
the divine is the predominating factor in human knowledge. 
Although all human knowledge in a way is revealed to man, al-Färdbi does 
distinguish knowledge revealed to all men and knowledge revealed through prophets 
i. e. revelation. What is the content of this knowledge revealed through prophets? The 
questions that need to be raised concerning the content of revelation are: 1. What is the 
content of revelation?; 2. What kind of knowledge or information does it give us? 
Does it give us new knowledge or information that we never knew before? Is the 
knowledge or information that it gives all new or only some of it new and the rest we 
already know and thus it serves only as a reminder?; 3. What is the value of the 
knowledge that revelation gives us? Is the knowledge or information that revelation 
gives us already known? Or can it be known to us by ourselves and revelation is a 
strong reminder for man of what is expected of him/her and his/her future? 
Al-Färäbi answers the first question raised above concerning the content of 
revelation by arguing that the content of revelation consists of both theoretical and 
practical knowledge. Al-Fä bi says: 
The virtuous religion (al-milla al-fädila) is similar to philosophy in 
that both possess theoretical (nazariyya) as well as practical parts 
('amaliyya). Theoretical and speculative refer to that which cannot be 
performed even when a man knows it, while practical refers to that 
which, once known, a man may do. The practical part of religion 
consists of those(actions) whose universal (rules) are found in 
practical philosophy. That is to say, what religion (al-milla) 
possesses of practical matters consists of the universals (al-kulliyyät), 
qualified in a certain manner......... Consequently, all virtuous laws 
(al-sharäi' al-fädila) ( [because they are qualified] are subsumed 
under the universals of practical philosophy (al-falsafa al-amaliyya). 
The theoretical opinions of religion are demonstrated in theoretical 
philosophy (al-falsafa al-nazariyya) though they remained 
undemonstrated /(bi !ä barähin) in religion. Thus, both parts of 
religion are subsumed under philosophy. Something is said to be part 
of, or subsumed under a science in two possible manners: either that 
which is adopted without proof is demonstrated in that science, or its 
particulars are given an underpinning by the universal axiom 
possessed by that science. Accordingly practical philosophy provides 
the underpinnings for the conditions by which (a religion's) actions 
are determined, taking into account the things legislated and the end 
sought by these. Further, this part of philosophy supplies proofs for 
the theoretical part of religion insofar as these are susceptible of 
demonstrative knowledge. The theoretical part of philosophy provides 
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proofs for the theoretical part of religion. Philosophy can be seen to 
offer proofs for that which a virtuous religion includes. t 
Thus, we can conclude that the content of revelation for al-Färäbi consists of both 
theory and practical action. The theoretical part refers to that which cannot be 
performed even when a man knows it. The theoretical part of religion using religious 
terminology is beliefs. In religious terminology, the foundational beliefs in the six 
pillars of Islamic faith (arkaa al-imän). 2 The result of this faith is practical action. On 
the other hand, the practical action refers to that which, once known, a man may do 
or act upon. These practical actions using religious jargon are embodied and 
prescribed in the Islamic shad 'a. 
Al-Färäbi answers question two about what kinds of knowledge or 
information revelation gives us by arguing that the theoretical opinions of religion are 
demonstrated in theoretical philosophy, although the reasons are undemonstrated in 
religion. And for practical part of religion, these are particular actions whose 
universal rules are found in practical philosophy. Thus for al-Färdbi, both the 
theoretical and practical knowledge, i. e. all the knowledge revealed through the 
prophets, can ultimately be known through philosophical endeavours. It must be 
emphasised that for al-Färdbi, truth can be known with certainty either independently 
through primary knowledge or logical demonstration. Al-Färabi says: 
The opinions prescribed in a virtuous religion will either be true (al- 
hagq) or will resemble truth (mithal al-hagq). Truth is entirely that which one knows with certainty either independently through primary 
knowledge or through (logical) demonstration (baräbin) Therefore, 
those religion whose opinion include neither that which may be 
certainly known, nor the likeness of things which may be so known 
are religions of error. 3 
lal-Fdrdbi. Kitdb al-millah wa nusils ukhrä, ed. M. Mahdi, 47-8.. 
2The six pillars of Islam belief are; Belief in God, the Angels, Revealed Books, 
Prophets, Day of Jugement and the Divine decree (Qadr) in good and evil. For further 
information, see, Ibn IIajar al-`Asgaläni , Fath al-bäri bi-sharh sahih al-Bukhari ed. Muhibb at-Din al-Khatib Vol . 
1. (Cairo, 1986), Chapter Two: The Book of Faith . 60- 169. 
3A1-Färdbi, Kitäb al-millah wa nusns ukhrä, 46. 
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Thus for al-Färäbi, the truth of revelation revealed through the prophets can be 
verified either through primary knowledge or logical demonstration. 
Since, for al-Fdräbi, the knowledge revealed through revelation can be 
ultimately be known through the efforts of philosophy, does this mean that for al- 
Färäbi, revelation revealed through prophets has little or no value at all? In dealing 
with question three, al-Fdräbi answers that revelation revealed through prophets has a 
real and true value. By answering the question on the true value of revelation revealed 
through prophets, he answers questions three to five raised above. Al-Färäbi argues 
the value of revelation revealed through prophets by pointing to three factors: 1. a 
form of God's guidance in educating man; 2. revelation's ability to convey truths to 
all levels of mankind; 3. revelation's ability to motivate man to action. 
It must be remembered that, for al-Färdbi, in a way all knowledge is 'revealed 
' to man, whether it be a specially chosen individual, i. e. prophets or ordinary men. 
It is God, who illuminates, enlightens and thus educates all men through the activities 
of the Active Intelligence, i. e. the Angel of Revelation. Therefore, for al-Färäbi, 
revelation revealed through prophets should be seen as a form of God's guidance in 
educating man. 
This revelation, seen as a form of God's guidance in educating man, is the 
true value of revelation revealed through prophets. The knowledge given by 
revelation can ultimately be obtained through the efforts of philosophy because truth is 
one and indivisible. However, this philosophical endeavour requires a very long and 
arduous endeavour and only very few individuals can finally reach this very high level 
of understanding. For example, one can relatively easily understand a scientific 
principle after it has been explained to one, even to the extent that one wonders why 
one has never thought of it before, but it is extremely difficult, next to impossible, to 
discover these scientific principles by oneself. Thus, revelation enables one to easily 
accept what revelation prescribed as good and evil acts and how one should live a 
good life, rather than oneself discovering, creating and inventing this understanding 
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and actions by oneself. This is because one can understand the rationale underlying 
the prescriptions of revelation. 
More importantly, the knowledge given by revelation uses symbols to convey 
its truths. By using symbols, revelation achieves two major objectives. Firstly, it is 
able to convey its truths to everyone with varying levels of intellectual capacity and 
ability. Thus, revelation is able to convey its message to everyone at some level of 
understanding. 
Secondly, it is able to motivate people to action. This is because unlike 
intellectual truths, which one can only be arrived at through intellectual endeavours, 
about what one ought to do and not to do, i. e. the concept of right and wrong, 
revelation impels man to action. How does revelation achieve this? After a long 
strenuous process of intellectual endeavour, one can arrive at the conclusion that if 
one pursues the moral good, it will be beneficial for the mind, freeing it to attain 
spiritual freedom and ultimately bliss. Instead, for example, revelation compels man 
to action by telling man of the physical rewards and punishments man will receive for 
his action both in this life and in the after-life. 
Transmission of Revelation: How Revelation is Received? 
The many different levels of knowledge among men, however, call for a 
distinction among the levels of 'revelation'. In one sense, all that man knows is 
revealed by the divine, God, through the activities of the Active Intelligence and thus, 
in a way, a 'revelation'. However, it is clear that for al-Fdräbi, there is a distinction 
between the 'revelation' that is revealed to all men and enlightens them and gives 
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them knowledge and the revelation that is revealed through a specific person, i. e. a 
prophet in a revealed text such as the Qur'än. AI-Färrabi attributes this difference of 
the levels of revelation as being due to the faculties of the soul existing in individual 
men, i. e. the imaginative faculty and the rational faculty. 
The emanation from the Active Intelligence can pass beyond the rational 
faculty into the human imaginative faculty. This will result in the imaginative faculty 
manipulating this knowledge obtained from its own rational faculty a the result of the 
emanation of the Active Intelligence into symbols. The imaginative faculty is a 
faculty of the soul serving the rational faculty. The function of the imaginative faculty 
are three, retentive, compositive and in a manner creative. Firstly, it is retentive 
because it stores the sense perceptions (maiisusät) or the impressions of the objects 
when they are no longer in sight'. Secondly, it is compositive because it manipulates 
the sense perceptions retained in it , separating them or combining them into figures 
that may or may not exist in reality such as a unicorn or a golden mountain. 2 Thirdly, 
it is in a manner creative or a reproductive imitation because it can create figurative 
images (muhakät) that symbolise rather than strictly represent a given object. For 
example, when one is asleep, it is the activity of the imaginative faculty that creates 
dreams. If, for example, while one is asleep, the body becomes wet, the imaginative 
faculty may be led to create a dream concerning water or swimming? 
The result of the emanation of the Active Intelligence through the rational 
faculty to the 'adjoining' imaginative faculty is at two levels . The two levels are the 
result of the nature of the rational faculty which has both a theoretical and practical 
character, thus, the knowledge imparted by the Active Intelligence through the rational 
faculty, acts upon the 'adjoining' imaginative faculty in a twofold manner as well. 
Al-Färabi says: 
Since it has been made clear that the Active Intelligence is the cause of 
the potential intelligibles becoming actual and of the potential intellect 
1 A1-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 168-9. 
2 Al-F&rabi on the Perfect State: 168-9. 
3A1-Färäbi on the Perfect State: 212-3. 
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becoming actual; and that it is the rational faculty which is made to 
become actually intellect; and that there are two forms (species) of the 
rational faculty, theoretical and practical, and that the function of 
practical reason is to direct action towards present and future 
particulars, and that of theoretical reason to become aware of the 
intelligibles which cannot be translated into action; and since the 
faculty of representation is closely connected with the two 
forms(species) of the rational faculty-for what the rational faculty 
obtains from the Active Intelligence ( which is to it as light is to sight) 
emanates sometimes from the Active Intelligence to the faculty of 
representation(imaginative faculty)-it follows that the Active 
Intelligence acts in some way upon the faculty of 
representation(imaginative faculty) as well, by providing it sometimes 
with the intelligibles whose proper place is in the theoretical reason and 
sometimes with particulars in the form of sensibles whose proper place 
is in practical reason. I 
The knowledge obtained from the Active Intelligence has either a theoretical or 
practical content. 
The knowledge, imparted by the Active Intelligence to the imaginative faculty 
which has a theoretical content, consists of metaphysical truths. When the 
imaginative faculty receives theoretical knowledge, it must recast this knowledge into 
figurative images. This is because the imaginative faculty is a physical faculty, 
capable only of handling physical impressions, and thus unable to receive theoretical 
truths in pure abstract form. Al-Färäbi explains this process, which the 
imaginative faculty takes in transforming the theoretical truth into figurative images, 
by saying: 
The faculty of representation(imaginative faculty) also imitates the 
rational faculty by imitating those intelligibles which are present in it 
with things suitable for imitating them. It thus imitates the intelligibles 
of utmost perfection, like the First Cause, the immaterial things and the 
heavens, with the most excellent and most perfect sensibles, like 
things beautiful to look at; and the defective intelligibles with the most 
inferior and defective sensibles like things ugly to look at. 2 
The imaginative faculty tries to imitate the knowledge given to it with the thing most 
suitable for imitating them. This theoretical knowledge obtained by the imaginative 
faculty is the higher of the two levels of knowledge received from the Active 
I A1-F5räbi on the Perfect State. 218-221. 
2A1-Färäbi on the Perfect State: 218-9. 
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Intelligence via the rational faculty. This higher level is exclusive to the fortunate 
man who has developed his/her intellect to the highest stage, the acquired intellect. I 
The knowledge imparted by the Active Intelligence to the imaginative faculty 
which has a practical content consists in sense perception of a certain kind. They are 
'particulars' that relate to events in the present or future and are related to the practical 
side of reasoning, the performance of deliberation. The imaginative faculty here 
visualises the events occurring at a distance and foresees future events. These events 
appear to it as they were being perceived by the sense organs, although in actuality 
they are beyond the perception of the sense organ. Davidson explains this process 
that the imaginative faculty undergoes by saying: 
Under the influence of the Active Intelligence , present and future 
events sometimes show themselves to the imaginative faculty "as they 
are"; the imagination perceives an event at a distance or a future event 
in the exact shape it has or will have when it occurs. Alternatively, 
events may be recast by the imagination in figurative images. 2 
The imaginative faculty recasts all knowledge that it receives through the rational 
faculty into figurative images. 
The lower of the two levels of knowledge which the imaginative faculty 
receives from the Active Intelligence which has the practical content, is received by all 
men, even those who have not perfected their rational faculty. Al-Färäbi labels this 
level specifically as 'prophecy' (nubuwwa). Al-Färäbi, explaining the impact of the 
emanation of the Active Intelligence upon imaginative faculty says: 
It is not impossible, then, that when a man's faculty of representation 
(imaginative faculty) reaches its utmost perfection, he will receive in 
waking life, from the Active Intelligence, present and future 
particulars of their imitation in the form of sensibles, and that he 
receives the imitations of the transcendent intelligibles and the other 
glorious existents and sees them. This man will obtain through the 
particulars which he receives 'prophecy (supernatural awareness) of 
the present and future events, and through the intelligibles which he 
receives prophecy of things divine, This is the highest rank of 
ID. M. Dunlop ed., A1-Färäbi's Fusül al-madani '(Aphorisms of a Statesman), (Cambridge, University Press, 1961). 74. 
2 Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi. Avicenna. and Averroes on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) . 59 
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perfection which the faculty of representation (imaginative faculty) can 
reach. I 
Al-Färäbi relegating the term 'pro phecy'(nubuwwa) for the lower of the two levels of 
the result of the emanation of the Active Intelligence upon man needs some 
explanation, especially since in his book, Mabädi' ärä' ahl al-madina al-fädila, 
usually avoids the use of key Islamic terms, opting rather for more universal terms 
applicable to all religions. Al-Fdräbi throughout the first fourteen chapters of this 
book avoids such terms as 'nubuwwa'. The first reference to the term 'nubuwwa' is 
in chapter fourteen. Two possible explanations can be given as to why al-Fdräbi uses 
the term 'nub uwwa' here. The first explanation put forth by Walzer is that it is a 
denigration of a fundamental tenet of Islam by reducing visionary prophecy to the 
second rank of human perfection and making it dependent on philosophical reason'. 2 
On this point, I cannot agree with Walzer. Al-Färäbi considers that all knowledge 
ultimately comes from God and that the individual prophets are individuals with the 
highest degree of perfection of both their imaginative faculty and rational faculty3, 
thus making them unique and extremely rare individuals, therefore, al-Faz bi does not 
in any way undermine the integrity of prophecy. It is clear that an idiot cannot 
became a prophet. Therefore, prophecy should be seen as the culmination of the 
perfection of the intellect and imaginative faculty and the intellect's ability to 
transform this knowledge utilising the naturally fully developed imaginative faculty 
into symbols for all to understand. The second possible explanation for this which I 
feel is far more plausible is that al-Färäbi was using this term 'nubuwwa' in a more 
general manner and thus applying it to any form of symbolisation. 
I A. 1-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 224-5. 
2Al-Fdr5bi on the Perfect State. 440. 
3Al-Färäbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madaniyya). 49. 
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Prophets: The Medium of Revelation. 
Al-Färabi makes a clear distinction between the 'revelation' that is revealed to 
all men and enlightens them and gives them knowledge and the revelation that is 
revealed through a specific person i. e. a prophet in a revealed text such as the Qur'an. 
Al-Fdräbi explains that this difference of the revelation to the prophet is due to the 
faculties of the soul existing in the prophet. i. e. the naturally fully developed 
imaginative faculty and the highest degree of development of the rational faculty. 
Revelation to prophets is defined as the union of the highest philosophical knowledge 
with the highest form of representation. I Thus, the prophet must possess an intellect 
developed to the highest stage, the acquired intellect and a fully naturally imaginative 
faculty. This is because the prophet must not only be able to comprehend 
philosophical truths that he receives from the Active Intelligence through its emanation 
to his rational faculty, but also must possess a fully naturally developed imaginative 
faculty, because he must translate these truths into figurative symbols capable of 
leading to action. Al-Färdbi says: 
When this occurs in both parts of his rational faculty, namely the 
theoretical and practical rational faculties, and also in his 
representative(imaginative faculty) then it is this man who receives 
Divine Revelation (yuwahi ilaihi), and God Almighty (Allah `azza 
wajja) grants him Revelation through the mediation of the Active 
Intelligence , so that the emanation from God Almighty to the Active Intelligence is passed through the mediation of the acquired intellect, 
and then to the faculty of representation (imaginative faculty) . Thus he is , through the emanation of the Active Intelligence to his passive intellect, a wise man and philosopher and an accomplished thinker 
who employs an intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation 
from the Active Intelligence to his faculty of representation 
(imaginative faculty) a visionary prophet (nabs): who warns of things 
to come and tells of particular things which exist at present. This man 
holds the most perfect rank of humanity and has reached the highest 
degree of felicity. 2 
Revelation is the auxiliary to the rational faculty and as such an indispensable 
ingredient in man's perfection. Hence, the prophet is an individual endowed with an 
'A1-Faron the Perfect State. 244-245: 
2A1-Färabi on the Perfect State. 244-245. 
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extraordinary rational faculty and a fully naturally developed imaginative faculty 
capable of understanding the highest philosophical truths and able to translate these 
truths through his imaginative faculty into figurative symbols capable of leading 
people to right action. 
The prophet is a person of extraordinary intellect, so endowed that he is able 
to know all things by himself without the help of instructions by an external human 
source. I Although al-Färäbi contends that. the prophet's intellect should go through 
stages of development, preceded by ordinary philosophical thinking, only then does 
revelation come to him. Al-Fäabi says: 
The supreme ruler without qualification is he who does not need 
anyone to rule him in anything whatsoever, but has actually acquired 
the sciences and every kind of knowledge and has no need of a man to 
guide him in anything . 
This is found in the one who possesses great 
and natural dispositions, when his soul is in union with the Active 
Intelligence 
. 
He can only attain this (union with the Active Intelligence 
) by first acquiring the passive intellect and then the intellect called the 
acquired intellect ; for as it is stated in' On the Soul ', union with the 
Active Intelligence results from acquiring the acquired intellect 
..... 
This man is the true prince according to the ancients; he is the one 
of whom it ought to be said that he receives revelation For man 
receives revelation only when he attains this rank, that is, when there 
is no longer an intermediary between him and the Active 
Intelligence...... It is the power that enables man to understand how to 
define things and actions and how to direct them towards happiness, 
which emanates from the Active Intelligence to the passive intellect. 
This emanation that proceeds from the Active Intelligence to the 
passive through the mediation of the acquired intellect is revelation. 2 
From this rather lengthy quotation of al-Färäbi's on the intellectual capacity and 
ability of the prophet, we can deduce four points concerning the prophet's intellectual 
capacity and ability. The four points are: 1. the prophet's mind is endowed with an 
extraordinary intellect: 2. the prophet's intellect does not need an external instructor 
to develop but develops by itself with the aid of the Active Intelligence even though it 
goes through the stages of actualisation that any ordinary intellect passes; 3. at the end 
of this development of the prophet's intellect, he attains contact with the Active 
'Al-Fdribi's The Political Regime al-Siyäsa al-madaniyya). 49-50. Mahdi. 36 
2A1-Färiibi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madanivva). 49-50. Mahdi. 36 
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Intelligence and receives for it revelation1; 4. the Active Intelligence gives him the 
power to understand how to define things and actions and how to direct them towards 
happiness, i. e. the ability to translate abstract truths into figurative symbols able to 
lead to action. Fazlur Rahman, commenting on the intellectual ability of the prophet 
and how and why it is different from other intellects says: 
He (the prophet) already possesses an assurance, so that by the aid of 
the Active Intelligence he can create all knowledge by 
himself...... Again, whereas an ordinary mind cannot know all the 
relations between things since its knowledge is piecemeal, the prophet 
has all the relations at once present in his mind. This is not merely a 
quantitative difference but a qualitative one. The most glaring 
difference will be in the sphere of law and morality, as we shall see. It 
is the prophet alone, who seeing the nature of the whole course of 
history at a glance, is able to create moral values and to embody them 
in legal prescriptions. 2 
In addition to the four points made above concerning the prophet's intellectual ability, 
we can add that the prophet's intellect is unique and different from other intellects 
because of its ability to have knowledge in unity and not in a piecemeal manner. This 
is a very significant difference and essential for him to be able to create moral values 
and to embody them in legal prescriptions. 
The idea that the prophet creates moral values and embodies them in legal 
prescriptions does not mean that the prophet himself consciously writes out the text of 
the revelation as a legislator writes a writ. Rather, revelation, should be seen as the 
impact of the emanation of the Active Intelligence on the prophet's intellect which is 
automatically translated by his imaginative faculty unconsciously without any of his 
own conscious control or interference. Fazlur Rahman says: 
The Muslim philosophical tradition of revelation does not envisage that 
total 'otherness' of the giver of revelation which is characteristic of the 
Semitic tradition. This total 'otherness' was safeguarded by Philo 
who regarded revelation as the suspension or suppression of the 
prophet's self by God or by a divine agent; and he seems to have 
safeguarded it in order to establish the purity of verbal revelation. The 
Muslim philosophers regarded revelation not as a suppression of the 
prophet's personality but as its enlargement, an enlargement which 
'See also, Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy 
in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979) 31. 
2Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam , 68. 
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already lies potentially in the prophet and which when actualised, 
makes him a member of the ideal world. ' 
Basically, the verbal words of revelation are not the production of the direct divine 
agency but rather God supplies the inspiration to the prophets which then the prophet 
himself unconsciously translates into verbal form. 2 The exact words of the verbal 
revelation are neither distorted nor altered through this process. In other words, the 
exact words of the verbal revelation would be exactly the same had God Himself 
uttered it Himself to man directly. 
(4)The Mission of Prophecy: The Purpose of Revelation. 
According to the Muslim philosophers, for example al-Faabi and Ibn Sind, at 
the intellectual level the prophet and the true philosopher of the highest degree are 
identical except the prophet's knowledge is in a unity while the philosopher's 
knowledge is piecemeal. 3 This is not to say that every single philosopher is at the 
same intellectual level of a prophet but, rather the exceptional, outstanding 
philosopher who has reached the highest pinnacle of intellectual excellence and a 
prophet are both equal at the intellectual level. More importantly, however, the 
prophet is distinguished from the others by his ability to receive revelation through 
his strong imaginative faculty. A naturally fully developed representative faculty is 
essential for the prophet. As we discussed above, revelation which is the figurization 
and symbolisation of truths is a function peculiar to the imaginative faculty. Every 
datum, whether it is intellectual or sensible or emotional, is transformed by the 
I Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam . 69. 2 Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam . 73. Fazlur Rahmaa says: " Plutarch returns to this theme again and again, (de. Def. Orac. 9) (says) Certainly, it 
would be foolish and childlish in the extreme to imagine that the God himself, after 
the manner of ventriloquist .... enters into the body of his prophets and prompts their 
utterances, employing their mouths and voices as instruments. " Prophecy in Islam 
73. 
3Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam , 36. 
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imaginative faculty into vivid and potent symbols capable of impelling action. This 
potent symbolisation is essential for the prophet because he must not only know the 
truths but must be able to communicate it to others and move them to action 
We have up to this stage looked at: what revelation is; how revelation is 
transmitted and to whom it is transmitted; i. e. the prophets. However, the most 
important issue is to examine the task or function of revelation, i. e. the mission of 
prophecy. The task or function of revelation, i. e. mission of prophecy, is to lead 
man right action. Fazlur Rahmaa sums up the mission of prophecy by saying: 
A true prophet or a genuine philosopher, merely by virtue of being 
this, cannot remain within the confines of his own personality but 
must go forth to humanity, or to a nation, both with a divinely revealed 
religion and with a law based upon it. He must be able to formulate 
his religious consciousness into a definite pattern of religio-political 
life for people to follow. I 
We can conclude from this that the prophet is not only concerned with the perfection 
of himself and his own happiness, but also with the perfection and happiness of 
others. The prophet achieves his task by the ability to translate religious 
consciousness into a definite pattern of laws for people to follow. In order to achieve 
this, the prophet must not only be a true philosopher of the highest degree with total 
comprehension of theoretical knowledge, but also have the ability to translate these 
theoretical truths into action for people to follow through the promulgation of laws. 
Thus, the prophet must also be a law-giver. 
Al-Färäbi's concept of the perfect philosopher reverberates with this same 
demand made on a prophet, namely that he must transcend the confines of his own 
personality and go forth to humanity, or to a nation, to be a genuine philosopher. 
For al-Faz5bi, a true philosopher must not only possess the theoretical sciences for his 
own benefit but must be able to exploit this knowledge for the benefit of all others in 
accordance with their capacity to receive this knowledge. Al-Färäbi says: 
1Fazlur Rahmar, Prophecy in Islam,, 57. 
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When the theoretical sciences are isolated and their possessor does not 
have the faculty for exploiting them for the benefit of others, they are 
defective philosophy. To be a truly perfect philosopher one has to 
possess both the theoretical sciences and the faculty for exploiting 
them for the benefit of all others according to their capacity. Were 
one to consider the case of the true philosopher, he would find no 
difference between him and the supreme ruler. For he who possesses 
the faculty of exploiting what is comprised by the theoretical matters 
for the benefit of all others possesses the faculty for making such 
matters intelligible as well as bringing into actual existence those of 
them that depend on the will. The greater his power to do the latter, 
the more perfect is his philosophy. I 
Therefore, intellectual perfection is not limited to the perfection of one's own self, but 
must transcend one's limited self. Thus, intellectual perfection includes the ideals of 
missionary zeal and the ability to transform these ideals through the formulation of 
laws. Both of these facets of intellectual perfection are distinct characteristics of a 
prophet. 
Al-Fdräbi, however, adds to these two characteristics of the prophet, an 
intellectual dimension. He says: 
Therefore, if he intends to possess a craft that is authoritative rather 
than subservient, the legislator must be a philosopher. Similarly, if the 
philosopher who has acquired the theoretical virtues does not have the 
capacity for bringing them about in all others according to their 
capacities, then what he has acquired has no validity. Yet, he cannot 
find the states and conditions by which the voluntary intelligibles 
assume actual existence, if he does not possess the deliberative virtue, 
and the deliberative virtue cannot exist in him without the practical 
virtue. It follows that the idea of Imam, Philosopher, Legislator is a 
single idea. However, the name philosopher signifies primarily 
theoretical virtue. But if it be determined that the theoretical virtue 
reach its ultimate perfection in every respect it follows necessarily that 
he must possess all the other faculties as well. Legislator signifies 
excellence of knowledge concerning the conditions of practical 
intelligibles, the faculty of finding them, and the faculty of bring them 
about in nations and cities..... As to the idea of Imam in the Arabic 
language, it signifies merely the one whose example is followed and 
who is well received: that is either his perfection is well received or 
his purpose is well received. 2 
From this passage, we can conclude that, for al-Färäbi, not only must the prophet 
have a superior intellect and the ability to translate philosophical truths into symbols 
1Al-Färäbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda 89-90. Mabdi, 43. 
2A1-F5räbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, 91-2. Mahdi. 46. 
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for everyone to understand but that he must also possess the ability to lead, have the 
will and an ardent desire to lead mankind and transform peoples, i. e. society and 
states. This understanding of al-Färabi that philosophy must benefit not only oneself 
but others through the transformation of society and state is not Platonic but closer to 
the Aristotelian viewpoint and very much in line with the Qur' anic missionary zeal. 
Plato had argued in his magnum opus, The Republic, that philosophers who have 
caught the vision of the good would prefer to remain in their intellectual paradise 
rather than go down and educate others. ' Aristotle instead argues in his 
Nicomachean Ethics that a virtuous individual is an imperfect concept since real 
moral virtue can only be realised in a community2. 
Since, for al-Färäbi, the virtuous individual must influence others, the prophet 
as a virtuous individual must go forth and influence society positively. Men should 
not be left alone to their own opinions concerning how to reach this ultimate 
happiness because they will differ each from the other, every man considering as 
good that which favours him and as evil that which works against his advantage in 
accordance to their differing levels of intellectual capacities. How then does the 
prophet influence and transform society? Since the prophet is an individual who 
'Plato, Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985) Republic VII 519b-d, 751-2, Plato 
says: 
"Well then, said I, is not this also likely and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever 
adequately preside over a state, nor could those who have been permitted to linger on 
to the end in the pursuit of culture-the one because they have no single aim and 
purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the 
others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Island of the Blessed? ..... we must not allow what is not permitted What is that? That they should linger there, I said, and refuse to 
go down again among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether 
they are of less or of greater worth. Do you mean to say that we must do them a 
wrong and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power ?" 2Joachim, H. H. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1952), 1094b. Aristotle says: 
" For even if the good is the same for the individual and the state, the good for the 
state is clearly the greater and more perfect thing to attain and to safeguard. The 
attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is a nobler and more divine. " 
See also, Ernest Baker, The Political thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York, 
1958), 284-292. 
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receives revelation, he is able to comprehend each one of the things that he ought to 
do, how to do them in guiding others, and to determine, define and direct actions 
toward achieving this end, i. e. happiness. The prophet is a man who is able to 
translate his knowledge into a set of beliefs and a socio-political order, i. e. the 
shar! 'a. The prophet is a man able to lead men to right action in order to reach this 
ultimate goal of happiness. Al-Fäabi says: 
This man holds the most perfect rank of humanity and has reached the 
highest degree of felicity. His soul is united as it were with the Active 
Intelligence, in the way stated by us [i. e. a prophet]t He is a man 
who knows every action by which felicity can be reached. This is the 
first condition of being a ruler. Moreover, he should be a good orator 
and able to rouse (other people's) imagination by well chosen words. 
He should be able to lead people well along the right path to felicity 
and to actions by which felicity is reached. 2 
How does the prophet lead men ? In order for the prophet to lead men, he 
must become the ruler. As a ruler, he will establish the laws and thus is also the 
lawgiver. Al-Färdbi says: 
Now because the Active Intelligence emanates from the First Cause, it 
can for this reason be said that it is the First Cause that brings about 
revelation to this man through the mediation of the Active Intelligence. The rule of this man is the supreme rule; all other human rulership is inferior to it and derived from it. Such is its rank. The men who are 
governed by the rule of this ruler are the virtuous, good and happy 
men. If they form a nation, then that is a virtuous nation. 3 
We can conclude that for al-Fär-abi, whenever there is a prophet alive in that time, he 
must become the ruler. This is because his rulership is superior to all other forms of 
rulership because not only does he perfectly understand the theoretical knowledge but 
he is able to translate this knowledge into symbols which are best able to represent 
these truths and also at the same time motivate man to action and live according to 
these truths. 
The prophet is not the kind -that comes into the world in every age. It thus 
follows that the prophet in his capacity as a lawgiver must devise ways and means of 
'This inclusion [ i. e prophet ] is my own conclusion drawn from the context. 2A1-F5rabi on the Perfect State. 244-7. 
311-Färäbi's The Political Regime (a1-Siväsa al-madanivva). 66-7. Mahdi. 36-7. 
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securing the survival of his code and law in all spheres of human welfare. This law 
should be codified and preserved . If other law-giver(prophets) come after 
him , that 
law-giver will be able to change the laws accordingly to suit the times , for if the first 
law-giver had been there, he would have done the same thing to revise the law to suit 
the present conditions. 
If there is no prophet after him, then the next ruler should follow all his laws . 
If the next ruler is not a prophet, he should at least have these six qualities. According 
to al-Färäbi, these qualities are: 
The next sovereign...... should be distinguished by the following six 
qualities: (1) He will be a philosopher. (2) He will know and 
remember the laws and customs with which the first sovereign had 
governed the city, conforming all his actions to all their actions. (3) 
He will excel in deducing a new law by analogy where no law of his 
predecessors has been recorded, following for his deductions the 
principles laid down by the first Imam (4) He will be good at 
deliberating and be powerful in his deductions to meet new situations 
..... (5) He will be good at guiding the people by his speech to fulfil the laws of the first sovereign as well as those laws which he will have 
deduced in conformity with those principles after their time. (6) He 
should be of tough physique.... ' 
For al-Färäbi, the next ruler should not follow the laws literally but should follow 
their intent, using this to be able to deduce new laws to suit his own time while still 
preserving the original intent of the first lawgiver. 
The law established by the lawgiver applies to everyone. The philosopher is 
not above or beyond the law. The philosopher must also perform the external (bodily) 
acts and observe the duties of the law. This is because the ordinary philosopher may 
understand the intention of the lawgiver but he is unable to institute a new law. The 
status of the lawgiver (prophet) is, for example, like that of a doctor who prescribes 
medicine for the cure of a patient. Whether the patient understands or not, the effect 
of each of the medicines prescribed by the doctor that he/she takes is that he/she still 
gets cured as long as he/she takes the prescription as prescribed. Thus, even if a 
philosopher understands the reasons behind the performance of external (bodily) acts 
and the duties of the law, he must carry out these prescriptions to the letter because 
1AI-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 252-3. 
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only by carrying them out will he be able to benefit from them. Therefore, the 
theoretical understanding of the value of this or that practical action does not negate 
the duty to carry out the practical action but in fact enhances the appreciation, and 
thus, the value of the act. 
The laws the prophet establishes are by communicating these truths that he 
knows in such a manner to men that it will drive them to action. The prophet 
communicates these truths to others by figurative symbols persuasive enough to lead 
them to act rightly. Using religious symbolic language, the prophet tells the multitudes 
what to believe, prescribes certain action and creates just laws. It is not necessary 
and it will be unwise for him to tell them the philosophical reasons for his 
prescriptions of opinions and the actions he tells them to do because to do this may 
impose a great strain upon the multitudes and would only confuse them. For 
example, he would establish in them the belief in the afterlife, in a manner that comes 
within the range of their imagination and will satisfy their soul . He will liken the 
happiness and misery there to be experienced in terms that they can understand and 
conceive . He might say that the pleasure awaiting us beyond the grave is a mighty 
kingdom while the pain is an abiding torment. 
These religious symbols, however, may differ from one people to another. 
Although the essence of truth is identical and unchangeable, because these things 
(philosophical truths) are thus allegorised for every nation or people in terms familiar 
to them, it is possible that what is familiar to one is foreign to another. AI-Fdrdbi 
says: 
Now these things (truths) are reproduced by imitations for each nation 
and for the people of each city through those symbols which are best 
known to them. But what is best known often varies among nations, 
either most of it or part of it . Hence these things are expressed for each nation in symbols other than those used for another nation. I 
Here al-Färäbi recognises that different nations are motivated by different symbols 
and thus the revelations revealed through prophets produce differing symbols 
I L1-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 280-1.. 
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representing the same truth which is one and unchangeable in order to best produce 
the desired result of action. 
The spiritual content and background of all true religions is identical since 
truth is one and universal. However, since truth is symbolised in religions, this 
truth is not always expressed at the same level . Some symbolic expressions 
better 
express the truth and thus are nearer to the truth than others. Some symbolic 
expressions are more adequate than others in leading humanity to the higher truth. 
Some symbolic expressions are more effective than others in gaining the belief of 
people and in becoming the directive force of their lives . 
Al-Färäbi says: 
Now, while the meanings and the essences of those things are one and 
immutable, the matters by which they imitated are many and varied. 
Some imitate them more closely and others do so only 
remotely........ The imitation of those things differ in excellence: some 
of them are better and more perfect in imaginative representation, while 
others are less perfect; some are closer to, other are more removed 
from the truth........ But if they are not of equal excellence, one should 
choose the ones that are the most perfect imitations and that are either 
free from contention or in which the points of contention are few or 
unnoticeable; next, those are closer to the truth: and discard all other 
imitation. I 
Thus by using symbolic expression in order to convey the truth, some religions are 
more effective than others. Therefore, al-Färäbi recognises grades of religions. 
All this symbolisation does not restrict the lawgiver in his discourse, 
interspersing it with sundry hints and allusions , to attract those qualified 
for 
speculation to undertake philosophical research into the nature of religion. The 
ultimate aim of the state is the diffusion of philosophy among the people in so far as 
it is possible, and bringing them nearer to God . 
The origin of morality and law as a 
dire necessity to prevent excessive self interest and the end of the law is to prepare 
men for a spiritual purpose: the benefit of religious acts. 
We can conclude here, that for al-Färäbi, the function of revelation i. e. the 
mission of prophecy, is not only to educate the people about the 'ultimate principles 
but also about the ultimate aim, the way to reach it, the supreme happiness. 
'Al-Fdrdbi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madaniWa). 74-5. Mahdi. 40-1 
42 
Revelation, similar to philosophy is partly theoretical and partly practical. The 
theoretical part relates to the beliefs. The beliefs influence and shape the practical pan 
which is embodied in the laws, i. e. the shad 'a which deals with the duties and 
observances of men in order to lead a virtuous life. The function of the revelation is 
to persuade the masses of the laws and rules, to instruct them in it and to educate them 
in it using persuasive means to action in order to attain the ultimate success, supreme 
happiness. 
Concluding Remarks. 
Al-Färäbi had created a theory of revelation which is essentially a fusion of 
neo-Platonic cosmology, i. e. a theory of emanation with the idea of symbolisation in 
expressing religious truths. In this manner, al-Färäbi constructed a comprehensive 
and complex theory of prophecy. Al-F bi's prophet not only received intellectual 
truths from God through the mediation of the Active Intelligence which is identified 
with the Angel of Revelation, Gabriel, but also translates these intellectual truths 
unconsciously through his fully developed imaginative faculty into symbolic truths for 
everyone to understand and these symbolic truths have the power to lead and motivate 
man to right action. Al-Färäbi's prophet is actively involved in guiding man and 
using these symbolic truths, he is able to create the best kind of law in order to lead 
man to right beliefs and actions that are necessary for man to attain happiness. 
However, it is interesting to question and speculate why al-Eärdbi chose to 
create this theory of revelation which has no parallel in Islamic intellectual thought 
before al-Färäbi. Al-Färäbi's theory of revelation can be seen as a philosopher's 
attempt to understand his religion, Islam in terms of his own rationalism. Thus, al- 
l Färäbi's theory of revelation can be seen as his attempt to reconcile revelation with 
reason and therefore, a rational defence of religion. 
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I think that al-Färäbi adopted this neo-Platonic theory of emanation as a 
solution to the problem raised by Aristotle concerning change. According to Aristotle, 
change means imperfection. Aristotle had posited a theory of dualism between God 
and Matter. God and Matter existed independently of each other and are both eternal. 
God for Aristotle is pure perfection and thus cannot change and therefore does 
nothing but think of Himself. Matter which is pure imperfection continuously 
changes trying to imitate the perfection of God which it can never ever attain because 
of its nature as matter. It is the changing actions of Matter which produce this world. 
This theory of dualism of Aristotle, by which God did not actively create anything, is 
totally unacceptable to any Muslim. Thus, I would like to speculate here that al- 
Färäbi, inheriting this problem raised by the great Aristotle, saw the Neo-Platonic 
theory of emanation as a solution to the problem raised by Aristotle because it is able 
to achieve two objectives: the first, to allow God not to change; and the second, 
without God changing, to make Him still ultimately responsible for creating matter, 
creating everything. By accepting this theory of emanation, everything is ultimately 
derived from God through the process of the emanation. Therefore for al-Fih~abi, this 
theory of emanation is in a way a defence. of God's perfection and at the same time 
God's creation of everything without having to change. 
The subject matter and aims of the revelation revealed by God to his prophets 
have great similarities with al-Färdbi's conception of the role and aims of philosophy. 
It is in the method that revelation and philosophy seem to differ. It is important to 
keep in mind that, for al-Fdräbi, 'revelation' is not only that which is revealed to 
prophets but that all human knowledge is 'revealed', and revealed not only to 
prophets but all human beings. Thus for al-Färäbi, all knowledge comes from God. 
If all knowledge comes from God, what distinguishes revelation revealed 
through prophets from other forms of knowledge? In both subject matter and aims, 
revelation revealed through prophets and philosophy deal with the same subject. Al- 
Färdbi summarises these similarities by saying: 
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Both (religion and philosophy) comprise the same subjects and both 
give an account of the ultimate principles of beings . For both supply 
knowledge about the first principle and cause of beings and both give 
an account of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made- that 
is, supreme happiness and the ultimate end of every one of the other 
beings. ' 
Revelation revealed through prophets and philosophy consist of both theory and 
practical action. 2 The theoretical part in religion is called beliefs while in philosophy 
it is theoretical philosophy. The main difference being that' the theoretical opinions 
of religion are demonstrated in theoretical philosophy, though they remained 
undemonstrated in religion. 3 Thus the theoretical foundations of both religion and 
philosophy are similar but differ in their methods of proofs. 
The practical actions in religion consist of actions imposed upon individuals 
and society collectively, embodied in the shari'a with the ultimate aim of the success 
of the individual in this life and the hereafter. The practical actions in religion can 
find their origins and justification in the universal rules of practical philosophy. The 
practical actions in religion are subsumed under the universal rules of practical 
philosophy. 4 Therefore philosophers will be able to understand the intention of the 
practical actions imposed by the shari'a through using their understanding of 
universal rules in practical philosophy and thus they must obey the shari'a and 
perform the external bodily acts and duties of the law in order to gain benefit from it. 
Thus both the theoretical and practical aspects of religion are incorporated in 
philosophy but the methods and their proofs differ from each other. 
If, for al-Fdräbi, both the theoretical and practical aspects of religion are 
incorporated in philosophy, is then religion only a useless copy of philosophy? Al- 
Färäbi answers that religion is not useless but of true value. He attributes the value of 
religion to its ability to persuade people at large to right beliefs and to right actions in 
1Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1962) 44. 
tal-Färiibi, Kitäb al-millah wa nusüs ukhrä, 47. 
3a1-Färäbi, Kitäb al-millah wa nusns ukhrä, 47. 
4a1-Färäbi, Kitäb al-millah wa nusi s ukhrä, 48. 
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order for them to obtain the supreme happiness through its unique and powerful 
symbols which convincingly persuades and strongly motivate man to leap to action. 
Daiber aptly summarises al-Fdräbi's attitude towards the relationship of religion and 
philosophy by saying: 
Religion persuades the citizens of the virtuous city, to believe and to 
act for the sake of obtaining supreme happiness- what can be proved 
by philosophy but what cannot be deduced from philosophy. ...... For 
the relation of philosophy to reality in the eyes of al-Fdräbi not only 
justified by the Aristotelian theory of cognition, of interrelation 
between thought and perception; the virtuous religion is also a concrete 
and by philosophy provable example for the relation between scientific 
cognition and moral insight. By the 'rules' and 'laws' religion takes 
care of the relation of ethics to reality and tries to realise the practical 
prudence of philosophy. 1 
Thus for al-Fdräbi, although all the knowledge revealed through revelation can 
ultimately be known through the efforts of philosophy, the results that it wants to 
achieve can best be done by religion. The unique symbolic language of religion 
which fires ones imagination and stirs one's soul inspires man to righteous action is 
what philosophy aspires to, but cannot achieve through its dry intellectual 
endeavours. 
'Hans Daiber, The Ruler as Philosopher: A New Interpretation of at-Färäbi's View. 
(Amsterdam, 1986) 13-4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AL-FARABI'S CONCEPT OF REASON 
Introduction 
We began our study of revelation in order to understand how al-Färäbi 
conceived of revelation as a source of knowledge. We concluded that for al-Fazdbi, 
revelation is intimately connected to reason (`aql). It is this connection that we wish 
to explore further here, thus revealing the role of reason vis a vis revelation. We also 
will examine the role of reason per se, by itself for obtaining knowledge 
Harking back to the Brahman's challenge and conundrum against the existence 
of revelation for discovering and revealing the truth because the Brahmans argued that 
if revelation existed it would be made unnecessary and redundant by reason, poses a 
great challenge to the reason for and the method of incorporating revelation in the 
elaboration of the role of reason, especially among the philosophers. In addition to 
this, we have the accusation both from the Muslim tradition and modern Western 
1lmä. m al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, Kitäb al-Irshäd ilä gawäti' al-adilla fit usül al-i'tigäd, 
ed. Muhammad Yousof Musa, (Cairo, 1950). 302-4. See also discussion below on 
al-Ghazäli's rejection of the Brahmans position, Chapter 3. 
2Alfred Guillaume cites the accusations directed against the Muslim philosophers from 
the Muslim tradition. He says; 
" Philosophy was called 'wisdom mixed with unbelief'. Book-titles such as An 
Exposure of Greek Infamies and a Sip of Religious Counsels and Ocular 
Demonstration of the Refutation of Philosophy in the Ouran, tell their own story. A 
tale was circulated that a well known philosopher on his death-bed recanted his 
doctrines, his last recorded utterance being 'Almighty God has spoken the truth and 
Avicenna is a liar'. Alfred Guillaume, "Philosophy and Theology", in Thomas Arnold 
and Alfred Guillaume (eds. ) The Legacy of Islam (Oxford, 1931). 240. 
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scholarship, ' accusing the philosophers of only paying lip service to Islamic beliefs in 
order to pass as good Muslims. 
These accusations, although serious, must be taken in the context of a strong 
reaction against outside influences, seen as innovations of foreign origin. There is 
little doubt that the Muslim philosophers had constructed their philosophical system 
from Greek ideas or those deduced from them. However, as Fazlur Rahman points 
out, 'the Muslim philosophers made conscious efforts in their choosing this or that 
particular Greek idea and exerted great efforts to try to correspond their philosophy 
with the metaphysics of Islam'2. More importantly, it can be demonstrated from al- 
Fäabi's philosophical system how important the role of prophets, revelation and the 
revealed law are. In fact al-Fdräbi insists that a true philosopher is one who not only 
possesses this theoretical knowledge but is able to exploit this knowledge for the 
benefit of others3. Failure in the philosopher's ability to benefit other than himself 
results in him being a false philosopher. Al-Färäbi contrasts this definition of the true 
philosopher with that of the false philosophers as follows: 
The false philosopher is he who acquires the theoretical sciences 
without achieving the utmost perfection so as to be able to introduce 
others to what he knows insofar as their capacity permits. 4 
The false philosopher may possess the knowledge of the theoretical sciences, but his 
failure to exploit this knowledge for the benefit of others is his downfall. 
The way this theoretical knowledge can benefit others for al-Färabi is that 
this knowledge has to be transformed in accordance to the capacity of others to 
Al-Ghazäli who we are also examing in this study, makes this type of accusation 
against the Muslim philosophers that they are not serious in their religious convictions 
but only pay lip service to it. Al-Ghazdli says; 
These are men[the philosophers] who bedeck themselves with the trappings of Islam. 
Often you may see them reciting the Qur' än and attending the assemblies and public 
prayers and paying lip service to the Shari'a. " at- un id , 96. McCarthy. 104. 
1Fazlur Rahman, "Avicenna and Orthodox Islam: An Interpretative Note on the 
Composition of His System" in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee (Jerusalem, 1965). 
Vol. 2,667. 
2Fazlur Rahman, Islam. 117. 
3A1-Färäbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, 89-90. Mahdi, 43. 
4A1-Färäbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, 95. Mahdi, 48. 
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understand. The transformation of the theoretical knowledge is done by employing 
the following means: 
Therefore, he who is truly perfect possesses with sure insight, first the 
theoretical virtues, and subsequently the practical.... Since it is 
impossible for him to possess the faculty to bring them about except 
by employing certain demonstrations, persuasive methods as well as 
methods that represent things through images, and this is either with 
the consent of others or by compulsion, it follows that the true 
philosopher is himself the supreme ruler. I 
The best means to achieve this transformation of the theoretical knowledge is through 
the imaginative faculty transforming these abstract philosophical truths into 
understandable, motivational and persuasive truths. This transformation is best 
achieved in prophets who possess the highest intellectual capacity combined with the 
their naturally fully developed imaginative faculty. For the prophet, the imaginative 
faculty automatically converts these purely philosophical truths into the strong, 
powerful, emotionally charged, persuasive language of revelation driving man to right 
action. This transformation of course occurs automatically and not with the conscious 
effort of the prophet. Thus, for al-Färäbi, the literal words of revelation are not the 
conscious words created by the prophet, but the transformation done by Active 
Intelligence through the prophet, or in orther words, the revelation is the word of God 
through the Active Intelligence via the prophet. 2 Since for al-Färäbi, the more the 
philosopher has the power to exploit his theoretical knowledge for the benefit of 
others, the more perfect is his philosophy, therefore, the prophet's ability to 
transform theoretical knowledge into revelation which is the best form of persuasion 
benefiting the greatest number of people must be seen as the most perfect 
philosophy;. Thus, for al-Färäbi, the role of the prophet and of the revelation are 
central to his philosophical system and their importance should never be underrated. 
Therefore, these accusations against the philosophers that they only pay lip service to 
iAl-Färiibi, Tahsil al-sa'äda. 89-90 Mahdi, 43-4. 
2For further discussion on the literal words of revelation, refer back to section on 
Prophet: The Medium of Revelation, 30-1. 
3Al-Färdbi, Tahsil a1-sa'äda, 89. Mahdi, 43 
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Islamic beliefs in order to pass as a good Muslim are not substantiated. In the light of 
these accusations , the elaboration of the Muslim philosophers' concept of the role of 
reason in philosophy, has an added dimension of urgency and importance vis a vis 
their relationship to the religion, Islam. 
Here, we will limit our attempt to examining only the boundaries of 
reasoning, identifying its scope and limitations, if any such limitations exist. Since al- 
Färäbi considers reason to the cornerstone and foundation of all knowledge, this 
should simplify our task in examining and elaborating the role of reason. 
In examining the role of revelation we had raised four questions to revelation. 
These questions were: 1. what is revelation: what kinds of knowledge does it 
actually give us; 2. how is this knowledge ultimately transmitted to us; 3. by whom is 
it transmitted to in order to ensure its purity and originality; 4. and most importantly, 
what is the ultimate purpose of this revelation revealed to man. It is these same 
questions that we will now pose to reason. However, we will subsume these four 
questions under two broader questions. The first is the role of reason per se , by 
itself, in obtaining knowledge. The other category is the role of reason vis A vis 
revelation. 
The Role of Reason. 
For al-Färäbi the role of reason is supreme drawing its raison d'etre from a rational 
God , who manifests this rationality in all creation. Marmura points out that this 
relationship of reason to God is for al-Fdräbi as follows: 
The universe for Alfarabi is an orderly, rational one, emanating in degrees from the supreme mind, God. Man, on this earth, being 
endowed with voluntary action, must order his own life and society to 
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be in tune with the rational, harmonious order of the universe. Only 
thus can man attain happiness. Just as the universe is ordered by a 
supreme rational being, God, and each heavenly sphere is governed by 
an intelligence, so man, a small universe in his own right, ought to 
govern himself by his reason. The same holds for human society. I 
Thus, for al-Fdräbi, reason reigns supreme because it can comprehend not only the 
physical world we live in, but also the meaning and goal of human life, since the God 
who created the world and man, created the world and man in a rational manner. 
Thus, a man, utilising his reason is able not only to understand the physical world 
but also will be able to attain the aim and perfection of man. 
Al-Färdbi bases his argument on the premise that the world is created by a 
rational God and therefore, the world is created in a rational and orderly fashion. 
Based on the premise that the world is created in a rational fashion, man, who forms 
part of this world, must also act rationally in order to attain his perfection and 
thereby, ultimately his happiness. Thus, for man's own sake , he ought to govern 
himself by his reason. 
Man ought to act in accordance with the knowledge that he obtains through the 
use of reason. But, what can reason know and how does reason know? Here, we do 
not intend to delve into the inner workings of reason for that would be better left to an 
indepth study of logic. Rather, we will focus here on the boundaries of reasoning, 
identifying its scope and limitations, if any such limitations exist. 
How reason obtains knowledge is mysterious. Numerous answer have been 
given down through the ages. However, al-Färäbi's epistemology arises from and is 
based on his emanationist cosmology. I will only provide a brief summary of al- 
Färäbi's epistemology here since I have dealt with it in depth in the previous section; 
Al-Färäbi Epistemology: The Soul and Its -Cognitive Powers. 2 For al-Färäbi, 
initially everyone possesses a potential intellect. This potential intellect becomes an 
1Michael Marmura, "God and His creation: Two medieval Islamic views", in R. M. 
Savory (ed. ) Introduction to Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, 1976. ). 51. 
2See above Chapter 1: Al-Färäbi's Concept of Revelation, section on, Al-Färäbi's 
Epistemology: The Soul and Its Cogniti 
_ 
eers. . 
actual intellect when an external intellect, already an actual intellect, the Active 
Intelligence enlightens the potential intellect by transforming the knowledge of 
particulars which the potential intellect had made efforts to obtain and changing these 
particulars to universals through the abstraction of forms from matter. Once this is 
achieved, the potential intellect becomes an actual intellect in possession not of 
particular knowledge only but of the universal forms which constitute real 
knowledge'. The second stage is when the actual intellect begins to think about the 
intelligibles/universals which it has obtained from the Active Intelligence. When the 
actual intellect has finally obtained all the intelligibles/universals, there is no need for it 
to think of existing things outside itself. Thus, when the intellect thinks, it is thinking 
of itself and reflecting upon itself and therefore becomes self intellective. When the 
intellect reaches this stage, it becomes a form of forms and in al-Färdbi's terminology 
an acquired intellect ('aql mustafdd). This is the highest development and the final 
stage of the human intellect. 
The result of Al-Fdräbi's epistemology with its main players the Active 
Intelligence and the recipient the human intellect, is that he has egalitarianised the 
acquisition of knowledge because the Active Intelligence enlightens anyone and 
everyone who is prepared to receive its illumination. Thus, anyone who struggles 
hard is able to better himself/herself and ultimately able to acquire the highest degree 
of knowledge. We can deduce that for al-Färäbi, anyone can reach the highest form 
of human perfection, i. e. intellectual perfection which is the acquired intellect. 
It is not my intent here to repeat the previous discussion of al-Färäbi's 
epistemology. However, this summary seems appropriate as a prelude to a 
discussion of the boundaries of reason. From al-Färäbi's emanative epistemology, 
we perceive that it is the Active Intelligence, and therefore indirectly God, which 
gives man knowledge. Without the assistance of the Active Intelligence, man's 
i 
1For an explanation of why particular do not constitute real knowledge, see above Chapter 1: Al-Färäbi's Concept of Revelation, section on, Al-Färäbi's Epistemology: The Soul and Its Cognitive Powers. 
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knowledge would only be restricted to the particulars and therefore, he would actually 
know nothing. The Active Intelligence gives man knowledge by abstracting the form 
from matter and thus, giving man the form of each and everything and therefore, the 
principles of everything. This is only possible because each and everything has its 
own form, its own inherent nature, and acts in accordance to that very nature'. 
Therefore, the man, who has obtained the forms, knows the true nature of things and 
thus is able to judge and predict the actions of matter which conform to the same 
rational principle that man 's intellect is based upon. Therefore, he can utilise his 
theoretical knowledge and put it into practice. Thus, he knows about God and what is 
good and evil, and ultimately what is man's nature and true objective and how to 
achieve man's perfection. 
Through the assistance of the Active Intelligence which means indirectly the 
assistance of God acting on man's reason, all knowledge is in a way revealed to man. 
Through God acting via the Active Intelligence on man's reason, he can know 
everything which is necessary for him to attain his perfection, his happiness. 
Reason vis a vis Revelation. 
Al-Färäbi picked up the gauntlet thrown down by the challenge of the 
Brahmans against the existence of prophecy and revelation-2 Al-Färäbi accepts the 
same assumptions on reason that the Brahmans held, but he reached a totally 
opposite conclusion on the relationship of reason vis a vis revelation. For al-Färäbi, 
reason is not beyond or above revelation but revelation is a transformation of reason 
into symbolic and metaphoric language with the power and motivation that can make 
'Al-Ghazäli and the Ash'arites reject his idea of inherent nature and therefore, it 
becomes impossible for reason to make a rational objective judgement on anything, 
for futher discussion on this point, refer to chapters discussing al-Ghazäli. 
21 have so far not come across any reference to the Brahmans by al-Färäbi. However, 
he probably was aware of it since Muslim philosophy was not only influenced by 
Greek philosophy but also by Persian and Indian philosophy. 
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people understand the same truths that reason uncovers, however, in accordance to 
their own capacities to comprehend. In answer to the Brahmans, revelation vis a vis 
reason is certainly not redundant nor futile but revelation is actually an extension of 
reason with the motive of enlightening all in accordance with their ability. 
All human knowledge for al-Färäbi is in a way 'revealed' to man. For al- 
Fdräbl, God indirectly via the Active Intelligence is responsible for giving man 
knowledge by the Active Intelligence acting upon man's intellect. Revelation is seen 
as just another means by which God conveys knowledge to man. The relationship 
between revelation and reason is certainly not antagonistic, contradictory , competing 
against each other nor the Latin Averroes' dual truth idea 1. Rather, revelation is the 
transformation of reason and therefore, revelation and reason complement each other 
in conveying the same truths to all men. 
Al-Färabi argues that revelation is not only an important but an essential factor 
for the fulfilment of the purpose of philosophy. The importance of philosophy is to 
benefit not just the individual but others i. e. society. Thus, in order for philosophy to 
benefit not just the individual, it must pass from the theoretical to the practical. This 
means of transforming theoretical truths to practical actions occurs through the 
means of revelation. 
How revelation is transmitted to the prophet is essential to comprehend before 
we can discuss revelation's relationship vis a vis reason. At-Färäbi links prophecy 
with the perfection of the innate faculties of the soul itself and does not describe it as 
a state of possession by supernatural power2 which suppresses the prophet's 
'This dual truth theory of the Latin Averroes has no relationship to Averroes himself. 
Stuart MacClintock explains this dual truths idea as follows; "that such thinkers (Latin Averroist) were actually practising a system of 'double truths' in which a proposition 
can be true in natural philosophy but contradict a proposition true in theology and conversely". Stuart MacClintock, Encyclopaedia of Philosophy vol. 1,224. 2Richard Walzer, "Al-Färdbi's Theory of Prophecy and Divination", Journal o Hellenic Studies 27,1957.142. 
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personality but rather prophecy enlarges what already lies potentially in the prophet's 
personality, thus transforming it and thereby actualising this potential. However, he 
qualifies this statement that it is not a state of possession of supernatural power by 
pointing out that this innate faculty must be endowed and cannot be acquired by 
learning. ' Therefore, al-Färäbi argues that although prophecy is not possession of a 
supernatural state, it cannot be sought to be acquired through exertion of efforts but 
remains a unique gift of God to certain individuals whom He chooses. Therefore, 
God gives these men special qualities necessary in order to receive revelation and 
hence become a prophet. 
This has been dealt with in greater detail under the sections: The 
Transmission of Revelation and Prophets; The Medium Of Revelation. 
However, this summary is appropriate as a prelude to the discussion on reason's 
connection to revelation and also of how revelation fulfils the mission of philosophy. 
For al-Fdräbi, revelation occurs as a result of the emanation from God via the 
Active Intelligence on an individual who possess a fully developed rational faculty 
combined with an endowed, fully naturally developed imaginative faculty. The 
individuals who possesses both these faculties are extremely rare as they only occur 
in prophets2. Al-Färäbi explains this process of transmitting revelation as follows, 
God Almighty (Allah `azza wajja) grants him Revelation (yuwahi 
ilaibi) through the mediation of the Active Intelligence , so that the 
emanation from God Almighty to the Active Intelligence is passed 
through the mediation of the acquired intellect, and then to the faculty 
of representation (imaginative faculty). Thus, he is, through the 
emanation from the Active Intelligence to his Passive Intellect, a wise 
man and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who employs and 
intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation from the Active 
Intellect to his faculty of representation (imaginative faculty) a 
visionary prophet (nabs): who warns of things to come and tells of 
particular things which exist at present. This man holds the most 
perfect rank of humanity and has reached the highest degree of 
felicity.; 
'Al-F r5bi's The Political Regime (al-Siyäsa al-madam ya). 79. Mahdi. 36. 
2A1-Färabi's The Political Regime (al-Siväsa al-madam , 79. Mahdi. 36. 3A1-Färäbi on the Perfect State. 244-245 
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Thus, for al-Färäbi, revelation is a gift of God to His prophets. However, this 
revelation is a gift from God which occurs via the emanation of the Active Intelligence 
acting upon the prophet's intellect which is then transformed automatically through the 
imaginative faculty into symbolic language. Therefore, revelation is the product of the 
highest philosophical truths combining with the fully naturally developed imaginative 
faculty resulting in a transformation of these philosophical truth into symbols. Thus, 
revelation should not and cannot be seen as inferior to reason nor beyond reason but 
as a transformation of reason. 
Why reason has to be transformed into revelation is closely connected with the 
mission of philosophy and the purpose of revelation. But, how then does revelation 
fulfil the purpose of philosophy? Al-Färäbi repeats over and over again in all his 
writings the idea that true philosophy must benefit not just the philosopher but also all 
others. Al-Färäbi explains the means of instruction utilised by philosophy and that of 
religion as follows: 
Every instruction is composed of two things: (a) making what is being 
studied comprehensible and causing its idea to be established in the 
soul and (b) causing others to assent to what is comprehended and 
established in the soul. There are two ways of making a thing 
comprehensible: first, by causing its essence to be perceived by the 
intellect, and second, by causing it to be imagined through the 
similitude that imitate it. Assent, too, is brought about by one or two 
methods, either the method of certain demonstration or the method of 
persuasion. Now when one acquires knowledge of the beings or 
receives instruction in them, if he perceives their ideas themselves 
with his intellect, and his assent to them is by the means of certain 
demonstration, then the science that comprises these cognitions is 
philosophy. But if they are known by imagining them through 
similitude that imitate them, and assent to what is imagined of them is 
cause by the persuasive methods, then the ancients call what comprises 
these cognitions religion. I 
Al-F&äbi argues that revelation and reason intend to instruct and educate people in 
the same subject and the same truths but utilise different methods in conveying the 
same truths. 
i 
1Al-F räbi, Tahsil al-sa' äda, 89. Mahdi, 44. 
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The same subject matter is dealt with by revelation and reason. Both seek the 
ultimate perfection and happiness of man. Therefore, both give an account of the 
existence of the universe and where man fits in it and what is the ultimate aim of man 
and how to attain this goal of man, happiness. Al-Fdräbi explains the two different 
ways that revelation and reason utilise to describe the existence of the universe and 
the purpose of man as follows: 
Philosophy gives an account of the ultimate principles (that is the 
essence of the first principles and the essence of the incorporeal second 
principle), as they are perceived by the intellect. Religion sets forth 
their images by means of similitudes of them taken from corporeal 
principles and imitates them by their likeness among political offices. 
It imitates the actions of natural powers and principles by their likeness 
among the faculties, states, and arts that have to do with the will, just 
as Plato does in the Timaeus. It imitates (t4 kä) the intelligibles by 
their likeness among the sensibles: for instance, some imitate matter 
by the abyss or darkness or water, and nothingness by darkness. It 
imitates the classes of supreme happiness- that is, the end of the act of 
human virtues-by their likeness among the goods that are believed to 
be the ends. It imitates the classes of true happiness by the means of 
the ones that are believed to be happiness. It imitates the ranks of the 
beings by their likeness among the spatial and temporal ranks. And it 
attempts to bring the similitudes of these things as close as possible to 
their essences. Also in everything of which philosophy gives an 
account that is demonstrative and certain, religion gives an account 
based on the persuasive arguments. 1 
It is clear that the methods used by revelation and reason are different. However, the 
message they intend to convey remains the same. Both attempt to teach peoples about 
the existence of the universe and man's place and role in it. Philosophy explains 
utilising demonstrative means. Religion explains utilising persuasive arguments. 
However, because of philosophy's demanding method only the few can comprehend 
it message and therefore, its audience is limited. Thus, reason's ability to convey its 
message it limited. Because of reason being a difficult, dry and abstract intellectual 
method, its ability to educate the masses is limited and reason is impotent in 
motivating and driving most men to right action. Revelation, on the other hand, can 
reach a mass audience from the educated to the layman. Through its means of 
1A1-F&äbi, Tahsil al-sa'äda, 90-1. Mabdi, 45. 
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persuasive arguments it not only educates all in accordance to their capacity but 
revelation fires imaginations and stirs souls inspiring people to righteous actions. 
One may obtain the wrong impression here that revelation is merely an 
imitation of reason. In other words, revelation is reduced to only a popular 
philosophy for the uneducated man. This perception is inaccurate. Revelation has 
the ability to reach and educate the masses which reason by itself cannot and fail to 
achieve. However, for al-Färäbi the more the philosopher has the power to exploit 
his theoretical knowledge for the benefit of others, the more perfect is his 
philosophy. Therefore, the role of revelation should never be underrated in the al- 
Färäbi's philosophical system. Since, through the prophets, theoretical knowledge is 
transformed into revelation which is the best form of persuasion benefiting the 
greatest number of people, the prophets are the ones who must be seen as possessing 
the most perfect philosophy. Thus, for al-Färäbi, the role of the prophet and the 




Al-GHAZALI'S CONCEPT OF REVELATION 
Introduction 
In the Islamic religious tradition, a Muslim religious thinker's 
opinion on the issues surrounding revelation is very difficult to obtain and 
point out clearly. Muslim religious thinkers seem to discuss endlessly in 
minute detail every subject under the sun but they ever so carefully tiptoe 
around a fundamental subject, revelation, the source from which all their 
endless debates are supposed to spring , or at 
least have their grounding in, 
i. e. revelation, in the Muslim tradition, the Qur' än. 
The Muslim philosophers at least fare much better on this issue. They 
at least made an attempt to discuss the issues surrounding revelation because it 
was essential in their discussions on how to obtain certainty in knowledge and 
to their claims of possessing certain knowledgel. Thus, the Muslim 
philosophers made some systematic attempts to explain the issues surrounding 
revelation. 
All other Muslim religious thinkers seem to have accepted revelation as 
a given source of knowledge, needing neither further explanation, 
examination nor study. Rather they saw their task only as the transmitters of 
this knowledge through explaining and elaborating the content of the 
'Refer to the chapter on al-Färäbi's Concept of Revelation. 
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revelation and how to apply it in practise. However, it is from their 
explanation and elaboration on religious issues that we can derive and spell 
out their concept of revelation. Since a direct and systematic discussion on a 
religious scholar's concept of revelation is extremely scarce, and when it does 
appear, it is only in passing and usually incoherent, we will have to resort to 
an analysis of their understanding of religious issues in order to shed some 
light on their concept of revelation. 
In this study, I will limit myself to examining one of the greatest 
representatives of Muslim religious thinkers, al-Ghazäli. Al-Ghazäli (d. 
505/1111) was considered by his contemporaries as the reformer (mujaddid) 
of the fifth century of the Islamic era and was known by the honorific title of 
proof of the faith (hvjjat al-isläm)1. He was an extremely versatile scholar 
whose range of knowledge and writings2 encompassed all areas of Islamic 
religious thought. He was not only an outstanding jurist, theologian and Sufi 
but also an ardent critic of philosophy. However, even the versatile al-Ghazäli 
never discussed the issues surrounding revelation in any systematic manner. 
Nonetheless, we can still attempt to derive an understanding of his views on 
the issues surrounding revelation through the indirect method by looking at his 
positions on other religious issues. I purpose here to study al-Ghazäli's 
concept of revelation using his acceptance and use of Ash'arite theology. I 
believe that by examining closely al-Ghazäli's theological elaborations, I can 
answer the four questions I had asked originally surrounding the concept of 
revelation, namely: 1. what is revelation: what kinds of knowledge does it 
actually give us; 2. how is this knowledge ultimately transmitted to us; 3. by 
whom is it transmitted in order to ensure its purity and originality; 4. and 
'Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Ghazali's Theory of Virtue (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1975) 1. 
2For a list of al-Ghazäli's writings see, A. Badawi, Mu'allafät al-Gha _zälL (Cairo, 1961), G. F. Hourani, The Chronology of Ghazäli's Writings, " ou 
of American Oriental Societ, 79: 225-33 (1959). 
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most importantly, what is the ultimate purpose of this revelation revealed to 
man. 
Before we proceed to try to derive al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation 
from his theological views, let us first look at the background surrounding the 
challenges that al-Ghazäli was facing and attempting to answer the questions 
related to revelation. We will then examine his scarce and scanty direct 
discussions on revelation itself. Only then will we proceed to derive his 
concept of revelation from his theological views. 
Issues Surrounding Revelation 
Abü Hämid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tüsi al-Ghazäli 
(450/1058-505/1111) is better known in the traditional Islamic sources as 
simply al-Ghazäli. Many scholars have claimed that he is one of the greatest 
thinkers in the Islamic tradition and the man who influenced Islamic thought 
after the sixth/twelfth century more than any other'. Al-Ghazäli had earned 
the title of the proof of the faith (bvjjat al-Islam) because of his vehement 
intellectual defence of the faith against the non-believers, the Mu'tazilites, the 
1Adib Nayif Diyab, "al-Ghazdli", in Religion. Learning and Science in the 
Abbasid Period, edited by M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and, R. B Serjeant 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 424. See also W. 
Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazäli ( Edinburgh, 
1963)173-180. 
Tor further discussion on the Ismä ilites by al-Ghazäli, see al-Ghazäli's work, 
Fadä'ih al-bätiniyya wa fadä'il al-Mustazhiriyya (The Shames of the Bata 'tes 
and the Excellence of the Supporters of al-MustaZhir). (Amman, 1993). For an 
Ismä'ili's response to al-Ghazäli's criticism, see Henry Corbin, "The Ismä'ili 
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Ismä'ilitesl and questionably dealing a death blow to philosophy. 2 Al- 
Ghazäli's attitude concerning the issues surrounding revelation raised by the 
groups mentioned can best be summarised in his own words in his book a! - 
Risäla al-qudsiyya: 3 
.... that God most high 
is the creator of His servants' actions; 
that these actions are acquired (muktasaba) by His servants; 
that they are willed by Him: that He is gracious to create and 
create from nothing; that it is His prerogative to impose duties 
(taklif) beyond the capacity [of His servants], and to cause 
pain (Mim) to the innocent; that it is not incumbent on Him to 
do the most favourable [to His servants]; that [man's] 
obligations are laid down in the divine law; that His sending of 
prophets is not impossible (jä'iz); and that the prophethood of 
our prophet Muhammad (God bless and save him) is proved 
and confirmed by miracles. 4 
Response to the Polemic of al-Ghazäli" in Ismä'ili Contributions to Islamic 
Culture, ed. by S. H. Nasr, (Tehran, 1977). 67-99. 
2Moharned Ahmed Sherif, Ghazali's Theory of Virtue, 1. See also A. J. 
Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1965). 61. 
3a1-Risäla al-qudsiyya forms part of Kitäb Qawä'id al-'agä'id which is 
Book Two of al-Ghazili's magnum opus Ihyä 'ulnm al-din. This tract is an 
excellent and concise summary of al-Ghazäli's theological position. al-Risala 
al-qudsiyya has been edited, translated with an introduction by A. L. Tibawi, , " al-Ghazäli's Tract on Dogmatic Theology, " Islamic Quarterly, vol. 9 (1965). 
All further quotation from this tract will be based upon Tibawi's translation of 
it. Furthermore, I will simply refer to it as Ihvä (Arabic text)., Tibawi 
(translation page) 
4lhyä. 125, Tibawi, 96. I will compare the relevant passages of al-Risäla al- 
Qudsiyya cited here with al-Ghazäli's other major work on theology, al- 
Iqtisäd. This method will not only enable us to corroborate al-Ghazäli's 
consistency of thought on this subject but also help to verify that he wrote both 
works, especially since there seems to be doubt on the authenticity of a number 
of works attributed to al-Ghazdli. On the question of authenticity of al-Ghazäli's 
works, see W. M. Watt, "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al- 
Ghazäli, " Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1952), 24-45, see also Osman 
Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam (Kuala Lumpur:, 1992) 165-171. 
In order to compare the two texts the al-Risälah al-qudsiyya and al-Igtisäd 
if al-i'tigäd on this matter, I will however only cite the relevant passages of al- 
Igtisäd fi al-i'tigäd in the footnote. See also Al-Ghazäli"s, al-Igtisdd , I. A. Cubukcu and H. Atay (eds. ) (Ankara, 1962). 180-1. 
"We claim that it is possible for God Most High not to impose obligations on 
His servants. It is possible that He imposes on them ( His servants) what they 
are not capable. It is possible for Him to cause suffering of (His) servants 
without compensation or perpetration of a crime. It is not necessary (for Him) 
to consider what is advantageous for His servant. It is not necessary for Him to 
reward the obedient and punish the disobedient. For the servant, it is not 
necessary for him to do a thing (out of the obligation imposed) because of his 
reason but because of the shari'a (law). It is not necessary for God that He 
send prophets. If He does send them(prophets), then it is neither evil nor 
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Before we can even proceed to examine al-Ghazäli's arguments 
concerning revelation against the standpoint of the other groups mentioned 
above, we must deal with the accusation raised by the Brahmanst which 
attacks the very foundation of revelation, its very existence. It is in reply 
against the Brahmans'2 attack against the possibility of prophecy, the medium 
of revelation, that al-Ghazäli made the above statement, ' that His sending 
down of prophets is not impossible (jä'iz)', thus affirming the possibility, 
but, not however the necessity of prophethood3. The Brahmans' arguments 
against the possibility of prophecy were based on two types of argument, one 
ethical and the other epistemological. 4 The Brahmans' ethical argument is 
essentially that since all men are of the same genus(aI jins), it would be 
unfair for God to bestow revelation on one and not the other because God 
would be favouring one individual over another. It would be unjust for God 
absurd. It is possible to show their truth by miracles. All of these claims are 
based upon the discussions of the meaning of the necessary (wäjib), the good 
(al-hasan) and the evil (al-gab4). " 
'Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, al-Ghazäli's renowned teacher reports this 
debate against the Brahmans in his work Kitäb al-Irshäd. 
Al-Juwayni says: 
" The Brahmans reject prophecy and renounce prophets [because of] reason. 
They disclaim the sending of the tidings [revelation] of the prophets. We 
mentioned what they believe from their specious arguments and we separate 
ourselves from this. Firstly, they said if we consider the coming of a prophet, 
there is no doubt what he brings with him [revelation] is that which is 
anticipated by the judgement of reason or it is not anticipated by it [reason]. If 
what he brings with him is that which reason can arrive at . then there 
is no 
benefit in sending him [prophet] and they consider this objective truly useless 
and foolish. And if what he [the prophet] brings with him is that for which 
reason has no proof, then, there is nothing that requires its acceptance since the 
acceptance is only by the proof of reason. " 
Immen al-Ilaramayn al-Juwayni Kitäb al-Irshäd ilä gawäti' al-adilla fi usill al- 
''ttiad, ed. Muhammad Yousof Musa, (Cairo, 1950). 302-4. 
21t is not known how well versed al-Ghazäli was concerning the Brahmans. 
For further information on the Brahmans, see Fazlur Rahman, "Bardhima", 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd Edition). 
31 will explain later on why al-Ghazäli does not accept the necessity of 
prophethood. This has to do with his theological position and thus is more 
appropriately explained there. 
4al-Bägilläni cites both aspects, the ethical and epistemological arguments 
presented by the Brahmans, but the accounts are not clearly diffentiated by al- 
Bägilläni. See, Abü Bakr al-Bägilläni , 
Kitäb al-Tamhid. (ed. ) Richard 
McCarthy, (Beirut, 1957. ) 104-5. 
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to enlighten the one individual with revelation and not the othersl. The 
Brahmans argue that God may enlighten one individual with revelation if and 
only if there is some specifying principle that may set aside one man over the 
others. However, because all men are of the same genus, there is no 
specifying (al-takhs4) principle. Thus for the Brahmans, since God is and 
must be fair, prophecy is impossible. Against this Brahmans' objection to the 
possibility of prophecy, al-Ghazäli redefines the cornerstone concept holding 
together the Brahmans' argument, the concept of justice. Al-Ghazäli defines 
justice in terms of God's actions. Whatever God does is just . Therefore it 
would be a contradiction in terms to consider any of God's actions as unjust. 
The epistemological argument against the possibility of prophecy 
attributed to the Brahmans is related to the divine attribute of wisdom2. God, 
the Brahmans maintained, had created man with reason. It is this gift of God, 
reason, which enables man to arrive at what is good and what is its opposite, 
evil. Therefore, it would be redundant for God to send prophets to reveal to 
man the good which he can reach by himself. And what is redundant is 
superfluous. And what is superfluous is an unwise act. However, God is the 
Wise. Thus, He would not send prophets. Al-Ghazäli counters the argument 
presented here by the Brahmans by undermining the very basis of the 
Brahmans' argument which is the ability of reason to arrive at the good. Al- 
Ghazäli gives a strong reply in al-Risäla al-qudsiyya by saying: 
The ninth fundamental is that the mission (bi `tha) of the 
prophets is not impossible. This is contrary to the Brahmans 
who maintain that no benefit could be derived from sending 
prophets since reason is a (better) alternative to them. (But 
reason is not an alternative) because it does not guide to the 
works which earn salvation in the hereafter, just as it does not 
guide to medicines useful to health (in the world). Hence the 
need for God's creatures for prophets is as their need for 
physicians, but whereas the truthfulness of the physician may 
i Abt Bakr al-Bägilläni, Kitäb al Tamhid. 104-5. 
2a1-Igtisäd 180-1. See also, al-Juwayni, a- had 302-4. 
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be known through trial, that of the prophet is known by 
miracles'. 
Al-Ghazäli affirms here that the good is only what God commands. And 
these commandments can only be known through the prophets. For God 
reveals His commandments to man through His revelations to His prophets. 
In al-Ghazäli's reply to the Brahmans, al-Ghazäli affirms that God 's sending 
of prophets is possible and that this does not in anyway contradict any divine 
attributes. 
After dealing with al-Ghazäli's counter arguments against the 
Brahmans and thus at least for al-Ghazäli establishing the possibility of 
prophecy, therefore the possibility of revelation, we will next deal with al- 
Ghazäli's main two opponents, the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers2. Al- 
Ghazäli vehemently opposed the Mu'tazilites' and the philosophers' view that 
reason unaided by revelation is capable of arriving at the good. Even though 
the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers agree that reason unaided by revelation 
can ultimately arrive at the good, the Mu'tazilites' and the philosophers' views 
are different. Therefore, we will have to deal with and discuss al-Ghazäli's 
responses to them separately. 
The Mu'tazilites at the time of al-Ghazdli had already ceased to be a 
powerful school, seem to have had few living advocates, and to have lost all 
political support for their doctrines3. However, even though they had ceased 
1lhvä 135, Tibawi, 117. See also aIatisäd f al-i'tiaäd, 180-1. 
2For a full discussion of al-Ghazäll's detailed criticism of the philosophers, refer 
to his work, Tahäfut al-faläsifa (ed. ) Sulayman Dunya, (Cairo, 1972). 
Translated into English by Sabih Ahmad Kamali under the title, al-Ghazali's 
Tahäfut al-faläsifah, (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1974). In 
future, referred simply as Tahäfut al-faläsifa(Arabic text page), Sabih Ahmad 
Karnali (translation page). 
31t is interesting to note how much importance al-Ghazäli seems to give in 
refuting the Mu'tazilites. When we look at the historical period it seems strange for al-Ghazäli to take up so much of his time refuting the Mu'tazilites doctrines 
especially since by al-Ghazäli's time the Mu'tazilites had ceased to be a 
powerful school, had only few living advocates and no political backing from 
the ruling power, the Sunnite Seljuks. The Mu'tazilites' main proponents may have died by al-Ghazäli's time but I have to concur with George Hourani, 
commenting on al-Ghazäli's teacher, al-Juwayni's interest in the Mu'tazilites 
was because the Mu'tazilites' ideas live on 'as authors of influential books still 
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to be influential, their books were widely read and known'. The Mu'tazilites 
who had begun their career as defenders of the Islamic faith against outside 
attacks of Manichaeism, Gnosticism and Materialism2, had built their doctrines 
on five basic tenets : unity and justice, the inevitability of God's threats and 
promises, the intermediary position, the injunctions of right (ma'r0f), and the 
prohibition of wrong (munkar)3. Faziur Rahman succinctly explains the 
implications of one of the Mu'tazilites' most important doctrines, justice. He 
says: 
From among the various constituents of the Qur' dnic concept 
of God, power, mercy, will, justice, they isolated this last one 
and carried it to its logical conclusions that God cannot do the 
unreasonable and the unjust. In this connection they developed 
their doctrine of the 'Promise and Threat' according to which 
God can neither pardon the evil doer (and therefore violate His 
Threat) nor punish the good-doer (and violate His Promise). 
....... Consequently, the Qur' änic dicta concerning the mercy 
and grace of God were interpreted by them in terms of 
necessity and duty: God must do the best for man; He must 
send Prophets and revelation to mankind. If He did not do the 
best for man, He would neither be just nor God4. 
The Mu'tazilites saw themselves as defenders of God, through defending an 
essential feature that makes God, God, His Justice. The concept that God is 
Just entails that He acts justly. However, it is in this definition of 'just' that 
problems arise. The Mu'tazilites had subsumed the idea of God as Just under 
the human understanding of justice. It is this idea that human concepts can be 
imposed upon God which seems most repulsive and repugnant to al-Ghazäli. 
being read by Muslims in the later eleventh century - or at any rate as thinkers 
whose theories were still widely known at second-hand...... because the theory 
as we know it from 'Abd-al-Jabbdr was an elaborate one, which demanded an 
answer in some detail '. George Hourani, "Juwayni's Criticism of the Mu'tazilite Ethics" in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984) 126. I believe this same explanation can 
also be used to explain al-Ghazäli preoccupation with the Mu'tazilites . 'George Hourani, "Juwayni's Criticism of the Mu'tazilite Ethics", 126. 
2Fazlur Rahman, Islam, ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 88. 3A1-Khayyät(d. 902), Kitäb al-Intisar, ( Beirut, 1957), 30. 
4Fazlur Rahman, Islam 89. See also Majid Fakhry, " Some Paradoxical 
Implications of the Mu'tazilite View of Free Will, " Muslim World 43 (1953), 
98-108. 
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We will however restrict our discussions on the Mu'tazilitesl to only 
those objections that al-Ghazdli had raised against them concerning the 
implication of their upholding the ideas that reason unaided by revelation can 
arrive at the good and that God must act justly. The implication of these ideas 
have consequences especially on God's ability to impose obligation(taklif) on 
man, the amount of obligation that God may impose upon man, and 
ultimately the limitation of God's ability to act concerning giving rewards and 
punishing evil, and His ability to forgive the sins of His servants. 
Al-Ghazäli challenged the Mu'tazilites' contention that reason unaided 
by revelation can know the good. Al-Ghazäli argues that the Mu'tazilites 
arrived at this contention due to their misunderstanding of what is the good. 
The Mu'tazilites had understood the good as that which is beneficial for man. 
Al-Ghazäli explained the Mu'tazilites' misunderstanding of the concept of the 
good by saying: 
.... the knowledge (ma'rifah) of 
God and obedience (ta'ab) 
to Him is a duty imposed [upon man] by God's command and 
the law (shay) , and not as the 
Mu'tazilites maintain by human 
reason ('aql). For were obedience dictated by reason, it 
would be either be for no benefit, which is impossible, since 
reason does not dictate what is futile, or it would be for a 
benefit or selfish aim. This [motive] must either refer to God 
(al-ma'b id) which is impossible since He is inviolably above 
selfish aims and desires, nay, belief and unbelief, obedience 
and disobedience in reference to Him Most High, are 
indifferently alike; or it must refer to man's (al-'abd) selfish 
aims which is also impossible since his [expected] benefit is in 
this world or the next : in this world, he has none but that 
which causes him toil and deflects him from indulging his 
sensual appetites; in the next he can expect nothing but reward 
and punishment. But how can [man] know that God most 
high rewards for obedience and disobedience and does not 
punish for them, since obedience and disobedience are in 
reference to Him indifferently alike, and He has no preference 
to, or identification with, the one or the other. It is only 
1For an excellent discussion on the Mu'tazilites' theological position which has 
a great deal to do with their ethics and epistemology see, George Hourani, 
Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd I-Jabbar. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971). See also Judith Katz Hecker, Reason and Responsibility: An 
Explanatory Translation of Kitab al-Tawhid From al-Mughni fi Arwär al. - Tawhid wa-i 'Adl by Oadi 'Abd al-Jabbär al-Hamadhani with Introduction and Notes, (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis: University of California, Berkeley, 1971) 
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through God's law (shari'a) that such matters can be 
comprehended; and verily he errs who derives his 
comprehension of them from an analogy between the Creator 
and His creature, who [unlike the Creator] is not indifferent to 
gratitude and ingratitude and the amount of satisfaction, 
excitement, and enjoyment which he derives from one and not 
the other. ' 
This lengthy quote serves to explain al-Ghazäli's understanding of the 
Mu'tazilite position and provides his objections to them. Al-Ghazdli asserts 
here if obedience is dictated by reason, then reason demands it must be for a 
benefit. If it is not for a benefit, then reason would not be able to make an 
evaluation of it because reason's judgement is based upon deciding on the 
benefit. If it is not for a benefit, then, it would be futile, which is contrary to 
reason. This benefit must either be for the Creator, God or His creation, 
man. . 
Al-Ghazäli asserts that these obligations cannot be for the benefit of 
God, for He is above all selfish aims or desires and is never in need or in 
desire of anything at any time. With regard to the obedience or disobedience 
of man to God, He is indifferent to it. If al-Ghazäli asserts that this benefit 
cannot be for God, then is it possible that this benefit be for man ? Again a! - 
Ghazäli answers negatively. Al-Ghazäli asserts if it were for the benefit of 
man, it must benefit him either in this world or in the next. Interestingly 
enough, contrary to Greek traditions and philosophy which al-Ghazäli was 
well versed in, al-Ghazäli asserts in this world that the only benefit man can 
obtain is in the sensual appetites. In the next world, man cannot know 
whether God will reward or punish him for his actions, since God is 
indifferent to man's obedience or disobedience anyway. Thus, the only way 
to know the good, al-Ghazäli asserts; is not through reason but through 
revelation. The good is defined through revelation which thus informs man 
what God wants man to do and rewards him for these action. 
1hä 134, Tibawi, 115-6. See also al-Igtisäd 86-7. 
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AI-Ghazäli asserts that God's imposition of obligations on man is also 
known only through revelation. Al-Ghazäii says: 
....... creation from nothing and the 
imposition of duties 
(taklif) upon His servants are by His grace and favour the 
Most High. Neither creation nor such imposition was ever an 
obligation (wäjib) upon Him. The Mu'tazilah maintain that 
they were obligations upon Him because they are in the 
interest ( maslaha) of His servants. But this is impossible 
since it is He who imposes obligation (mvjib), He who 
commands and He who prohibits. How can He be liable to 
any obligation or be subject to any compulsion or 
command........ The [Mu'tazilah] assertion that [creation and 
imposition of duties are] obligatory in the interest of His 
servants is fallacious. For if no injury befalls Him through 
neglecting what is in the interest of the servants then obligation 
would be meaningless. Further, the interest for the servant is 
for Him to create them in Paradise, and thus those endowed 
with intelligence find no comfort in that He created the servants 
in the abode of calamities and exposed them in it to sin, and 
later He subjects them to the dangers of punishment and the 
awe of resurrection and judgement'. 
From the above statement, al-Gbazäli attributes the Mu'tazilite position as 
making it obligatory for God to impose obligation upon His servants because 
it is in their best interest. Thus, the Mu'tazilites contend that God acts in 
accordance with what is best for His servants. Al-Ghazäli totally reject any 
hint of any obligation for God to do anything. For al-Ghazäli, God acts in 
accordance to His own will (iräda). He acts in accordance with His Power 
(qudra). God is the one who imposes obligations. He is the one who 
commands ('amr) and prohibits (nahy). It is impossible that He be liable for 
any obligation, or be subjected to any compulsion or command. Al-Ghazäli 
argues against the Mu'tazilites' contention that it is obligatory for God to act in 
the interest of His servant as simply fallacious. The reason being that if there 
were no injury to God for neglecting what is in the interest of His servants, 
then that obligation would be meaningless. Furthermore, al-Ghazäli struggles 
to put down the Mu'tazilite contention that God is obliged to do what is in the 
best interest of His servants by pointing out how God created the process of 
1hä 133, Tibawi, 112-3. See also al I tý isäd, 86. 
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living for His servants, subjecting them to calamities of this world and 
exposing them to the sins in it, and then only later to be subjected to the 
danger of punishment on the Day of Judgement. If God had acted in the 
interest of His servants, al-Ghazali contends, then it would be in the best 
interest of his servants not to have to undergo these many trials and 
tribulations of life but for Him to have created them in Paradise. 
Once al-Ghaz Ji had countered the Mu'tazilites' contention that God's 
imposition of obligation can be known through reason because it is done for 
the benefit of His servant, man, al-Ghazä. li then proceeds to take the argument 
further by asserting that not only can God impose any obligation He wants on 
man without any reason, but that God may even impose obligations upon man 
greater than he can bear or is capable of achieving. He says: 
Contrary to the Mu'tazilah, God may impose obligations upon 
the servants which are beyond their ability. For were it not 
so, it would be impossible for them to pray to Him not to 
impose on them; and they did in fact pray to Him saying : Our 
Lord, do not Thou burden us beyond what we have strength to 
bear'. Also God most high informed His prophet( God bless 
him and save him) that Abil Jahl would not believe him, and 
then He commanded the prophet to call Abn Jahl to believe all 
God's words which included the [prediction] of Abü Jahl's 
disbelief. How then could he believe Him by not believing ? 
Is this [proposition] anything but impossible to conceive? 2 
Thus for al-Ghazäli, not only does God impose obligations on men for no 
reason except by God's command (' amr), but He, God, may impose 
obligation on man, even beyond man's ability to comply. 
If, for al-Ghazäli, God can impose obligations upon man for no reason 
even beyond man's ability to comply, God can do with man as He pleases. 
For al-Ghazäli, God can do with man as He pleases even to the extent of 
IQur'än, Surah 2: 286. In order to support his position on this matter, al- 
Ghazäli turns a blind eye to the continuing passage of the same Quranic verse, 
Qur'an 2: 286, which says, " God charges no soul save to its capacity". This 
section of the verse seems to oppose his position. 
21hya 133, Tibawi, 113. See also al-I tisäd 180. 
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inflicting pain on His creatures or tormenting them for no previous offences, 
or not to reward them at all. AI-Ghazäli says: 
Contrary to the Mu'tazilah, God (to whom glory and majesty 
belong) may inflict pain on His creatures or torment them for 
no previous offence or subsequent reward. For He has 
absolute control over [His creatures in] dominion (malakihi), 
and any dominion outside it is inconceivable for His control to 
embrace it. Thus, injustice, which is the disposal of what 
belongs to others without permission, is impossible for God 
Most High, for He encounters no possessions of others 
besides Him so that His disposal of these possessions could be 
injustice...... Thus the slaughter of animals, and the various 
kinds of torture they suffer at the hands of man, is for no 
previous offence that they committed. If it is said that God will 
reward such animals in the next world for what they had 
suffered, and that this was incumbent upon Him, we would 
reply as follows: He would go beyond the bounds of religious 
law and reason who would maintain that it is incumbent upon 
God to bring back to life every ant killed under the feet, and 
every bug crushed between the fingers, in order to reward it 
for its suffering'. 
Thus, for al-Ghazäli. God can impose any kind of obligation upon man but at 
the same time there is not, and cannot, be any obligation upon God. God is 
free to do whatever He pleases. There cannot be even the slightest hint of 
obligation upon God because that would curtail His will and power. Al- 
Ghazdli's debate against the Mu'tazilites must be seen in context, where al- 
Ghazäli sees himself as the defender of God, the defender of God's Power 
and Will against the Mu'tazilites, who seem to want to usurp God's power 
and will by curtailing God's ability to act in anyway He pleases. 
In the light of many of al-Ghazäli's works in which ethics2 is the 
major theme, if not the central theme, it seems difficult to understand al- 
Ghazäli's vehement attacks on the Mu'tazilites' understanding of right and 
1lhvä" 133, Tibawi, 113-4. See also al-I tisäd, 182-3. 
21n W. Montgomery Watt's introduction to Muhamad Abul Quasem's book, 
The Ethics of al-Ghazäli: A Composite Ethics in Islam, (Selangor, Malaysia, 
1971), Watt so aptly points out that' Muslim scholars did in fact discuss ethical 
problems but did so as part of usül al-figh (principles of jurisprudence)'. He 
should, however, have included that their perceptions on theology also have 
some bearing on their concept of ethics. These differing perceptions do not 
necessarily mean differing ethical actions but the perception of what these 
ethical actions mean to the individual. 
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wrong, rewards and punishment which constitute key elements in 
motivating people to act ethically. For al-Ghazäli, God is All Powerful, All 
Willing. There cannot be even the slightest hint that God must do anything or 
must act in a certain manner. Any hint that He must do certain things, act in 
a certain manner, implies obligation. It is impossible that there can be any 
obligation on God. 
It appears that al-Ghazdli seems to have failed to understand or 
missed the point that God may impose obligations upon Himself in al- 
Ghazäli's all blinding quest to defend and establish God's absolute power and 
will. God's revelation, i. e. in the Muslim context, the Qur' än, describes over 
and over again man's obligations to God but at the same time informs man of 
God's promises to man. It could be argued that it is God who promises to 
reward man. It is God who threatens to punish man. It is God who imposes 
upon Himself to undertake these obligations. I am sure al-Ghazäli would 
agree with me that God is all knowing, and certainly God is not a liar. 
Therefore, when God made those promises and threats to man, He knew what 
He was doing, and that He knew He would fulfil His promises and threats as 
He knows the past, the present and the future. It is God who imposes upon 
Himself to act in a certain manner. Thus, it seems difficult to come to terms 
with al-Ghazäli's insistence that, since God is All Powerful and All Willing 
and therefore can act in any manner He wishes, God does not have any 
obligation which He has imposed upon Himself, and does not have to fulfil 
either the promises or the threats which He has made. 
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Challenging the Philosophers 
Al-Ghazäli' s vehement attacks on the philosophers can also be seen in 
the context of al-Ghazäli defending God. The philosophers' concept of the 
nature of God, and the ways in which God is made known to His creations, 
have serious religious implications. For the purpose of this discussion, 
however, we will deal only with those ideas held by the philosophers which 
have relevance to our discussion on revelation. Thus, we will be restricting 
our discussion to the philosophers' concept of the nature of God in the 
relationship of God as the agent and maker of the world, God's knowledge 
and how He knows, and finally, how He is made known to His creation. 
Before we proceed to deal with al-Ghazäli's objections to the 
philosophers concerning issues surrounding revelation, let us first look at al- 
Ghazäli's approach to the study of philosophy. Ultimately, his study of 
philosophy led him to conclude that philosophy cannot lead to certainty of 
truth, that it has misled its adherents with false claims and that acceptance of 
their false doctrines is based upon authority (taglid) and has grave 
implications on their doctrine on religion. ' 
1a1-Ghazäli, al-Mungidh min al-alä1, ed., 'Abd-al-Mun'im, (Damascus, 1994), 
translated into English by Richard McCarthy under the title, Freedom and 
Fulfillment : An Annotated Translation of al-Mungidh min al-Daläl and Other 
Relevant Works of al-Ghazzäli . (Boston, 1980). 67-96. In future, referred to 
as simply, al-Mungidh -{Arabic text page), 
McCarthy (translation page). For 
further references on other translations of the Munqidh, see ibid. xxv. It is 
interesting to note that al-Ghazäli points out that once one abandons servile 
conformism (taglid), the danger is that there is no turning back to that 
complacency and certainty that conformism brings about. Al-Ghazäli says, 
" For there can be no desire to return to servile conformism once it has been 
abandoned, since a prerequisite for being a servile conformist is that one does 
not know himself to be such. But when a man recognizes that, the glass of his 
servile conformism is shattered-an irreparable fragmentation". al-Mungidh 47. 
McCarthy, 67. 
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In his spiritual autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-paläl, al-Ghazäli 
recognized only four groups in seeking out truth. These four groups 
comprise the theologians, Bätiniyah, philosophers and Sufis. Al-Ghazäli 
says: 
I was of the view that the categories of those seeking the truth 
were limited to four groups: 
1. the mutakallimnn (theologians), who allege that they are 
men of independent judgement and reasoning. 
2. the bätinites, who claim to be the unique possessors of al- 
ta'lim (the charismatic teachings of the infallible and 
impeccable Imam) and the privileged recipients of knowledge 
acquired from the Infallible Irnäm; 
3. the philosophers (faläsifa) who maintain that they are men 
of logic and apodeictic reasoning demonstration (al-burlian); 
4. the sufis , who claim to 
be the familiars of the Divine 
Presence and the men of mystic vision and illumination. 
I then said to myself: 'The truth cannot transcend these four 
categories, for these are the men who are the following the 
path of the quest for the truth. Hence, if truth eludes them, 
there remains no hope of ever attaining it. 1 
AI-Ghazäii's insistence that the truth must be found only among these 
four groups, the mutakallimvn (theologians), the bätinites, the philosophers 
(faläsifa), or the sufis, poses an interesting question on why he did not 
consider a fifth group, those who would follow only the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah. 
In al-Mungidh, al-Ghazdli states that he had studied philosophy by 
'private study without the help of an instructor'2 and had spent two years in 
studying philosophy and another year in reflection on the problems in 
philosophy3 until he had 'become so familiar with the measure of its deceit 
and deception, and its precision and delusions, that I had no doubt of my 
thorough grasp of it' .4 Al-Ghazäli also states that the reason for taking up a 













('aim) had directed his attention and endeavor to that end [the study of 
philosophy]'. 1 Thus, the ' ulamä's reply to the challenges of philosophy had 
been 'so plainly erroneous and inconsistent that no person of ordinary 
intelligence would be likely deceived, far less one versed in the sciences'. 2 
Therefore, al-Ghazäli undertook the study of philosophy in order to expose its 
deceits and confusion. 
Al-Ghazäli's method of study was that one had to first try to 
understand a subject as its exponents understood it and only then evaluate and 
give a critique of it. 3 Applying this method, he first wrote the Magäsid al- 
faliisifa4 which is a work describing the methods and doctrines of the 
philosophers. This work is a summary of philosophy based on Avicenna's 
Danishnäma yi-aiäi (The Book of Science dedicated to 'Ala al-Dawlah). 5 
Immediately following the Magäsid al-faläsifa, al-Ghazäli wrote the Tahäfut 
al-faläsifa in order to refute the doctrines of the philosophers. Then he wrote 
the Faysal al-tafriga bayn al-islam wa al-zandaqa (The Decisive Criterion 
for distinguishing Islam from Heresy), 6 providing legal arguments for 
condemning the philosophers for infidelity (ta Er). 7 
1a1-Mungidh . 50. McCarthy, 70. tal-Mungidh 
. 51 McCarthy, 70. 3A1-Ghazäli claims that the best way to understand something under study is 
firstly to understand it as its exponents understood it and only then go beyond 
this understanding of the exponents in probing the difficulties, problems and 
weaknesses of the subject. (al-Mungidh . 
51. McCarthy. 71. ). I believe that 
this is an admirable method of study. One should always try to understand and 
appreciate a subject as understood by its' exponents first before making any 
evaluation. However, this method is seldom used by the blamä of the past and 
many in the present who seem to have some obsessive fear that if they were to 
present the ideas of their opponents well, then their readers would be unduly 
influenced by these ideas before they had a chance to read their rebuttal of them. 
Thus, they resort to writing oversimplified ideas about their opponents and 
therefore fail to convince anyone of the importance of the challenge their 
opponents pose and of their own critiques of them. 
4Magä id al-faläsifa, (Cairo: al-Matbah al-Muhammadiyyah, 1936). 
5Osman Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam, (Malaysia, 1992). 160. 
6a1-Ghazdll, Faysal al-tafriga bayn al-islam wa al-zandaga (ed. ) Sulayman 
Dunya, (Cairo, 1961), translated into English by Richard McCarthy as 
"Appendix 1" in Freedom and Fulfillment. ( Boston: G. K Hall and Co. 1980 
). Futhermore referred to simply as as (Arabic text) McCarthy, (translation 
page). 
as 197, McCarthy, 164. 
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Al-Ghazäli's encounter with philosophy was not all negative 
however. He approved of the study of the philosophical sciences of 
mathematics (iiyädiyät) which included arithmetic and geometry, ' and 
natural sciences or physics (tab' `iyya) but with some reservation. 2 He claims 
the politics (siyäsiyya) of the philosophers were based on borrowings from 
'the scriptures to the prophets by God Most high and from the maxims handed 
down from the predecessors of the prophets'3 and their ethics (al-khaligiyya) 
'this they simply took over from the saying of the Sufis'. 4 Logic (al- 
mantigiyya) is the subject vigorously approved of S and positively 
encouraged. 6 
The large number of works that al-Ghazäli wrote on philosophy 
showed his great fascination with philosophy. His strong negative concerns 
were displayed in al-Ghazäli's works, Tahäfut al-Faläsifa and the Faysal, 
where he charged the philosophers with infidelity (takfir) for holding certain 
doctrines. In Tahäfut al-faläsifa, al-Ghazäli enumerated twenty 
objections7 against the philosophers heretical doctrines for which they must 
be exposed and against which the Muslim masses must be warned. 8 The 
1a1-Mungidh 
. 56-58. McCarthy, 72-4. tal-Mungidh 
. 57. McCarthy, 73-4. 3a1-Mungidh 
. 61. McCarthy, 77. McCarthy translates the Arabic term salaf 
al-anbiyä' as predecessors of the prophets. I think it would be less confusing 
if he himself had accepted his own suggestion in his footnote 111 on this matter 
that " the translation " the ancient prophets" may be better. "al-Mungidh 
, McCarthy, 130. 4a1-Mungidh 
. 
61. McCarthy, 77. 
5Al-Ghazäli did not consider that the philosophers were the first and only ones 
to use or introduce the study of logic (mantiq ). He says: 
The philosophers have changed its name to logic to make it look formidable. 
We often called it the Book of Disputation or the Data of the Intellects. When a 
gullible enthusiast hears the word 'Logic', he thinks that it is a new subject 
unknown to the mutakallimun and cultivated by the philosophers alone. 
(Tahäfut al-faläsifa 85, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 10). 6a1-Ghazäli wrote three works on logic using the philosophers' terminology. 
These works are; 1) First part of the Magdsid al-Faläsifa. 2) Mi'yar al-'Ilm ( The Standard of Knowledge), 3) Mihakk al-Nazar fi'l-mantic1(The Touchstone 
of Logical Thinking) 
For the list of twenty objections, see Tahäfut al-faläsifa 86-7. Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 11-2. 
8One of the main reasons that al-Ghazal, wrote Tahäfut al-faläsifah is in order to discredit the philosophers in front of the masses. Al-Ghazäli says, " Let it be 
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style of writing in Tabäfut al-faläsifa is dialectic. Al-Ghazäli argues against 
the philosophers with the aim 'of exposing the incoherence and contradiction 
in philosophical thought's using the philosophical method of logic with the 
intention of proving its limitation and exposing the philosophers' metaphysical 
claims as flawed and plagued with inconsistencies precisely because when 
'in metaphysics, they finally come to discuss questions touching on religion, 
they cannot satisfy those conditions (which they lay down in logic), but rather 
are extremely slipshod in applying them'. 2 To strengthen his assertion, al- 
Ghazäli points to the results of the philosophers' metaphysical questioning, ' 
owing to the fact that they could not carry out apodeictic demonstration 
according to the conditions that they have postulated in logic, they differ a 
great deal about metaphysical questions'. 3 
The seriousness of al-Ghazäli's attacks on the philosophers is clearly 
evident when out of the twenty objections that al-Ghazäli raised against the 
philosophers' doctrines in Tabäfut al-faläsifa, he declared that believing 
in three of these doctrines was tantamount to infidelity (takfir). 4 These three 
doctrines are; the eternity of the world; God's ignorance of the particulars; 
and the denial of the bodily resurrection. 5 For acceptance of the rest of the 
seventeen objections, he charges them with heresy (bid'a). 6 
All twenty objections that al-Ghazdli raised in Tabdfur al-faläsifa 
were concerned with the philosophers' concept of God and His relationship to 
known that it is our purpose to disillusion those who think too highly of the 
philosophers and consider them to be infallible". (Tahäfut al-faläsifa 82, Sabih 
Ahmad Kamali, 8) 
1Tahäfut a1-faläsifa 82, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 8. 
tal-Mungidh 58. McCarthy, 75. 
3a1-Mungidh 59. McCarthy, 76. 
4The charging of the philosophers with infidelity is a legal pronouncement with 
grave legal implications. In the a sal al-Ghazäli explains these legal 
implcations by saying " taxing with infidelity is a legal qualification which 
comes down to declaring the licitness of ( the confiscation of) goods and the 
shedding of blood and the sentence of eternity in the (Faysal sa , 
McCarthy, 
164. ) 
5a1-Mungidh. 61. McCarthy, 76-7. 
Gal-Mungidh 
. 
61. McCarthy, 77. 
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His creation. It is not within the scope of this study here to go through and 
evaluate each objection that al-Ghazali raised against the philosophers. I 
Rather, we will focus our attention on al-Ghazäli's arguments concerning 
God's nature as agent and maker of the world, God's knowledge of 
particulars and how He is made known to His creation i. e. through His 
prophets. 
Al-Ghaz i strongly protested against the philosophers' concept of 
God as agent and maker of the world. The philosophers' concept of God and 
how He creates was derived from their acceptance of the monistic Neoplatonic 
doctrine of emanation. 2 The monistic Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation 
explains creation as all being derived from God at the end of the process of 
emanation . 
The philosophers' concept of creation can be basically described 
by summarising al-F . räbi's explanation of the process of emanation. The 
First Cause ( God ), the deity, stands at the head of the universe and above the 
movers of the spheres. From the First Cause, a first incorporeal intelligence 
"emanates" (yufdu) eternally. The first intelligence has two thoughts, a 
thought of the First and a thought of its own essence. By the virtue of the 
former thought, the existence of a second intelligence " proceeds necessarily" 
(yalzamu), and by virtue of the latter, the existence of the first sphere " 
proceeds necessarily". The second intelligence similarly has a thought of the 
First Cause of the universe and of its own essence. It thereby eternally brings 
forth the existence of the third intelligence and of the second sphere, and the 
process continues down to the tenth intelligence from which emanates the 
ninth sphere, the sphere of the moon. 3 
'For a philosopher's response to al-Ghazdli's objections to the philosophers, 
Ibn Rushd wrote four books which are; Fast al-Magäl, Damimat al-'Ilm al-Ilähi, 
al-Kashf 'an Manähij al-Adillah-and Ta dfut al-Tahäfut. 
2Fazlur Rahman, Islam ( Chicago, 1979), 118. In accepting the monistic Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation for creation, the philosophers consciously 
chose this doctrine over the Aristotelian explanation of the world and discarded 
the Aristotelian theory of dualism between God and Matter i. e. the world. 3A summary of al-Fdräbi's explanation of the creation of the universe as he described it in his work Al-Madina al Fädila, translated into English by 
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The philosophers' concept of how God creates was totally 
unacceptable to al-Ghazäli. The implications of this concept for al-Ghazäli 
was that God did not act out of His will and power but everything, i. e. 
creation necessarily emanates (fayd), overflows from Him. The result is a 
God who has an impersonal relationship to His creation, whereas the 
relationship al-Ghazäli had sought to establish is that of a personal God, acting 
as an agent with total freewill and power over His creation. 
Al-Ghazdli describes the philosophers' position on God's nature as 
agent by saying: 
All the philosophers agreed that the world has a maker: that 
God is the maker or agent of the world, and the world is His 
action or product. But this is a dishonest distortion of their 
principles....... The reason which is to be found in the nature 
of the agent is that it is necessary for an agent to have the will 
for action: to have free choice, and to know what he wills. 
But, according to the philosophers, God has no will. Nay, He 
has no attribute at all. Whatever proceeds from Him is a 
necessary consequence. I 
For al-Ghazäll, the result of the philosophers' concept of creation resulting 
from the necessary emanation from God denudes God of the will to act by 
choice. 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to answer the philosophers' claim that 
creation proceeds necessarily from God by arguing as follows: 
An agent is he from whom an action proceeds because of the 
will for action: by way of free choice, and alongside the 
knowledge of what is willed. But in your (philosophers) view 
the world bears the same relation to God as an effect to its 
cause. So it follows from Him by way of necessary causation. 
And, therefore it is inconceivable that God should have been 
able to avoid His action, even as the shadow is unavoidable to 
a person or light to the sun. 2 
Richard Walzer under the title, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State, (Oxford, 1985), 
100-105. 
'Tahäfut al-faläsifa 134, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 63. 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa 135, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 64. 
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What al-Ghazäli is trying to achieve here is to substitute the philosophers' 
concept of a God who is a passive participant, acting necessarily, unable to 
change or choose His own actions with an active God choosing His own 
actions, acting voluntarily out of His own will and power. 
Al-Ghazäli also objected to the philosophers' concept that God knows 
only universals. I For al-Ghazäli, this understanding that God knows 
universals has a direct implication on God knowing individual prophets and 
their individual messages. AI-Ghazali states the position of the philosophers 
as follows: 
They (philosophers ) are all agreed on this. Those who believe 
that God knows nothing but Himself are obviously committed 
to it. But even those who hold that He (God ) knows the 
other- the position adopted by Ibn Sina - assert that He knows 
things by a universal knowledge which does not fall under 
Time and does not change through the Past, the Present and 
the Future. And in spite of this, it is asserted (by Ibn Sinä 
who represents the latter) that " nothing - not even as much as 
a particle of dust, in the heavens, or on the earth- is hidden 
from His knowledge"- only that He knows the particulars in a 
universal manner. 2 
The result of the philosophers' concept that God knows universals as 
understood by al-Ghazäli is that God does not know particulars. The 
philosophers never said that God did not know particulars, for that would lead 
to an inconceivable conclusion that God only knew certain things and not 
others and therefore He cannot be omniscient. What the philosophers meant 
by saying that God knows through universal knowledge does not necessarily 
mean that God knows only universals but that he knows everything through 
the means of His universal knowledge3. However, al-Ghaz5H seems to have 
1Tahafut al-faläsifa 207, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 153. For the philosophers, 
God knows universals because as Fazlur Rahmaa aptly explains, "in light of the Greek theories of Aristotle and Plotinus, it was impossible that God should 
know particulars: He could cognize only universals since a cognition of 
particulars would introduce change in the Divine Mind both in the sense of a 
temporal succession and a change of different objects. " Islam, 18. 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa 207, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 153. 
3Fazlur Rahman summarises Ibn Sina's position on God's knowledge by 
saying: "Avicenna devised a clever theory which would do justice both to the 
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misunderstood or misconstrued this and to have taken this concept to mean 
limiting God's knowledge. The philosophers' concept that God knows 
universals, for al-Ghazdli, would result in, for example, that while God 
knows the particular class of men called prophets, God does not know the 
details of the individual prophets. Al-Ghazäli says: 
They ( philosophers ) are bound to say that Muhammad ( may 
God bless him and grant him peace ) proclaimed his prophecy, 
while God did not know that he had done so. And the same 
will be true of every other prophet, for God only knows that 
among men there are some who proclaim prophecy, and that 
such and such are their attributes; but He cannot know a 
particular prophet as an individual, for that is to be known by 
the senses alone. Nor can He know the circumstances arising 
out of an individual's particular character. For such 
circumstances are divisible in time which measures his 
particular person. And the apprehension of those 
circumstances in all their diversity necessitates change in the 
cognisant being. ' 
Al-Ghazdli concludes that the acceptance of the philosophers' concept that 
God knows universals would result into accepting that God does not know the 
particular prophets sent to a particular people and thus it would necessarily 
follow that the prophet could not be sent with an individual message for a 
particular people, in a particular situation, at a specific time. 
Al-Ghazäli objected to the philosophers' concept of how the prophet 
receives revelation. The philosophers' concept of how the prophet receives 
revelation was coloured and shaped by their all pervading doctrine of 
demands of religion and the requisites of his philosophy. God, according to 
this theory, knew all the particulars since He, being the ultimate cause of all 
things, necessarily knew the whole causal process. Thus, God knew from 
eternity that, for example, a solar eclipse would occur, with all its particular 
characteristics, at a particular point of the causal process. This type of 
knowledge would require no change in the Divine knowledge since it removes 
the necessity of perceptual knowledge which occurs at a definite time and 
place". Islam, 118. For a more detailed discussion on how for Avicenna, God 
does have knowledge of the particulars, refer to, Michael Marmura, "Some 
Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars", Journal of 
the American Oriental Societ. vol LXXI (1962). 292-312. And see also, Fazlur Rahman, "Avicenna and Orthodox Islam: An Interpretative Note on the Composition of His System", in, Hear y Austryn Wolfson Jubilee, vol 2 (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research: 1965). 667-676. 
'Tahäfut al-faläsifa 211-2, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 156. 
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emanation. Through this process of emanation, God does not create actively 
but is a passive participant, because everything is derived from Him through a 
process of emanation or overflowing from Him. I Through this process of 
emanation, the end results in the creation of ten intelligences and nine 
spheres. 2 The lowest of the ten intelligences is known as the Active 
Intelligence, which al-Färdbi equates with al-i-4 al-amin or al-tvh al-qudus, 
the angel of revelation. 3 According to the philosophers, the process of the 
Active Intelligence emanating eternally into the human intellect and passing 
through it into the imaginative faculty transforms the theoretical knowledge in 
the human intellect through the use of his imaginative faculty into symbols. 
The Active Intelligence emanating eternally on unique and rare individuals, 
prophets, who possess the perfection of the intellect and a fully developed 
imaginative faculty, transforms the knowledge in their intellect, by utilising 
their imaginative faculty, into symbols, for all to understand. 4 The result of 
this is revelation. Under the influence of the Active Intelligence, the prophets 
are able sometimes to see present and future events as they really are. 5 
Al-Ghazali explains the philosophers' understanding of this process 
by the following exposition of their argument: 
In this way a prophet (nab! ) has a glimpse into the Hidden 
world. The psychic powers (al-quwwa al-nafsiyya al- 
nubdwiyya) are so high that the outward senses do not 
submerge them. It is for this reason that he sees in the waking 
life what others see only in dreams. Even in the case of the 
prophet, the imaginative faculty represents through symbols 
what is seen. Sometimes the actual thing remains in his 
memory; at others, it is a symbol of it which remains. 
Therefore this kind of inspiration (al-wally) requires to be 
interpreted, even as dreams require interpretation. If all that is 
1AI-Madina al-Fädila, Walzer, 100-5. 
2A1-Madina al-Fädila. Walzer, 104-5. 
3a1-Färäbi's The Political Regime al-Si 
with Introduction and Notes by , Fauzi 1964) 32. 
4A1-Madina al-Fädila. Walzer, 240-1. 
5A1-Madina al-Fädila. Walzer, 224-5. 
I Madanivva), Arabic text, edited 
( Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 
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to be did not exist in the Preserved Tablet, the prophets could 
not know the Hidden things in dreams or in waking life. I 
Al-Ghazäli, however, fails to see why the philosophers felt it necessary to 
construct such an elaborate theory of revelation which he felt cannot be 
proven or substantiated. Rather, al-Ghazäli argues that the philosophers 
should accept that it 'is possible that the prophets know such things because 
they have been disclosed to them by God or the angels'. 2 Al-Ghazäli then 
continues to undermine the philosophers' theory of revelation by asserting that 
they, the philosophers, provide no proof for holding this theory. Al-Ghazäli 
says: 
Therefore all that you have described (the philosophers' theory 
of revelation ) is superfluous; there is no argument to prove it. 
Nor can you advance an argument to prove things like the 
Preserved Tablet and the Pen.... The meaning that you have 
given to these things is not recognised by the followers of the 
Sacred Law. Since it is not open to you to approach these 
things from the point of view of that Law, all that remains to 
you is to take the rational point of view. But even if the 
possibility of all that you have mentioned is taken for granted, 
still its existence cannot be known and its reality cannot be 
verified. The source of these things is the Sacred Law, not 
reason. 3 
After undermining the philosophers' theory of revelation, al-Ghazäli 
proceeds to attack the philosophers' limited acceptance of miracles. The 
philosophers accept the possibility of what they consider to be the miracles of 
the prophet but for al-Ghazäli they do not go far enough. Al-Ghazäli provides 
us with the philosophers' explanation which limits the possibility of 
miracle in the following analysis of their views : 
This faculty ( practical faculty of the soul) develops to such an 
extent that physical things can be influenced and controlled by 
it. For example, when our soul imagines something, the limbs 
1Tahäfut al-faidsifa, 229. 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 229. 
3Tah5fut al-faläsifa. 229. 
Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 175 
Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 176 
Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 176. 
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and their faculties serve it, moving towards the direction 
imagined to be desirable........ Therefore, it is not improbable 
that the power of a soul should be so great that the physical 
forces outside its own body should serve it..... If, therefore, 
the physical parts of its own body can obey the soul, it will 
not be impossible for such parts outside the body to do the 
same. ' 
Thus, the philosophers explain the prophet's miracles through the power of 
his mind itself which can affect not only his own body but transcends his 
physical self and affect the physical forces outside his body. 
However, the philosophers limited this form of miracles to the capacity 
pf the natural physical forces. Al-Ghazäli cites the philosophers' explanation 
as follows: 
When a man's soul contemplates the blowing of the wind; the 
falling of the rains; the gathering of the thunderbolt or the 
trembling of the Earth, which are all natural phenomena whose 
occurrence depends on the appearance of heat or cold or 
motion in air-then such heat or cold appears in the soul, and 
these phenomena arise therefrom, although no perceptible 
physical cause is present. This is the miracle of the prophet. 
But such a thing is bound to occur in the air which is prepared 
to receive it. It is not possible for the miracle to go to such an 
extent as to transform a piece of wood into an animal, or to 
split the Moon which is incapable of being split. 2 
Thus, the philosophers are able to accept the prophet's miracles such as 
causing the blowing of winds and earthquakes because they are natural 
phenomena which the prophet's mind is able to manipulate. But they deny the 
possibility of the prophet's miracles of transforming wood into an animal or 
splitting the Moon because this is not a possible manipulation of natural 
phenomena. 
Al-Ghazäli condemns the philosophers for their limited acceptance of 
miracles. His main objection is because by their acceptance of limited 
miracles, the philosophers are qualifying the idea that God has power over 
tTahäfut al-faläsifa. 237-8. Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 183-4. 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 238. Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 184. 
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everything'. Again, here we see al-Ghazdli attacking the philosophers in the 
defence of God's power. In order to establish God's absolute power, al- 
Ghazäii denies natural causation. He tries to show that neither observation nor 
reason can prove necessary causation in nature. 2 To prove his point al- 
Ghazäli says: 
They (the events) are connected as a result of the Decree of 
God (holy be His name), which preceded their existence. If 
one follows the other, it is because He has created them in that 
fashion, not because the connection in itself is necessary and 
indissoluble. He has the power to create the satisfaction of 
hunger without eating, or death without the severance of the 
head, or even the survival of life when the head has been cut 
off..... 3 
Al-Ghazäli's denial of necessary causation does not mean there will be chaos 
and that whatever could happen would occur. The philosophers accuse al- 
Ghazäli of rejecting necessary causation and thus positing a world of total 
chaos. Al-Ghaz ii reports the philosophers' accusation: 
One who has left a book in his house might return to find it 
transformed into a slave boy, intelligent and resourceful; or 
into an anim l. 4 
Al-Ghazäli counters the philosophers' accusations by stating that God is able 
to allow this to happen and it is possible that these things may happen, but " 
God has created for us the knowledge that He would not do these things, 
although, they are possible. We have never asserted that they are necessary. '5 
Does al-Ghazali imply here that for all practical purposes God will not change 
the nature of things as we understand them till the end of time even though it is 
not necessary for Him to do so. If this is so, then, we should for all practical 
1Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 244-5. Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 189. 
2For al-Ghazäli's complete arguement against necessary causation, see; 
chapter 17 of the Tahäfut al-faläsifah entitled: Refutation of Their Belief in 
the Impossibility of a Departure from the Natural course of Events. Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 239-251. Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 185-96. 
3Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 239 Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 185. 
4Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 244. Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 189. 
5Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 244. Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 189. 
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purposes accept the idea that all things work on the principles of cause and 
effect, for if not, we would not have any knowledge of how things work. 
However, al-Ghazäli would never accept such a conclusion. Thus, it is 
difficult to comprehend what he actually means here. 
Al-Ghazäli concludes his debate with the philosophers by pointing out 
the great damage they have done, destroying the glory and greatness of God 
and calling upon them to repent and give up their investigations and accept the 
prophet as the final authority in these matters and not their intellect. Al- 
Ghazäli accuses the philosophers' investigations of resulting in a great 
injustice to God. Al-Ghazäli says: 
The final results of their investigations into the Divine Glory is 
that they have destroyed all that Glory signifies. They have 
made His condition comparable to that of a dead man who has 
no awareness of what goes on in the world - the only 
difference between Him and a dead man being that He knows 
Himself. l 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to call upon the philosophers to give up their 
misguided faith in their intellects and turn to the prophets and follow them. 
He says: 
Therefore, let us accept the authority of the prophets in regard 
to the fundamentals of these things. Let us submit to that 
authority for reasons have not been able to contradict it. Let us 
give up the inquiry concerning the 'Why? ' and " How much ' 
and ' What'. For these are thing beyond the power of man. 2 
Al-Ghazäli's encounter with the philosophers is difficult to evaluate. 
Al-Ghazäli attempts to test and undermine the claims of the philosophers using 
their own yardstick, the yardstick of logic. He seems rather successful in 
casting doubts on the certainty of the philosophers' metaphysical claims. 
'Tahäfut at-faläsifa, 148. Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 80. 
2Tabdfut al-faidsifa, 154. Sabih Ahmad Kamaii, 88. 
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However, in his quest to debunk the philosophers, he provides very little if 
any of his own thoughts or more importantly, an alternative explanation. 
The philosophers had been trapped in the eternal problem of a God 
who does not change but at the same time creates everything. The 
philosophers devised an elaborate explanation in order to enable God to create 
everything and yet at the same time He does not change one iota. For the 
philosophers, change meant change for the better or worse and this was either 
an increase or decrease in God's perfection. This was totally unacceptable to 
them because God is perfection and perfection can never change. Even the 
slightest hint of change implies that God is imperfect, a totally blasphemous 
conclusion. Therefore, the philosophers saw it as their duty to defend the 
position that God does not change in order to establish His perfection, but at 
the same time He creates the world, knows about everything, past, present 
and future in every detail and is made known to His creation. This difficult 
balancing act resulted in the philosophers devising the theory of creation 
through emanation, in which God creates the world but without any change. 
God knowing everything, past, present and future to every single particular 
detail without changing is made possible because He knows through 
universals from eternity. God is made known to His creation through the 
eternal emanation of the Active Intelligence on the prophetic intellect. Again 
this is devised to make God known to man without God actively acting to 
inform him. The results of the philosophers' defence of God's perfection is to 
create an impersonal God, stripped of any voluntary action of will, a God 
totally absorbed in Himself and not concerned with His creation, a God who 
does not actively participate, interfere and provide assistance and succour in 
the lives and fate of His creation, but passively affects everything through 
emanation. 
Al-Ghazäli instead saw his task in challenging the philosophers also as 
defence of God, but particularly here as a defence of God's Will and Power. 
87 
Thus, what al-Ghazäli wants to achieve here is to substitute the philosophers' 
impersonal, passive God with a vibrant God who acts voluntarily out of His 
own will, and is able to influence, shape and interfere in the daily lives and 
activities of His creation. Al-Ghazali even denies necessary causation in order 
to establish God's absolute power over everything. God can create, change 
and shape anything and everything in any fashion without having to go 
through any steps or process of necessary causation. What al-Ghazäli wishes 
to establish is a God who acts and does as He wills with no limitations 
whatsoever. 
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Al-Ghazäli's Writings on Revelation: The Direct Approach 
Al-Ghazäli's actual writings on revelation, as has been stated earlier in 
this chapter, are clearly not systematic and are scattered and at best described 
as either being discussed only in passing or as background information for 
other discussions. We will attempt here to give a fair representation of al- 
Ghazäli's writings on revelation. We will examine these writings by firstly 
reproducing them either in total or at least the parts which are directly relevant 
to our discussions on revelation. What we most desire to see here is how al- 
Ghazäli develops his concept of revelation and the implication of his concept 
of revelation. Therefore, instead of reproducing each and every sentence of 
al-Ghazäli's discussions on revelation here, we will present those aspects of 
al-Ghazäli's discussion on revelation which are more developed, and indicate 
how he shaped his concept of revelation. 
The most important of al-Ghazäli's writings on this subject and a fair 
representation of his thoughts on this subject lie in his theological tracts, al- 
Igtisäd if al-i'tigäd (The Moderation in Belief), Kitäb al-'ilm (The Book 
of Knowledge), which forms the first book of his magnum opus, Ihyä 'ulüm 
al-din ( The Revival of the Sciences of Religion), and al-Magsad al-asnä 
if sharp asmä' Allah al-husnä. All three of these works have been accepted 
as the works of al-Ghazäli. I will discuss these works in accordance with 
their chronological order. In examining them in their chronological order, we 
will be able to see the development of al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation. 
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AI-Igtisäd fl a! -i'tigäd 
Al-Igtisäd Ii al-i'tigäd (The Moderation in Belief) is arguably al- 
Ghazali's most important work on theology since it presents his own ideas, 
covering an extensive breadth of topics and most importantly, the 
presentation of well developed arguments . In al-Igtisäd , al-Ghazäli 
articulates a systematic exposition of the Islamic beliefs aimed at informing the 
Muslims what they must believe and as a defence against innovation (bid `a). 
In al-Igtisäd , al-Ghazäli provides a very broad definition of 
theology. He defines theology as "the study of God". 1 This study of God 
comprises: 1. The fundamental (dhät) nature of God; 2. attributes (sifät) 
of God; 3. actions (af `al) of God; 4. the prophet of God and the 
revelation. 2 Richard Frank elaborates on this definition of kaläm by saying: 
The kaläm does nonetheless articulate in analytical form what it 
sees as the essential and fundamental content of Islam's belief, 
constructing in the form of a dialectic discourse the speculative 
framework according to which it understands the rational 
content and coherence of the principles and elements of this 
belief. The original and originating problem for Islam, and so 
for the kaläm, is that of the questions raised and implied in the 
texts of the revelation and the canonical tradition. 3 
The main method used by kaläm for learning and research is 
disputation and argumentation(munäzara). 4 However, it would be a grave 
error to conclude that the method, disputation and argumentation, is the aim 
and end of kaläm. This method of disputation and argumentation of kaläm 
la1-Igtisäd 4. Kalärn is also known as Film 'uszil ad-din. 
tai-Igtisäd 4. 
3Richard Frank, " Kalam and Philosophy, A Perspective From One Problem", 
in Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1979). 73. 
4Richard Frank, " Kalam and Philosophy, 'A Perspective From One Problem", 
72. See also Josef Van Ess, " The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology, " in 
Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. by Gustave von Grunebaum, 
(Wiesbaden, 1970). 24. 
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must rather be seen as a means to articulate, establish and defend the 
teachings of Islam. Al-Ghazäli explains the raison d'etre of kaläm as: 
So God Most High raised up the group of the mutakallimiin 
and motivated them to champion orthodoxy by a systematic 
discussion designed to disclose the deceptions introduced by 
the contriving innovators contrary to the traditional orthodoxy. 
This gave rise to the science of kaläm and its practitioners. A 
group of mutakallimvn did indeed perform the task assigned 
to them by God. They ably protected orthodoxy and defended 
the creed which had been readily accepted from the prophetic 
preaching and boldly counteracted the heretical innovations. I 
AI-Igtisäd is written in a manner which is formally bound to the 
conventions of the traditional (theological) manuals. Al-Ghazäli divides his 
al-Igtssdd into five parts. In the first part which is a long introduction, he 
discusses the importance of why kaläm must be studied and who must 
study it. He divides the introduction into four sections. The four sections 
are, Section One: On the elucidating on importance of this knowledge (kalätn) 
for religion; Section two: On the elucidating that it (kaläm) is not (to be 
studied) by all Muslims but only some of them (the Muslims), (who become) 
experts (makh ti in)3: Section three: In elucidating that it (the study of 
kaläm) is a collective duty (fardu kifaya)4 and not an individual duty (fardu 
'al-Mungidh . 48, 
McCarthy, 68. Al-Ghazäli commended the intent of the 
mutaka/limnn to articulate faith in defence against the innovators. However, he 
censured kaläm methodology as limited and unable to arrive at sure and certain 
knowledge. He says, " Most of their polemic was devoted to bringing out the 
inconsistencies of their adversaries and criticising them for the logically absurd 
consequences of what they conceded. This, however, is of little use in the case 
of one who admits nothing at all except the primary and self-evident truths. So 
kaläm was not sufficient in my case, nor was it a remedy for the malady of 
which I was complaining........ therefore, it (kaläm) did not provide an effective 
means of dispelling entirely the darkness due to the bewilderment about the 
differences dividing men. I do not regard it as improbable that such may have 
been the result in the case of others. I do not even doubt that it has been the 
actual experience of a limited group of men, but in a way vitiated by servile 
conformism in some matters which are not among the primary truths". a 
un 'd 48-9, McCarthy, 68-9. 
? al-Igtisäd , 6-8. aal-Igtisäd , 9-13. 4Fardu kifayah means engaging in a collective duty. If there are some people in the community who have engaged and discharged this duty, it relieves the 
others in the community of the obligation to this duty. In this case, the 
91 
al-'ain)', Section four: On the detailed explanation of the stages of proof 
which I have presented in this book2. 
This long introduction serves to prepare the believer to recognise the 
importance and role that kaläm plays in defence of the religion. The next three 
sections of the book is an exposition of the issues discussed in kaläm which 
seeks to explain and provide proof; of the nature and essence of God3, (2) on 
the seven essential attributes of God4 and finally, God's actionss. The last 
section is divided into four chapters6, beginning with a chapter which is 
devoted to the affirmation of the truth of the prophecy of Muhammad, the 
message i. e. revelation he brings and its implications7. It is this chapter 
which we are mostly concerned with here. 
(1) Revelation Defined 
A1-Igtis5d deals with theological formulations and nowhere does it 
discuss the concept of revelation directly8. The closest it approaches to 
shedding any light on the questions raised by the concept of revelation is in the 
last part of the book, the part concerned with the affirmation of the prophecy 
of Muhammad and the message, i. e. the revelation he brought with him and 
its implications. In the last part of al-Igtis d, al-Ghazäli argues for the 
engaging in the study of kaläm. Thus, there must be some experts in kaläm in 
order to defend Islam but not everyone needs to be or can be an expert. 
'at- tisäd , 13-15. z -I tisäd , 15-24. 3 -I tisdd , 24-79. 4a1-Igtisäd , 79-160. sal-Igtisäd , 160-202. 6The four chapters are; 1: affirmation of the truth of the prophecy of Muhammad 
and the message i. e. revelation he brings and its implications, 2: On self- 
discipline, 3: On leadership ( al-Lmäma), 4: Elucidation on those who must be 
considered infidels (takfu) from among the sects (al-firaq). 
Tal-Igtisäd , 202-210. 8We have already stated iat the beginning of this chapter that there will be 
approaches to obtaining al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation, 1) direct approach- 
actual writing on the subject of revelation, and 2) indirect approach- analysing his theological positions which have bearing on the concept of revelation. 
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possibility of God sending prophets contrary to the Brahmans' assertions of 
the impossibility of prophecy, he provides proof of the prophecy of 
Muhammad, and affirms the revelations brought by the prophets. 
It is in this last part of this work that al-Ghazäli provides some 
explanation of the role of revelation and reason. He says: 
In elucidating the necessity of belief in matters brought by 
revelation ( spar')' and that which is considered possible by 
reason ('aql).... That which is not known by necessity 
(dar66)2 is divided into: 1. what is known by proof (dalil) 
of reason without revelation; and 2. what is known by 
revelation without reason; and 3. what is known through (the 
use) of both of them (revelation and reason). 
Concerning the knowledge by the proof of the reason without 
revelation, it is that (knowledge) of the beginning of the world 
(hudüth al-'ä1äm)3, and ( from this premise that the world is 
caused and thus created4, (therefore) the necessity of the 
Creator of the caused world, who necessarily possesses 
power (qudra), knowledge, and will. If all of that (the 
necessity of the Creator of the new world, who necessarily 
possesses power (qudra), knowledge, and will) is not 
affirmed (by reason) , it (the necessity of the Creator of the 
1W. C. Smith explains and differentiates this term spar' from shari'a by 
saying "Al-shar' is God ordaining that man shall act thus-and-so; al-shari'a is 
the systematic formulation of the ordinances into an explicit (revealed) pattern or 
statement. Al-shay' is that by which man becomes morally obligated to act 
thus-and so; al-shari'a is that by which man knows that he is obligated. Al- 
shar' is something that God does..... ", W. C. Smith, "The Concept of Shari'a 
Among Some Mutakallimun", in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of 
Hamilton A. R. Gibb, edited by George Makdisi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965). 598- 
9. 
2Darüri here means that knowledge which man knows as obvious, vis ä vis 
the concept of axioms( badihhiya). Walzer explains this term darüri as "that 
which is given to man without any action on his part". Walzer (trans. ). Al- 
Fdrdbi on the Perfect State: Abu Nasr al-Fiiräbi's, Mabädi' Ara Ahl al-Madina 
al- äd' a, (Oxford 1985). 461. 
3George Anawati, " Hudüth al-'Aläm" Encyclopaedia of Islam, 548. Anawati 
explains this term " huddth is the masdar of hadatha, which signifies: (1) to 
appear, to arise, to have come into being recently; (2) to take place, to happen. 
With Muslim thinkers the term has two meanings: one denotes the existence of a 
thing, after its non-existence, in a temporal extension: this is al-hudüth al- 
zamiini.. For the mutakallimün, hudnth al-'äiam bears only the sense of a 
beginning in time". 
4For further discussions on al-Ghazäli's arguments that the world is new and 
thus created, see, "Refutation of Their(Philosophers') Belief in the Eternity of 
the World", forming chapter 1 in Tahäfut al-faldsifa 89-123, Sabih Ahmad 
Kamali 13-53, Michael Marmura, " The Logical Role of the Argument From 
Time in the Tahäfut's Second Proof for the World's Pre-Eternity", The Muslim 
World, XLVIIII, (1959). 306-314, George Hourani, The. Dialogue Between al- 
GhazdH and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World, " The Muslim World, 
XLVIII. (1958), 189-198. 
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new world, who necessarily possesses power (qudra), 
knowledge, and will) cannot be affirmed in revelation, 
because the revelation is based upon (God's) eternal speech 
(kaläm)1 If (God's) eternal speech (kaläm al-nafs)2. is not 
affirmed, revelation is not affirmed. For all that [the proof of] 
is preceding in ranking to (God's) eternal speech (kaläm a! - 
nafs), its proof is impossible by (God's) eternal speech 
(kaläm al-oafs) and what is based on (God's) eternal speech 
(kaläm al-nafs). In this same discussion3 also, in which we 
explain its (God's eternal speech), proof is not possible by 
revelation. 4 
Al-Ghazäli classifies here the instruments or means through which man 
knows. This classification of the means of knowledge given here is not 
meant to be exhaustive. From the above passage, al-Ghazdli recognises at 
least four means of obtaining knowledge; the first, by necessity (darüri); 
second, reason; third, revelation; and fourth a combination of both reason and 
revelation. 
Without elaborating on the knowledge known through necessity 
(daräzl), al-Ghazäli proceeds directly to discuss the second and third means of 
knowledge, that obtained by reason and that obtained by revelation. It is 
reason that al-Ghazäli uses to establish and lay the essential foundation which 
serves as a necessary stepping stone for obtaining any and all knowledge. 
Even the existence of revelation has to be first established by reason. Why 
1In this context, kaläm not only means speech but the speech of God. Gardet 
explains the meaning of the term " kaläm" by saying, " kamm in the sense of 
ka äm Allab, the Word of God, must be distinguished from; 'jim al-kaläm, 
"defensive apologetics"[q. v. ]' or "the science of discourse" (on God); and 
[q. v. ] which, in the expression kalima Allah means "a (single) divine 
utterance". Louis Gardet , 
"KaHm", Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd. edition. ). 
2Fazlur Rahman explains this technical term kaläm al-nafs. He says: 
" The great leaders of the orthodoxy like Abü' al-Hasan al-Ash`ari and others, 
were then led to declare that " the Qur' än as it is read and heard and seen is not 
the Word of God". They explicitly stated that the eternal Word of God is "a 
simple eternal, indivisible mental act of God (kaläm al-oafs) of which the 
Qur'an and other Revealed Books are the effects- the Qur'an being the latest and 
final in the series of Revelations. " Fazlur Rahmaa, " Divine Revelation and the 
Prophet (P. B. H. )". in Essays on Islam: Felicitation Volume in Honour of Dr. Muhammad Hamiddullah, ed. Hakim Mohammed Said, (Karachi, 1992). 106- 
7.1 
3It is most likely that al-Ghazäli here is referring to his previous discussion on 
an attribute of God; in the chapter on "The Seventh Attribute (of God): Speech 
(kaliim). al-igtisäd 114-129 
4- t'ä , 210 
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does al-Ghazäli insist that we must first establish that existence of revelation 
by reason? 1 Before al-Ghazäli can prove the existence of revelation, he 
needs first to establish the existence of the sender of revelation, i. e. God. 
The means by which al-Ghazdli seeks to establish the existence of God is 
through the existence of the world. Al-Ghazäli says: 
It is that (knowledge) of the beginning of the world, and (from 
this premise that the world is caused and thus created, 
(therefore) the necessity of the Creator of the caused world2. 
Anawati frames al-Ghazäli's argument in a syllogistic form as follows; 
Every being that has a beginning in time (hädith) necessarily 
has a cause that brings it into existence. 
Now the universe is a being that begins to exist. 
Therefore: It necessarily has a cause (i. e. God)3 
After establishing through the use of reason that God exists, by 
proving that He(God) is the creator of the world, the next step is to point out 
that the creator of the world must possess some attributes, obviously at least 
these attributes4, power, knowledge and will, for these attributes are 
absolutely necessary for creation. Al-Ghazäli must first establish the existence 
'One has to wonder who al-Ghazdli is addressing here. It is most likely that al- 
Ghazäll is trying to counter the Brahmans' objections to the possibility of 
prophecy. The Brahmans asserted that "the sending of prophets is impossible". 
al-Igtisäd , 195. tal- tisäd , 210 3George Anawati, " Hudiith al-'Alam", Encyclopaedia of Islam, 548. This 
form of syllogism is the syllogistic form of modus ponens. 
P then Q 
P 
Therefore :Q 
P (Every being that has a beginning in tirne(hädith)) then Q {necessarily has a 
cause that brings it into existence}. 
Now P {the universe is a being that begins to exist),. 
Therefore: Q {It necessarily has a cause( i. e God)} 
4For a full discussion of al-Ghazäli's concept of the attributes of God, see his 
book, al-Magsad al-asnä fi shark ma'äni asmä'. 
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of the sender of revelation i. e. God, before he can proceed to argue for the 
possibility of revelation i. e. the speech of God. It is with God's attribute of 
kali m that we are most concerned here. It is through this attribute of kaläm 
that revelation is produced. In order to prove that God possesses the 
attribute of kaläm, al-Ghazäli refers to the attribute of His creation, man. The 
principle al-Ghazäli applies here is that every perfection that is an attribute of 
the creation must necessarily exist with the Creator. He argues: 
It is said either that (speech) is perfection or imperfection- or 
that it is neither imperfection nor perfection- but since it is 
absurd to say that it is not imperfection and/or neither 
perfection nor imperfection, it would be necessarily established 
that it is perfection. Therefore, every perfection [which can ] 
exist in man necessarily exists in the Creator' as we pointed out 
ab ove. 2 
After arguing that God possesses the attribute of speech, al-Ghazäli 
explains in chapter six of al-Igtisäd: On the Seventh Attribute( of God): 
Concerning Speech3, why it is important to affirm the speech of God i. e. 
revelation through the use of reason. He says: 
If one attempts to affirm the divine speech (kaläm) on the [the 
authority of] the consensus and/or on [the strength] of the 
Tradition of the Messenger, one would wrong oneself because 
the consensus leans on the Tradition of the Messenger; and if 
one denies the Benefactor's being speaking, one necessarily 
denies the concept of messengership since being a messenger 
means transmitting the message of the sender. If it is 
inconceivable that the one who asserts that he is a sender 
speaks, how could a messenger be conceived? We do not, 
for example, listen to one who tells of being the messenger of 
the earth or the mountain to us, because we believe in the 
'This principle that every perfection which is an attribute of man must 
necessarily exist in the Creator in Arabic is expressed by - kullu kamälu wujnd ii al-makhldq fa huwa wäjib ii-wujdd al-khäliq. I have modified Abdu-r- 
Rahman Abu Zayd's translation of the above principle in the quotation because 
it is unclear. 
2 The above English translation is from a partial translation of the Igtisäd BY 
al-i'tigäd by, Abdu-r-Rahman Abu Zayd, Al-Ghazäli On Divine Predicates and Their Properties, ( Karachi, 1974). In future, refered to as at-Iqtisfid (Arabic 
text page), Abdu-r-Rahman Abu Zayd (translated page). - tisäd , 115. Abdu- r-Rahman Abu Zayd. 48. 
3a - t'sä , 114-129 
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impossibility of a speech or a messenger from either the 
mountain or the earth. To God alone is the highest ideal. 
Whoever believes in the absurdity of attributing speech 
to God could not possibly believe in a messenger, because 
whoever deems the divine speech a lie would necessarily deny 
its transmission. The message is an expression of the 
transmission of speech and the messenger an expression of the 
transmitter. I 
For al-Ghazäli, the authority of the consensus (al-ijmd') cannot affirm 
revelation because authority of the consensus is based on the strength of the 
tradition of the prophet (bi-qaul al-rasül) which is dependent on the truth of 
the revelation. Thus, to try to affirm revelation through either the authority of 
consensus or the tradition of the prophet is a logical fallacy. Revelation must 
be affirmed by an instrument which is not dependent on revelation. For, al- 
Ghazäli that instrument is reason. Thus, al-Ghazdli makes great efforts to 
prove the possibility of revelation through using reason, thereby making 
reason the basis for the affirmation of revelation. 
This demonstrates that al-Ghazäli recognises both revelation and 
reason as sources of knowledge. He explains that there are certain kinds of 
knowledge which are known through revelation alone, others by reason 
alone and there is also knowledge which is known through a combination of 
both sources, revelation and reason. He says: 
Concerning the knowledge which is only based on 
revelation.... We know from God Most High through 
revelation (wahy) and inspiration (ilh im). We know from 
revelation by hearing(bi-samä') concerning the Day of 
Resurrection, the reward and punishment and similar matters. 2 
The knowledge which can be known through revelation is, for example, the 
knowledge concerning the Day of Resurrection, the reward and punishment in 
the Hereafter. However illuminating these examples provided by al-Ghazäli 
of the knowledge obtainable only through revelation are, they still do not give 
1 -I tisad, 114-5. Abdu-r-Rahmaa Abu Zayd, 47-8. 
2a1-I tq isäd, 211. 
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us any discernible category of knowledge under which these types of 
knowledge fall , so that 
it will enable us to categorise what kinds of 
knowledge are known only through the means of revelation. For example, do 
we know right from wrong through revelation? Is it possible by knowing 
what actions are rewarded, and what are punished which are known only 
through revelation, that we may deduce from this what is right action and 
what is wrong action. From the above examples, it seems very difficult to 
answer this question. However, this issue of right or wrong may be better 
resolved by using al-Ghazäli's theological positions, especially on God's 
commands and actions. 
Al-GhazM-1 also states that we know God not only through revelation 
(wahy) but also by inspiration (Rhäm). Revelation and inspiration are means 
by which God makes himself known to man. Both revelation and inspiration 
are gifts of God to man, to whoever He wishes. Al-Ghazäli recognises that 
revelation and inspiration are two different sources of knowledge. However, 
he fails to tell us here from the perspective of what kinds of knowledge they 
give us how these two sources of knowledge are different. Do they provide 
us with the different kinds of knowledge or are they the same, 
complementary, but with different degrees of certainty? 
Concerning the knowledge which can be known by reason alone, he 
bases it on knowledge of this world. By knowing the world is originated 
and therefore, created, we are able to deduce that it must have a creator. In 
order for the creator to create, He must possess power (qudra), knowledge, 
and will. Thus, we are also able to deduce that this creator has power 
(qudra), knowledge, and will. If we start from the premise that the world is 
created, we easily deduce that the creator has the power, knowledge and will 
which are prerequisites in order to create this world but can we deduce much 
more than that? Using this premise that the world is originated and thus 
created, can we by using reason arrive at, for example, the conclusion that 
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God must be one, all powerful, all knowing ? Is it then possible to build on 
these deductions a whole framework of what God is and therefore deduce a 
whole theology using reason? This seemingly simple premise that the world 
is originated and thus created, when utilised creatively and logically, and then 
pushed to its ultimate conclusions, may lead to some very interesting 
implications. However, al-Ghazäli's conclusion that reason can deduce from 
the world being new that it is created and therefore there must be a creator, 
who obviously must possess power, knowledge and will, takes this premise 
only one step forward. , Al-Ghazäli does not take the trouble to elaborate the 
use of reason here, leaving instead a great deal to be desired. 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to deal with the knowledge obtained through 
using both sources of knowledge, revelation and reason. He says: 
Concerning knowledge through both (revelation and reason), it 
is within the scope of the reason and next (lower) in ranking 
to affirming the speech of God, like the problem of seeing of 
God, and (the fact that ) God Most High alone creates all 
movements and accidents, and similar matters. Whatever 
revelation brings, reason must consider it. If reason 
considers it possible, the necessity of belief in it is definite. 
(Assuming) that the revelational proof is unmistakably in the 
text and it rests upon no other possible (interpretations). 1 
Al-Ghazäli concludes the discussion on the role of reason here by setting it in 
judgement of revelation but only in terms of whether what revelation brings is 
possible. This is the only means by which reason can judge revelation. Al- 
Ghazdli here is only saying that revelation cannot and does not contradict 
reason. Reason stands in judgement of revelation only in terms of assessing 
what revelation brings as a possibility among other possibilities. If reason 
deems it possible, then reason must accept and assent to the demand of what 
revelation brings. The role of reason is limited to just making sure what 
revelation says is possible. It is not the role of reason to affirm nor deny 
revelation or even give rational reasons in support of it. However, al-Ghazäli 
1- t' äd, 213. 
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makes a very interesting concession to reason. If reason deems that this 
particular statement of what revelation brings is impossible according to the 
standards set, I assume, by reason, then this revelation must be reinterpreted. 
He says: 
Concerning what reason considers impossible (istihöla), it is 
necessary to interpret what revelation (sam') brings. It is 
inconceivable that revelation contains an unmistakable 
contradiction to reason. Most of the phenomena of prophetic 
reports (badkh, p1. aiadith) on God's anthropomorphism are 
false. The true prophetic reports among these reports are not 
final but susceptible to interpretation. ' 
Al-Ghazäli makes a similar argument for the interpretation of orally 
transmitted religious statements when they seem to contradict reason in - 
another work, Faysal. In Faysal, he provides examples to explain this point. 
He says: 
The second example is the saying of the Apostle-God's 
blessings and peace be upon him! -"God Most High leavened (khammara: here equivalent of "kneaded"-? ) the clay of Adam 
with His hand for forty mornings. " Thus he indeed affirmed 
of God Most High a hand. Now he who has solid apodeictic 
proof of the impossibility of God Most High's having a hand 
which is a sensible or imaginable member affirms that God- 
Praised be He! -has a spiritual and mental hand. I mean that he 
affirms the meaning and essence spirit of the hand, not its 
(physical) form. 2 
By comparing and contrasting al-Ghazäli's concepts of revelation and 
reason, we are better able to understand these concepts. However, 
discovering any coherent understanding of these concepts from al-Ghazäli's 
direct writings on these subjects in this theological tract is very difficult. 
From these scant discussions on these subjects in this book, we only can 
obtain a vague idea of al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation. It leaves us, 
however, with more questions than answers. 
1 -I 'säd, 213. 2as, 181-2. McCarthy, 154. 
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(2) Transmission of Revelation- How is Revelation Received? 
In al-Igtisäd, al-Ghazäli states that revelation is given to prophets' 
with the mission of conveying this message to man. In this theological work, 
in relationship to his discussion of the attribute of speech of God(kaldm 
Allab), al-Ghazäli rejects the philosophers' notion of how revelation is 
transmitted to the prophets. He summarises his understanding of the 
philosophers' notion of how revelation is transmitted to the prophets as 
follows: 
The philosophers pushed ahead their analogy to "the will" 
(iräda) and as for the speech, they say He is speaking in the 
sense that He creates in the essence of the Prophet the hearing 
of the arranged sounds either in [the Prophet's sleep] or in his 
state of consciousness, and that these sounds would have no 
existence outside the essence. Rather [these sounds exist] in 
the hearing of the Prophet just as a sleeping person would see 
non-existent individuals though their forms occur in his mind 
(dimägb). He also hears non-existent sounds which a person 
present [at the side] of a sleeping person does not hear while 
the person who is sleeping may hear [these sounds] and may 
become terrified and disturbed and [hence] awake frightened 
and alarmed. They [also] claim that if a prophet ranks high in 
prophecy ('ä15 al-rutba if al-nubuwwa), the purity of his soul 
leads to his seeing in his state of consciousness marvellous 
forms and he hears from harmonious sounds which he learns 
by heart while those around him hear and see nothing. By 
[these marvellous forms] they mean the vision of the angels 
and the hearing of the Qur' .n from them. But [he] who does 
not rank high in prophecy (al-nubuwwa)sees these [forms] 
only in [his] sleep. This is the gist of the doctrine of the 
misguided. 2 
Al-Ghazäli rejects the philosophers' concept of transmission of revelation 
I- 
which the philosophers argue occurs internally in the prophet's mind through 
God via the Active Intelligence acting on the prophet's intellect and this 
tal-Ic tisad, 195. 
2 -I tisäd, 130. Abdu-r-Rahman Abu Zayd, . 65-6. 
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enlightenment is transformed by the prophet's imaginative faculty into the 
symbolic and metaphorical truths of revelation. Instead, al-Ghazali affirms the 
traditional view that the Angel of Revelation appears physically in front of the 
prophet reciting to him verbally the verses of the Qur'an'. 
His attacks directed against the philosophers' concept of the 
transmission of revelation to the prophet as occurring internally are aimed at 
establishing the otherness, objectivity and verbal character of the revelation. 
For al-Ghazäli, the philosophers' concept of the transmission of revelation to 
the prophet as occurring internally would result in the rejection of the divine 
law itself. Al-Ghazäli explains why this is the result if one accepts the 
transmission of the revelation to the prophet as occurring internally as 
follows: 
As for the philosophers, they have fallen into contradictions 
concerning the attribute of speech. Their position is invalid 
from two positions: First, they say that God is speaking 
though they neither affirm the inner speech (kaläm al-nafs) 
nor do they affirm the existence of sound externally. They, 
however, affirm the hearing of sounds which they hold are 
created in the ears of the Prophet, peace be upon him, without 
any external sounds. If it is permissible that He be described 
as speaking through that which occurs in the mind ( dimägb) 
of someone else [i. e. the Prophet's mind] it should be 
permissible that He be described as sound producing and 
moving through the existence of sound and motion in someone 
else, which is absurd. 
Secondly, all that which they have mentioned is a rejection of 
the Divine Law (shatfa)) in total because what is perceived by 
a sleeping person is phantasm, not real. If the Prophet's 
knowledge of the Divine Speech is attributed to imagination 
which is like confused dreams, the Prophet would not trust it 
and it would not be knowledge. 2 
Al-Ghazäli's attacks, directed against the philosophers' concept of the 
transmission of revelation to the prophet as occurring internally, is aimed at 
establishing the traditional view that the Prophet received revelation through an 
external source in order to safeguard the purity, objectivity and verbal 
lIhy, a. 105, Nabh Amin Faris 234. 
tal-Igtisäd, 137-8. Abdu-r-Rahmaa Abu Zayd, 73-4. 
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literalness of the revelation which ultimately affect how we perceive the divine 
law derived from the revelation. 
(3) Prophets: The Medium of Revelation 
In al-Igtis d, al-Ghazäli does not discuss whether there are any pre- 
requisite qualifications for being a prophet. However, it would be 
inconceivable that he may accept an idiot or a person of unsound mind as a 
prophet. He does make a claim in the Ihyä that a prophet is one who 
possesses such an intellect that he requires no instruction from anyone except 
God. He is however, silent and does not discuss that issue in this work. 
(4) The Mission of Prophecy : The Purpose of Revelation 
After rejecting the Brahmans' assertions that prophecy is impossible 
and the Mu'tazilite position that prophecy is necessary for God, al-Ghazäli 
affirms the Ash'arite position that the sending of prophets by God is possible. 
A true prophet is confirmed by miracle. The mission of the prophet is to 
convey the revelation he receives to everyone. This mission ultimately points 
to the purpose of revelation itself. Since the purpose of prophecy is to convey 
the message of revelation, thus, conveying the content of the message of 
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revelation must be the purpose of revelation. We know from revelation by 
hearing (bi-samä') concerning God, the Day of Resurrection, the reward and 
punishment and similar matters. I Al-Ghazäli accepts that we also know 
certain things about God through the use of reason, at the very least that God 
is the Creator of the created world possessing knowledge, will and power. 
Thus, the revelation confirms these attributes of God and provides us with a 
much fuller description of God. Revelation also gives us knowledge which 
we cannot obtain elsewhere, such as, for example, the knowledge concerning 
the Day of Resurrection, the reward and punishment in the Hereafter. 2 
However illuminating these examples provided by al-Ghazäli of the 
knowledge obtainable only through revelation are, they still do not give us any 
discernible category of knowledge under which these types of knowledge fall 
to enable us to categorise what kinds of knowledge are known only through 
the means of revelation. 
'al-Igtis d, 211. 
tal- tisdd, 211. 
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(1) Kitäb al-'ilm 
Al-Ghazäli begins his magnum opus, Ihyä 'ulvm al-din with the 
discussion on the types and classification of knowledge. The first book of 
the Ihyä is titled Kitäb al-'ilm (The Book of Knowledge) . We will focus 
here on this Kitäb al-'ilm rather than his theological chapter the Qawä'id al- 
'Agä'id (The Principles of Belief) in the Ihyä because I think his other 
theological work the Igtisäd , is far more developed and better presented' on 
the concept of revelation than his Qawä'id al-'Agä'id. Al-Ghazäli divides 
his Kitäb al-'ilm into seven parts in which he discusses the types and 
classification, values and aims of knowledge and concludes the chapter 
interestingly enough with a discussion of the definition and divisions of the 
intellect ('aql) of which he speaks with high praise. 
Al-Ghazäli explains why he wrote this book by saying: 
To tread the crowded and dangerous path of the hereafter 
(tariq al-'akhira) with neither guide nor companion is 
difficult, tiring and strenuous. The guide for the road are the 
learned men who are the heirs of the prophet, but the times are 
void of them now and only the superficial are left..... 
Everyone of them was so wrapped up in his immediate fortune 
that he came to see good as evil and evil as good, so that the 
science of religion (`ilm-al-din) disappeared and the torch of 
the true faith was extinguished all over the world. They duped 
the people into believing that there was no knowledge except 
such ordinances of government as the judges use to settle 
disputes when the mob riots; or the types of arguments which 
the vain-glorious display in order to confuse and refute; or the 
elaborate and flowery language with which the preachers seek 
to lure the common folk. They did this because, apart from 
these three, they could find no other way to snare illegal profits 
and gain the riches of the world. On the other hand the science 
of the path of the hereafter, which our fore-fathers trod and 
which includes what God in His book called law (figh), 
II concur with Michael Marmura's comments while comparing the style and 
content of a1-Igtisäd and Qawä'id al-'Agä'id He argues that 'the Igtisäd's 
arguements are more developed and he argues that it serves as the sequel to al- Ghazdli's Tahäfut al-faläsifah. See, Micheal Marmura, " al-Ghazaii on the 
Bodily Resurection and Causality in Tahafut and the Igtisad, in Aligarh Journal 
of Islamic Thought. (1989). 50-51. 
105 
wisdom (hikma), knowledge (`ilm), enlightenment 
(diyä'), light (nür), guidance (hidäya) and righteousness 
(rushd), has vanished from among men and has been 
completely forgotten. Since this is a calamity afflicting religion 
and a grave crisis overshadowing it, I have therefore deemed it 
important to engage in writing of this book to revive the 
science of religion, to bring to light the exemplary lives of the 
departed imams, and to show what branches of knowledge the 
prophets and the virtuous fathers regarded as useful. I 
After a rather strong condemnation of the state of religious leadership 
and teaching of his times, especially of the hair splitting jurists, dialectical 
theologians, and the popular preachers, al-Ghazäli saw his task as to revive 
the true teachings of religion which is the science of religion. 
Al-Ghazdli then proceeds to define the science of religion as divided 
into two sciences which are the science of revelation ('ilm al-mukäshafa)2 and 
the science of practical religion ('ilm al-mu'ämala). He defines 'ilm al- 
mukdshafa as 'knowledge and only knowledge'. 3 In contrast, he defines the 
science of practical religion as 'knowledge as well as action in accordance with 
that knowledge'. 4 
Al-Ghazdli discusses revelation in Kitäb al-71m not as a concept by 
itself but under the study of `ilm al-mukffshafa. It is al-Ghazäli's discussion 
of `ilm al-mukäshafa as discussed in this book which we will have to focus 
upon here. Al-Ghazäli himself only discusses revelation here in regard to its 
1A1-Ghazäli, Kitäb al-'ilm is in Vol. 1 of lea., (Cairo, 1987), (4 Volumes). 
Kitäb al-'ilm has been translated into English by Nabih Amin Faris under the 
title of The Book of Knowledge, (Lahore, 1962). Hereafter referred to as 
LArabic text page) Nabih Amin Faris( translation page). hvä 10. Nabih Amin 
Faris, 2. 
2There is a serious flaw in using Faris' translation of the term 'ilm al-mukäsbafa as 
the science of revelation. Al-Ghazäli defines ('Rm al-mukdsbafa) as "that science 
whereby the cover is removed so that the truth regarding the truths of these things 
become as clear as if it were seen by the eye, leaving no room for any doubt. " yä 
31. Nabih Amin Faris, 48. Such a translation of the term 'ilm al-mukäshafa as the 
science of revelation is not only inaccurate but for our purposes here confuses our 
discussion on revelation which is wahy. Thus, while still utilising Faris' translation, 
wherever the term 'B m al-mukäshafa occurs, we will use the Arabic term instead of 
Faris' English translation of it as the science of revelation. 
3Jä_ 12. Nabih Amin Faris, 6. 
4hä 12. Nabih Amin Faris, 6. 
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relationship with `ilm al-mukäshafa. He points out he will discuss revelation 
under the study of `ilm al-mukäshafa in the following way: 
As to the stages of revelation (wahy), they are many, but to 
embark on a discussion of them under practical religion ('ilm 
al-mu'ämala) is not fitting, because they fall under the science 
of revelation('ilm al-mukäshafa).. Do not think, however, 
that the knowledge of the stages of revelation (darajät al-wahy 
requires that a person be himself a receiver of revelation, 
because it is not unlikely for a physician to know the different 
stages of health...... Consequently, not everyone who knows 
what prophethood (al-nubuwwa) and sainthood (al-wiläya) 
are will be a prophet( nabs) or a saint (wall), and not everyone 
who knows piety (al-tagwa-) and godliness (al-wara') will be 
pious or godly. ' 
There emerges from the above passage some very important issues on how al- 
Ghazäli discusses revelation in this work. Firstly, he plans to discuss 
revelation under the study of `ilm al-mukäshafa. Secondly, he at least 
acknowledges that one can actually know about revelation without having to 
become an actual prophet who receives revelation. Not only can one come to 
know about revelation without having to be one who has experienced 
revelation, but he also recognises that having knowledge is one thing and 
acting on it or benefiting from it is quite another. 
He further elaborates the use of the science of revelation in trying to 
comprehend revelation as follows: 
Through it ('ilm al-mukdshafa) is also attained the knowledge 
of the meaning of prophecy (al-nubuwwa) and the prophet 
(nabs) and the import of revelation (wahy)..... Through it is 
known how the Angels (al-mala'ika) appeared to the prophets 
(a! -anbiya-) and how they [the prophets] received the (divine) 
revelation (wahy). 2 
Therefore, for al-Ghazäli here, the key to understanding the revelation is 
through understanding 'R m al-mukäshafa. First and most importantly, at 
least as far as understanding revelation is concerned, al-Ghazdli acknowledges 
11a. 105. Nabih Amin Faris, 234. 
2Ihyä. 31. Nabih Amin Fads, 47 
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that even one who has not experienced revelation can come to understand 
revelation. Next, he plans to discuss revelation under the discussion on 'ilm 
al-mukäsbafa because it is through this 'ilm al-mukishafa that one comes, to 
attain the knowledge of the meaning of prophecy, prophethood and revelation. 
In addition to this, through 'ilm al-mukäshafa, one comes to know how the 
Angel appeared to the Prophets and gave them the revelation. Thus, for al- 
Ghazäli, 'Um al-mukäshafa is the key to understanding revelation itself. 
However, al-Ghazäli's discussions on `ilm al-mukäshafa in this 
work pose some problems. He states in regard to Vim al-mukäshafa as 
follows: 
One is not permitted to record in writing, although it is the 
ultimate aim of saints and the desire of the eye of the sincere' 
`Ilm al-mukäshafa, a science withheld from men and its 
discussion proscribed. The limits into which it is permissible 
to go into its discussion is to say that it is a precious jewel and 
a pearl of inestimable worth, more excellent than all material 
objects. 2 
This attitude towards 'ilm al-mukäshafa makes an analysis of revelation 
difficult because as a result of this attitude there is no systematic discussion of 
'ilm al-mukäshafa and therefore no systematic discussions on revelation 
itself. However, as we stated earlier, an analysis of revelation is not 
impossible because one finds some discussions on revelation in relation to 
other discussions. We will thus have to try to make do from these brief and 
scattered discussions on 'ilm al-mukäsbafa to abstract an analysis of 
revelation. 
We will subject our analysis of al-Ghazdli's 'ilm al-mukäsbafa as 
discussed here in Kitäb al-'ilm to the same analysis as we stated in the 
beginning of this chapter. In short, we will try to obtain from al-Ghazdli's 
1hä 12. Nabih Amin Faris, 6 
2,, 68. Nabih Amin Fads, 142. 
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writing of the Kitäb al-'ilm concerning revelation: 1. what kinds of 
knowledge does revelation actually give us; 2. how is this knowledge 
ultimately transmitted to us; 3. by whom in order to ensure its purity and 
originality; 4. and most importantly, what is the ultimate purpose of this 
revelation revealed to man. 
Revelation Defined 
In this book, Kitäb ai-'ilm, al-Ghazdli does not discuss revelation by 
itself but as part of his discussion of 'ilm al-mukäshafa. Thus, we will here 
present al-Ghazd1l's discussions on 'ilm al-mukäsbafa. From these 
discussions, we hope to be able to abstract al-Ghazäli's concept of revelation. 
In Kitäb al-'ilm, we find no statement on the definition of revelation. 
Rather, we do find al-Ghazäli classifying knowledge into sacred knowledge 
(shaifa) and non-sacred knowledge (gbayr shari'a). A closer examination of 
the classification of sacred knowledge will unveil al-Ghazäli's definition of 
revelation. This is because revelation is the source of sacred knowledge. 
Thus, by defining sacred knowledge, we are indirectly defining its source, 
revelation. 
Al-Ghazäli defines sacred knowledge (shari'a) by saying: 
By sacred sciences I mean those which have been acquired by 
the prophets and are not arrived at either by reason, like 
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arithmetic, or by experimentation, like medicine, or hearing 
(sam'), like language. I 
For al-Ghazäli, sacred knowledge which is the product of revelation is neither 
obtained through reason, experimentation, or hearing, but it is acquired from 
God through His prophets. Thus, if sacred knowledge is neither obtained 
through reason, experimentation, or hearing, then its source, revelation, also 
cannot either be obtained through these means. Therefore, since the sacred 
knowledge which is the product of revelation is acquired from God through 
His prophets, thus, revelation itself must be acquired from God through His 
prophets. 
To substantiate al-Ghazäli's claims that revelation gives us knowledge 
which we can not obtain either through reason, experimentation, or hearing, 
but are only obtainable through the prophets, al-Ghazäli proceeds to give us a 
long list of examples of knowledge that the science of revelation provides. Al- 
Ghazäli says: 
'Ilm al-mukäshafa is the science concerned with the saints and 
the favourites of God. It stands for a light which shines in the 
heart when it is cleansed and purified of its blameworthy 
qualities. Through this light is revealed the truth of several 
things, and to which several ambiguous and obscure meanings 
have been attached. 
1. Through it, these truths are clarified until the true knowledge 
of the essence of God is attained together with that of His 
eternal and perfect attributes, His work and wisdom in creation 
of this world and the hereafter. 2 
2. As well as the reason for His exalting the latter over the 
former. 
3. Through it is also attained the knowledge of the meaning of 
prophecy and the prophet and the import of revelation (wahy). 
4. Through it is obtained the truth about Satan, the meaning of 
the word angels and devils, and the cause of enmity of Satan 
and man. 
5. Through it is known how the Angel appeared to the 
prophets and how they received the (divine) revelation (wahy). 
6. Through it is achieved the knowledge of the kingdom of heaven and earth, as well as the knowledge of the heart and 
how the angelic hosts have confronted the devils. 
1hä. 28. Nabih Amin Faris, 36-7. 
21 have provided the numbering of this list (1-10) to simplfy and highlight the different areas the examples cover. 
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7. Through it is gained the knowledge of how to distinguish 
between the company of heaven and the company of the Devil, 
a knowledge of the hereafter, Paradise and hell-fire, the 
punishment of the grave, the bridge (al-sirär) across the 
internal fire, the balance of the judgement-day, and knowledge 
(of the day) of reckoning. 
8. Through it is also comprehended the meaning of the 
following words of God: " Read thy Book; there needeth none 
but thyself to make out an account against thee this day; " (Sara 
17: 15) and " Truly the hereafter is life indeed ! (Sura 29: 64). 
9. Through this same light is revealed the meaning of meeting 
God and of occupying a place in His proximity; the meaning of 
attaining happiness through the communion with the heavenly 
hosts (al-malä al-a'15) and association with the angels and the 
prophets. 
10. Through it also the distinction between the ranks of the 
people in the different heavens is determined until they see one 
another in the same way as Venus is seen in the heart of 
heaven. 1 
The long list of examples al-Ghazäli provides here as examples of knowledge 
that 'ilm al-mukdsbafa gives us is certainly not exhaustive. However, it 
provides a fascinating insight into what kind of knowledge al-Ghazdli 
considers 'ilm al-mukdsbafa gives us. From the many examples al-Ghazäli 
provides on knowledge the 'Um al-mukdsbafa gives us, we can deduce that 
at the very least that 'ilm al-rukäshafa gives us a description of God, man's 
relationship with God and vice-versa, and man's life after death. However 
this relationship of 71m al-mukäshafa to the revelation itself is still somewhat 
vague. Are we to assume that all that can be known through 'ilm al- 
mukdsbafa ultimately means knowing the revelation itself, since al-Ghazäli 
argued that it is through 'ilm al-mukäshafa that one attains knowledge of the 
meaning of prophecy, prophet and the revelation. If this is so, then the 
knowledge gained from 'Jim al-mukdshafa directly reflects the knowledge 
that can be gained from revelation. If this is so, then, since 'ilm al- 
mukdsbafa gives us a description of God, man's relationship with God and 
vice-versa, and man's life after death, we can then deduce that revelation also 
gives us this same knowledge. It still remain unclear whether 'Um al- 
1hä 31. Nabih Amin Faris, 47-8. 
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mukäshafa provides us with more knowledge than the revelation itself or less. 
If 'ilm al-mukäshafa provides us with more knowledge than the revelation 
itself, how do we distinguish this added extra that 'iim al-mukäshafa 
provides ? From the long list of examples given above, it would seem that 
'ilm al-mukäshafa provides more detailed information than those provided in 
the revelation. However, without al-Ghazäli specifically specifying that this 
more detailed information is what distinguishes the information from 'ilm al- 
mukäshafa from the revelation itself, that in fact all the 'ilm al-mukdshafa 
does is to expand and provide a detailed explanation or commentary on the 
terse statements of revelation, we can only speculate that this is so. Thus, it is 
most likely that the information given by Vim al-mukäshafa reflects a 
contemplation on the information given in the revelation. Therefore, if we 
denude the information given in 'ilm al-mukäshafa of its detailed aspects, we 
should be able to arrive at the crux of the knowledge that the revelation 
provides us. 
However, al-Ghazäli's later comments on 'ilm al-makäshafa raises 
some problems of its essential nature which ultimately effect his 
understanding of revelation itself. He says: 
We, therefore, mean by Vim al-mukäsbafa (that science 
whereby) the cover is removed so that the truth regarding the 
truths of these things becomes as clear as if it were seen by the 
eye, leaving no room for any doubt. Man would by himself be 
capable of such a thing had not rust and rot resulting from the 
filth of this world accumulated over the surface of the mirror of 
his heart. By the science of the road of the hereafter ('ilm a! - rariq al-'akhira), we mean the knowledge of how to remove 
from the surface of this mirror the filth which bars the knowing 
of God, His attributes, and His works. The mirror is cleansed 
and purified by desisting from lust and emulating the prophets in all their states. Thus to whatever extent the heart is cleansed 
and made to face the truth, to that same extent it will reflect His 
reality. But there is no way to this except through discipline 
(which will be discussed in the proper place) learning and instruction. I 
1hä 31-2. Nabih Amin Faris, 48-9. 
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The above statement made by al-Ghazäli causes great confusion to his concept 
of 'ilm al-mukäshafa which will ultimately affect his concept of revelation 
itself. From the above statement, 'man would by himself be capable of such a 
thing had not rust and rot resulting from the filth of this world accumulated 
over the surface of the mirror of his heart', I have a great deal of trouble in 
trying to understand what al-Ghazäli means by this. Does al-Ghazäli means 
that if men's hearts were not rusted or filthy, then 71m al-mukäshafa is not 
necessary? Would this then imply that if men's hearts were not rusted nor 
filthy, then he would by himself obtain the knowledge that 'ilm al-mukäsbafa 
gives him. If this is so, then, 'ilm al-mukäsbafa only became necessary 
because men's hearts became rusted and filthy, and thus were unable to obtain 
this knowledge by themselves. However, the knowledge that 'iim al- 
mukäsbafa gives us is closely related to the knowledge that revelation gives 
us. If Vim al-mukäshafa only became necessary because men's hearts 
became corrupted, then, how does this understanding affect the necessity of 
revelation itself. Unless for al-Ghazäli, inevitably each and every men's hearts 
will become rusted and filthy and thus they will all fail to obtain this 
knowledge without the help of Vim al-mukäsbafa. It must borne in mind 
that since al-Ghazäli said that sacred knowledge(sbari'a) is neither obtained 
through reason, experimentation, or hearing, then its source, revelation, also 
cannot either be obtained through these means'. The relationship of 'ilm al- 
mukäsbafa to revelation itself remains unclear. 
11h7ä. 27. Nabih Amin Faris, 36-7 
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Transmission of Revelation: How is Revelation Received? 
In Kitäb al-`ilm, al-Ghazäli points out that revelation (wahy) is only 
given to prophets. I He differentiates acquired knowledge which is learnt and 
heard, and that which is given through inspiration (ilhärn) from revelation 
(wahy). For al-Ghazäli, acquired knowledge which is learnt or heard is 
obtainable by everyone. For learnt knowledge is obtainable through reason 
and experimentation, and heard knowledge is language. 
The knowledge obtained from inspiration (ilhäm) and revelation 
(wahy) is given by God to man. However, who receives them and the 
methods of their reception are different. Both prophets and non-prophets can 
receives inspiration. Al-Ghazäli explains inspiration (ilhärn) as: 
The question may be asked, how did the person who related 
this know what the Devil has said especially since no one has 
seen the Devil or talked with him? Then you shall know that 
those whose hearts have been sanctified have the secrets of the 
heavens made known to them either by inspiration (Rh 5m) 
which dawns upon them from where they know not, or by 
actual vision (al-ru ya al-sädiga) (in their sleep), or in their 
wakefulness which unfolds to them the mysteries through the 
contemplation of types just as in sleep. 2 
From this explanation of inspiration, we can deduce that for al-Ghazäli, 
inspiration makes known to us what we had not known before. The types of 
knowledge that inspiration provides are not clearly defined. From the example 
given above, inspiration gives us a knowledge of what the Devil has said, 
even though no one has ever seen or talked with the Devil. This seems to 
imply that inspiration can give us knowledge beyond sensory perception since 
no one has physically seen nor literally talked to him. It also seem to imply 
1hä 105. Nabih Amin Faris, 234 
2hä. 97. Nabih Amin Faris, 218. 
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that it gives knowledge which is beyond reasoning because no one could 
reason out what the Devil would say. Therefore, the knowledge from 
inspiration is knowledge beyond human physical perception and beyond 
ratiocination. This does not mean that this knowledge contradicts reason for 
it may be within the realm of possibility but it cannot be confirmed by reason. 
Al-Ghazäli does distinguish inspiration from revelation. Al-Ghazdli 
says that the process of communication between God and man can never be 
direct but is achieved through an intermediary, for example through the means 
of the angels. Al-Ghazali proceeds to describe this communication form God 
to man as revelation by saying: 
Besides, the light of knowledge is not made to shine upon the 
heart of man except through (the instrument of) the angels, and 
it is not possible for any man to have any communication with 
God except through revelation or through a veil or through a 
messenger whom God sends and instructs to declare His will. 
Similarly, whatever knowledge is sent by the grace of God to 
the human heart is transmitted by the angels who have been 
entrusted (muwakkalirn) with this responsibility. They are 
angels who have been made holy, pure and free from all 
blameworthy traits. They attend to no one but the good, and 
with what they possess of the mercy of God, they reform no 
one but the pure. I 
However, revelation can only be received by specially chosen individuals, the 
prophets. Al-Ghazäli describes the difference between inspiration and 
revelation by saying: 
This kind of imparting information by the angels to the 
prophets is different from explicit revelation (wahy) which 
involves hearing a definite voice with an ear and seeing the 
angel with the eye. 2 
From the above statement, al-Ghazäli clearly differentiates inspiration from 
revelation. However, he did not here distinguish the kinds of knowledge that 
one receives from inspiration from that which One receives from revelation. 
11bya , 62, Nabih Amin Faris, 126-7. See also the Quran 42: 51 which says; "It is not fitting for a man that God should speak to him except by inspiration(w47) or from behind a veil or by sending a messenger to reveal 
with God's permission, what God wills; for He is Most High, Most Wise. " 
2ä_1O5. Nabih Amin Faris, 234 
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The issue here is whether the kinds of knowledge that one receives from 
inspiration and that from revelation are different either in content, degree of 
importance or even degree of certainty. Al-Ghazäli, however, does make the 
distinction between inspiration and revelation in the technical form of how it is 
transmitted to the prophet. Revelation is transmitted to the prophet by him 
hearing a definite voice and seeing the angel communicating it to him. I Thus, 
for al-Ghazäli the revelation itself is transmitted word for word, verbatim and 
by an external factor, the trustworthy angel. To emphasise these two factors 
that the revelation is transmitted word for word, and by another to the prophet, 
the imagery of the angel being seen by the prophet and the angel speaking and 
being heard by the prophets is essential and important to emphasise. This is 
in sharp contrast to the philosophers' view on the transmission of revelation. 2 
After stating that revelation is transmitted to the prophets verbatim, we 
take a closer look at how the prophet communicates 'ihn al-mukishafa to 
others. Al-Ghaz5U says: 
The science of practical religion ('ilm al mu'iimala) is merely a 
path which leads to [science of ] revelation and only through 
that path did the prophets of God communicate with people and 
lead them to Him. Concerning 'iim al-muklshafa itself, the 
prophets spoke figuratively ( bi-al-ramz) and briefly through 
signs (al-tamthil) and symbols, because they realised the 
inability of man's mind to comprehend (bi-qusür afhäm al- 
khalq). 3 
From the above statement, we find al-Ghazäli arguing that the prophets spoke 
figuratively utilising signs and symbols concerning 'ilm al-mukdshafa. The 
prophets did this in that manner for the purpose of conveying to man 'iltn al- 
mukäshafa in a manner that is in accordance to his ability to understand. 
Contrast this usage of symbolic language to educate in accordance with one's 
audience's ability to understand with the philosophers who have argued that 
: A05. Nabih Amin Faris, 234. 11bya 
2For the the philosophers' view on the transmission of revelation to the 
prophets, see Chapter One, Section 2.2 : Transmission on Revelation. 
3hä 12. Nabih Amin Faris, 6. 
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the revelation uses figurative language and signs for the same purpose of 
conveying to men a message of belief and action in accordance with his ability 
to understand. However, al-Ghazäli states that the prophet receives the 
revelation from the angel verbatim and conveys it to man verbatim. He. 
however, does not discuss whether the revelation utilises figurative language 
and signs in this work. In al-Mungidh , al-Ghazäli criticises the philosophers 
for taking the commands of the religious laws based on the revelation in a 
figurative sense, regarding the laws' aim only as a means to control the 
common man. Al-Ghazäli says concerning the philosophers' view towards 
religious laws as he understood it : 
... the aim of the religious prescriptions is to control the 
common people and to curb them from internecine strife and 
contention and from unrestrained indulgence in their passion. 
Hence I [the philosopher] am not one of the ignorant masses 
and therefore subject to commandments. ' 
I do not wish here to address the issue whether al-Ghazäli was right , wrong 
or had oversimplified the philosophers' view on the religious prescriptions, 
for that has been dealt with in the Chapter on al-Fdräbi's Concept of 
Revelation. What is at issue here is that this is how ai-Ghazäli had perceived 
the philosophers' view on religious prescription, a view which he clearly 
condemns. Thus, it is most likely that even though al-Ghazäli has argued that 
the prophets in conveying 'ilm al-mukäsbafa had utilised a figurative 
language, he would probably conclude that the revelation itself must be taken 
literally 
ilal_Mung, idh 96. Mc Carthy. 104. 
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(3) Prophets: The Medium of Revelation. 
Al-Ghazili in Kitäb a! -71m does recognise the differences in the 
native intellect men are endowed with and seems very much to concur with the 
philosophers here that there are pre-requisite qualifications for becoming a 
prophet at least in terms of an intellectual pre-requisite. In comparison to the 
philosophers who insist that the prophet should not only have a intellectual 
pre-requisite but also the imaginative pre-requisites, al-Ghazäli requires only 
the intellectual condition. Al-Ghazäli says: 
In fact, he who denies the disparity of men in this instinct[the 
intellect] is loose outside the confines of sanity, and he who 
thinks that the intellect of the Prophet is the same as that of any 
of the outlandish peasants and desert ruffians is himself filthier 
than any of those peasants. Furthermore how could the 
disparity of intellect [i. e. the native intellect] be denied when 
without it men would not have varied in their ability to 
understand knowledge, nor would they have been divided into 
the stupid who fail to understand anything except after a long 
and tedious explanation by a teacher, the brilliant who respond 
to the least sign, and the perfect (kämil) from whose souls 
truth emanates (tanba `athu) without any previous 
instructions.... Such are the prophets to whom recondite things 
are clarified in their inward thoughts without having learned or 
heard anything of the sort. 2 
It is clear here that al-Ghazäti differentiates the prophets from others at least in 
terms of the their native intellectual capacity with which they are endowed 
and cannot be obtained by them through other means. Thus, the prophets 
obtain knowledge through their souls in their inward thoughts without having 
to learn or hear from others. However, al-Ghazdli neglects to explain further 
what exactly is the meaning of his view that the prophets are in no need of 
instruction but instead things are clarified to them in their inward thoughts. 
1For the philosophers' discussion of the pre-requisite qualifications of the 
prophet, see Chapter One: Section 2.3: Prophets: The Medium of Revelation. 2j h ä. 105. Nabih Amin Faris, 233-4 
118 
s 
Al-Ghazäli fails to explain what kinds of knowledge the prophets obtain 
through this means. Do the prophets obtain all their knowledge through this 
means or only a certain kind of knowledge? If the prophets obtain knowledge 
through their own soul, what then is the role of the angel of revelation in 
bringing them revelation and giving them this knowledge of revelation? Al- 
GhazM-l's statement on the status of the prophets' native intellectual capacity is 
indeed revealing. However, without him elaborating further how this works 
and what are its implications, we have great difficulty in trying to comprehend 
the intellectual role in the career of a prophet. 
The intellect's role in the career of a prophet may have been left 
unclarified satisfactorily by al-Ghazäli here but the duties of the prophet are 
clearly stated. Once a person receives revelation and thus becomes a prophet, 
then he must discharge the duties of prophethood. For al-Ghazdli, it is 
revelation. that makes the person become a prophet. He says: 
Knowledge however is in itself an absolute excellence apart 
from any attribution. It is the description of God's perfection 
and through it the angels and the prophets were imbued with 
honour. I 
The task of prophethood then is conveying it to everyone. Al-Ghazäli 
explains the role of the prophet as follows: 
The Prophet said, " God does not give the learned any 
knowledge unless He entered with them into the same 
convenant He entered with prophets- namely to make it known 
and not to conceal it. 2 
A person who is blessed with receiving revelation becomes a prophet. Once 
he becomes a prophet, he is burdened with the task of conveying the message 
of revelation to man. 
Ißä 
. 23, 
Nabih Amin Faris, 25. 
zha 120, Nabih Amin Fans, 20 
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(4) The Mission of Prophecy: The Purpose of Revelation. 
The mission of the prophet is to convey the message that he receives 
from revelation to everyone. This mission points to the purpose of prophecy 
and thus ultimately to the purpose of revelation itself. Revelation's goal is to 
give man knowledge which will inform him on how to act and motivate him to 
action. 
Al-Ghazäli stated that sacred knowledge (shag `a) which is the 
product of revelation is neither obtained through reason, experimentation, or 
hearing (sam'), but is acquired from God through His prophets'. Thus, if 
sacred knowledge is not obtained through reason, experimentation, or 
hearing, then its source, revelation also cannot either be obtained through 
these means. Therefore, since the sacred knowledge which is the product of 
revelation is acquired from God through His prophets, revelation itself must 
be acquired from God through His prophets. Al-Ghazäli does not state 
anywhere in this book whether the knowledge obtained from revelation is 
contradictory to reason. It is plausible that reason may not be able to derive 
this knowledge, but once reason knows it, it may be able to comprehend and 
understand and accept the truth of this knowledge. Al-Ghazäli must have 
realised that the understanding of revelational truths must be through the 
limited capacity of man's intellect. Thus, man's ability to understand and how 
he comprehends revelational truth is somewhat influenced by his intellect. 
Therefore, to conceive of revelational truths and intellectual truths as mutually 
exclusive is problematic. At the end of Kitäb al-Um, al-Ghazäli gives very 
high praise to man's intellect, however, even here he does not clarify the role 
of intellect in relationship to revelational truths, its understanding and 
application in man's daily lives. 
1hä. 27. Nabih Amin Faris, 36-7 
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The application of revelation, which has a revolutionary impact on 
man's life, is the aim and goal of revelation. Revelation does not only provide 
knowledge that man must know. But this knowledge must be applied in 
action. Thus, al-Ghazäli says, " The gist of it all is knowledge of how to 
perform works whose discharge is obligatory". ' Al-Ghazäli's use of the term 
obligatory (wajib) is very important. It denotes that man has obligations and 
he must discharge these obligations. Revelation informs man of his 
obligations to God and how to discharge these obligations. It must be borne 
in mind that, when we discuss al-Ghazäli's theological works, that for al- 
Ghazäli, these obligations only go in one direction. Man is obligated to God. 
God has no obligation to anyone, whosoever and for whatsoever. 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to describe the relationship between 
knowledge and action. He says: 
That with which (men) draw closer to God is divided into three 
parts: pure knowledge which is `ilm al-mukäsbafa; pure 
works such as, for example, the justice of the magistrate and 
his rule among men; and a mixture of works and knowledge 
which is the science of the path of the hereafter (71m-tariq-al- 
akhira)whose possessor belongs to both men of knowledge 
and the men of works. 2 
From this above statement, we can deduce that for al-Ghazäli, the relationship 
between knowledge and work is dynamic. One has to have knowledge in 
order to know how to act. And it is in the action that one gains benefit from the 
knowledge. All knowledge and action is in order to know and please God. 
Al-Ghazäli says: 
It is therefore wise to acquire the best of everything, satisfying 
oneself, so to speak, with the mere tasting of it while directing 
whatever power one has left, after having obtained all available knowledge, towards mastering that the noblest of all sciences, 
the science of the hereafter ('ilm al-akhira) including the 
science of practical religion ('ilm al-mu'ämala), as well as 'ilm 
1T. 26. Nabih Amin Faris, 35. 
2hä 35. Nabih Amin Faris, 58 
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al-rrmukäshafa The goal of the science of practical religion (VIM 
al-mu `ämala) is al-mukäshafa and the goal of al-mukäshafa is 
to know God. By this I do not mean the creed which the 
common folk receive from their parents or accept on the 
authority of others, nor the rules of dialectic and argumentation 
in the defence of one's position against the devious attacks of 
adversaries which is the aim of the theologians. What I mean is 
a form of conviction which is a result of a light with which God 
floods the heart of a servant who, through self mortification has 
purified his soul from all impurities until he has attained to the 
measure of Abu-Bakr's faith which, as the Lord of creation 
testified, would outweigh the faith of all the world if it were 
ever compared with it. I 
Even with al-Ghazäli's emphasis on knowledge, he still feels that true 
conviction is not attain through the efforts of the intellect. Rather it is attained 
through self mortification. Self mortification (mujähada) purifies the soul 
form all impurities and allows the light from God to flood the heart of the 
servant. 
Al-Ghazäli proceeds to describe the process of self mortification and its 
results. He says: 
For self mortification leads to contemplation (musbähada), and 
through the intricate details of the sciences of the heart 
fountains of wisdom gush forth. Books and formal education 
are of little help in this field because the wisdom which passes 
all understanding is only achieved through self mortification, 
observation and watching, the active fulfilment of outward and 
inward duties, coming before God (julils) in solitude (kbalwa) 
and bringing the heart before His presence (budür) through 
pure reflection (fikr) and sole devotion to Him. This is the key 
of inspiration (ilbäm) and the fountainhead of unveiling 
(kasbf) .2 
The relationship in al-GhazM between these three concepts knowledge, action 
and self-mortification, is complex. Revelation is the source of knowledge. 
Action is the result of obeying the knowledge gained from revelation. The 
relationship of self-mortification is not so easy to understand. However, it 
obviously plays an important role for al-Ghazäii. 
h ä. 65 Nabih Amin Faris, 135 
2hä. 86. Nabih Amin Faris, 189. 
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(3) Al-Magsad al-asnä ff sharh ma'äni asmä' Allah al-husnä 
Al-Magsad al-asnä fs sbarlj ma'äni asmii' Allah al-husnäl(The 
Noblest of Aims in the Explanation of God's Fairest Names) is essentially a 
work on theology. However, its style and themes are not bound to the 
conventions of the traditional theological manuals like al-Igtisäd which al- 
Ghazal-1 had written earlier in his career. Instead, Frank aptly summarises the 
uniqueness of this work by saying " he (al-Ghazäli) tends to express himself 
more forthrightly and with greater clarity than he generally does elsewhere in 
treating the same basic matter (theological debates)"2. It is precisely for this 
reason that this work represents al-Ghazäli's own thoughts rather than him 
being formally bound to regurgitate certain conventional positions or 
arguments such as in al-Igtisäd or al-Ghazäli speculating only for the 
purpose of debunking others' positions and arguments such as he did in 
Tahäfut al-faläsifa. This is the real and true value of this work. Thus, we 
have chosen this work among the three theological works reviewed in order to 
lay bare al-Ghazdli's own ideas on theology and their implications for his 
concept of revelation. 
tal-Ghazäli. al-Magsad al-asnä fi sharh ma'äni asmä' Allah al-husnä, ed. 
Fadlou A. Shehadi, ( Beirut, 1971). This work has been translated into 
English under the title, al-Ghazäli : The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 
by David Burrell and Nazih Daher. ( Cambridge: 1992). Hereafter referred to 
as simply al-M a sad (Arabic Text page), David Burrell (translation page). 
2Richard Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: al- hazäli and Avicenna, 
(Heidelberg, 1992), 10-11. It should be noted also that although this work is of 
great interest and a welcome addition to the discussion of the impact of 
philosophy on the Islamic tradition, I cannot agree with many of Frank's 
conclusions on al-Ghazäli especially on causality and how Frank translates as he 
wishes certain Arabic terminologies to suit his arguments. For an excellent 
critique and review of this book, see Michael Marmura, "Ghazalian Causes 
and Intermediaries (Review Article)", Journal of the American Oriental Society 
(1995) 115: 89-100. 
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A1-Ghazäli divides al-Magsad into three parts. Part One is 
theoretical. 
Part one consists of: 
(1) explaining the truth of what is to be said concerning the 
name, the named, and the act of naming, (2) exposing the 
errors into which most groups have fallen regarding this 
matter, and (3) clarifying whether it is permitted for those 
names of God which are close to one another in meaning -like 
al-'Azim (the Immense), al-Jalil(the Majestic), and al- 
Kabir(the Great)- to be predicated according to a single 
meaning so that they would be synonymous, or must their 
meanings differ? Futhermore, (4) it explains about a single 
name which has two meanings: how does it share these two 
meanings? Is it predicated of both of them, as a general 
predicate of the thing it names {as ' animal' is said of lion and 
a lamb], or must it be predicated of one of them in particular? 
Finally, (5) it explains how man shares in the meaning of each 
of the names of God- great and glorious'. 
The second part deals with explaining and elaborating the meanings of 
each and everyone of the ninety-nine names of God as it pertains to God and 
also to his creation, man. The second part consists of: 
(1) the clarification of the meaning of the ninety-nine names of 
God and (2) the explanation how the people of the Sun. na 
reduce them all to an essence with seven attributes, and (3) 
how the doctrine of the Mu`tazilites and the philosophers 
reduces them to a single essence without multiplicity2. 
The third and final part deals with all other questions that arise out from these 
discussions on the ninety-nine names of God. The third part consists of: 
1 sad 21. 
2a1- a sad 21. 
3a1- a sad 22. 
(1) that the names of God-Most High exceed the ninety-nine 
by divine instruction, and explains (2) how it is permissible to 
describe God Most High by whatever may qualify Him even if 
no permission or divine instruction be found-so long as it is 
not prohibited. Finally, it explains (3) the advantage of the 
enumeration and specification of the one hundred-minus-one 
names;. 
David Burrell. 3. 
David Burrell. 3. 
David Burrell. 3. 
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It is the final section of part one and the beginning section of part two of this 
book dealing with how the ninety-nine names of God apply to God and how 
man may share in these attributes of God which I find to be most interesting 
and useful for our purposes here. 
In the final section of part one, al-Ghazäli sets out the epistemic 
problem of the limitation of man's ability to comprehend God, and the 
importance of understanding the meaning of the names of God for the 
happiness and perfection of man. For al-Ghazdli, man's ability to know God 
is limited. This limitation according to al-Ghazäli is because man cannot 
understand anything unless he has in him something to correspond it with. 
He points out: 
And if one asks: How might He (God) be powerful, we 
answer: as you are powerful. For a man cannot understand 
anything unless he has in him something corresponding to it. 
He first knows what characterises him, and then knows 
something other then himself by analogy with it. So if God 
had an attribute or a specifying property, and there were 
nothing in us corresponding to it or sharing its name -even so 
much as the sweetness of sugar shares in the pleasure of 
intercourse-it would be inconceivable that we would ever 
understand (that attribute or property) at all. For each person 
understands himself , and then compares his own attributes with those of God Most High. I 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to illustrate this point that man can only 
understand by comparing what is in him with others experiences. Man 
compares one human activity with another as reference if he has not yet 
experienced this activity. He says: 
I would say were a small boy or an impotent person to say to 
us: what is the way to know the pleasure of sexual intercourse, 
and to perceive its essential reality? We would say that there 
are two ways here: one of them is for us to describe it to you, 
so that you can know it, the other is to wait patiently until you 
have experienced the natural instinct of passion in yourself, 
and then for you to engage in intercourse so that you 
experience the pleasure of intercourse yourself, and so come to know it. This second way is the authentic way, leading to the 
reality of knowledge. 
tal-Magsad 52. David Burrell. 40. 
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The first way leads only to imagining and comparing it with 
something which is not like it, since the most we can do is 
represent the pleasure of intercourse by something whose 
pleasure an impotent man can experience, like the pleasure of 
food and drink. So we would say to him; Do you not know 
that sweets are delicious for when you take some you reach a 
pleasant state and feel delight in your soul? He will say 
'certainly' and then we would say: ' sexual intercourse is like 
that as well. Do you think that this brings him to understand 
the real pleasure of intercourse as it is, to the point of 
occupying in his knowledge the place occupied in one who has 
tasted that pleasure and experienced it? Hardly! In fact, the 
most that this description could be would be an imagining and 
a misleading comparison, an illustration sharing nothing but 
the name. 
So far the imagining is concerned, he would imagine that it 
[intercourse] was something pleasant in a general way. As for 
the comparison, it amounts to likening intercourse to the 
sweetness of sugar, and this is misleading since there is no 
correspondence whatever between the sweetness of sugar and 
the pleasure of intercourse. And as far as he is concerned, he 
knows that it deserves to be called pleasure. I 
Convincing as this example may seem to support al-Ghazäli's position that 
man knows only through comparison, we may turn the tables against al- 
Ghazäli, by asking how does man obtain the first idea in order to compare 
anything with. Utilising this same argument, how does man obtain this 
general principle of pleasure2 in the first place, thus enabling him to compare 
all other pleasures against this benchmark and therefore obtains the same 
results that sweetness of sugar is pleasurable and so is sexual intercourse. Al- 
Ghazäli either did not see this problem that his methodology of knowledge 
might raise or he just neglected to provide us with an answer here. 
This brief discussion on al-Ghazäli's epistemology on how man 
knows, is important because al-Ghazäli then proceeds to argue that man can 
know God also in two ways: the inadequate way of comparing names of God 
I- 
1-a sad 50-1. David Burrell. 38-9. 
2It should be noted that even if we limit our understanding of the concept of 
pleasure to physical pleasure, different people seem to derive pleasure from 
different things and to different degrees. For example, certain kinds of foods 
brings great pleasure to one and have the totally opposite effect on another even 
though all human beings have the same physical senses, therefore, how is it 
possible that they experience pleasure differently? 
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with what we know of ourselves, and the impossible way or closed way of 
experiencing God by becoming God. 
Al-Ghazäli explains the first way as follows: 
The inadequate way consists of mentioning names and 
attributes and proceeding to compare them with what we know 
from ourselves. For when we know ourselves to be powerful, 
knowing, living , speaking and then 
hear those terms attributed 
to God-great and glorious, or when we come to know them by 
demonstration, in either case we understand with an inadequate 
comprehension, much as the impotent person understood the 
pleasure of intercourse from what was described for him of the 
pleasure of sweetsl. 
The second way which will provide authentic knowledge is, however, 
impossible. Al-Ghazä says: 
The second way-the one that is closed--consists in one's 
waiting to attain all the 'lordly' (i. e. divine) attributes to the 
point of becoming a 'lord'....... But this path is closed, since it 
is impossible that this reality be attained by anyone other than 
God the Most High. There is no other way to authentic 
knowledge than this, yet it is utterly closed except for God the 
Most high and Holy One2. 
Thus for al-Ghazäli, it is impossible for anyone to truly know God other than 
God Himself. 
He then seems to make a principle of this method of experience at 
least as it applies to prophets. He says: 
But I would also say : it is impossible for anyone other than a 
prophet to know a prophet. For whoever has no part in 
prophecy understands nothing of prophethood except the 
name: that is a property existing in a man which distinguishes 
him from one who is not a prophet; yet he does not know the 
quiddity of that property except by comparison with his own 
attributed. 
It would prove very problematic to know much, if al-Ghazäli insists that to 
know something is to experience it, for man's experiences are limited. Al- 
1-a sad 52. 
2a1- a sad 53. 
3a1- a sad 53. 
David Burrell. 39 
David Burrell. 40. 
David Burrell. 41. 
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Ghazäli is silent on whether this experience must be experience through 
man's five senses or not. If it must be experience through man's senses, 
then, man can indeed only know very little. 
Al-Ghazäli considers it important that man make great efforts to 
understand the meaning of the names of God for his/her own happiness and 
perfection. Man may benefit from understanding this because it will help 
him/her draw near God through three ways. Firstly, by trying to understand 
the names of God, he/she gains knowledge about God'. Second, from this 
knowledge, he gains "a longing to possess these attributes in every way 
possible, so that he may grow closer to the truth. "2 The third and final stage, 
is he/she acts upon this longing and makes the effort to acquire whatever is 
possible of these attributes. He says: 
The third share follows upon the effort to acquire whatever is 
possible of those attributes, to imitate them and be adorned 
with those qualities, for this way man becomes 'lordly'-that is 
close to the Lord Most High, and so becomes a companion to 
the heavenly host (al-mala' al-a'la-) of angels for they are on 
the carpet of proximity (to God). Indeed whoever aims at a 
likeness to their qualities will attain something of their 
closeness to the extent that he acquires some of their attributes 
which bring them closer to the Truth Most High. 3 
Thus, for al-Ghazäli, man can greatly benefit from trying to understand the 
names of God. 
In the beginning section of part two, al-Ghazäli sets out to explain each 
and everyone of the ninety-names in accordance to how firstly they pertain to 
God and next, how man may share in these names. The length of explanation 
for each name varies in length from a few pages to just a few lines. These 
expositions utilise rational arguments and build upon them. He does cite 
many Qur' änic verses and prophetic traditions but they are used as supportive 
'al-Maqsad 43. David Burrell. 31. 
2a1-Magsad 43 David Burrell. 31. 
3a1-Magsad 44. David Burrell. 32. 
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evidence for his arguments and not as an absolute and final proof of his 
exposition. 
It is in this exposition of the ninety-nine names of God that we see al- 
Ghazäli freely expressing his own thoughts unhindered by the conventional 
theology, presenting directly or indirectly his own whole world view, through 
how he perceives the Creator and His creation. From al-Ghazäli's 
explanations of the names of God, we can deduce how al-Ghazäli conceives 
of God. While explaining how the ninety-nine names apply to God, he 
simultaneously explains how these names may be shared by man. From al- 
Ghazäli's explanation of these names and how they may be shared by man, 
we can see how al-Ghazäli conceives of man, and his/her relationship to God. 
Combining both of these views of God and man, it would not be far fetched to 
say that we may be able to derive from al-Magsad, al-Ghazäli's 
Weltanschauung. 
I believe that the explanation of the ninety-nine names of God which 
al-Ghazali provides in this book can give us great insights into al-Ghazdli's 
thoughts. The true value of this book is not in al-Ghazäli's explanation of 
how the names apply to God even though that is extremely insightful, but in 
his explanation of how man shares these names of God. 
(1) Revelation Defined 
Al-Ghazäli's purpose in writing this book is to explain the importance 
11 
of the names of God and their implications for mankind's happiness and 
perfection. Al-Ghazäli's explanation of the names of God involves him in 
dealing with a wide variety of topics ranging from God's nature, ability and 
actions. However, even with al-Ghazäli's presentation of these various 
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topics, we find no significant direct discussions' on the content and method of 
God conveying His message, wishes and commands to man. Again, even 
here, we will have to resort to the indirect method, using al-Ghazdli's 
theological positions in order to shed light on the question of revelation. 
In al-Magsad, al-Ghazäli has no systematic discussion on the 
relationship of revelation and reason. However, in some statements that he 
makes in various parts of the book, he alludes to his understanding of this 
relationship. In his discussion on ilhäm, he says: 
Now you might say: the words of the Sufis are based on 
visions given (ilhäm) to them in the stage of friendship (tawr 
al-wiläya), and reason falls short of grasping that, yet all that 
you have said involves the exercise of reason. Yet you should 
know that it is not possible to see in the stages of friendship 
anything which reason judges to be impossible. Certainly, it is 
possible for one to see something which exceeds reason, in the 
sense that one will not grasp it by reason alone. For example, 
it may be made known to a holy man that someone will die 
tomorow and that will not be known by the powers of reason 
because reason falls short of it. But it is not possible that it be 
made known that God-may He be praised and exalted-will 
create tommorow someone like Himself, for reason shows that 
to be contrary to it[reason], rather than exceeding it. 2 
From his discussions on ilhäm, we can conclude that firstly, al-Ghazäli 
accepts that there are different sources of knowledge, for example knowledge 
from reason and ilhäm. Secondly, he asserts that ilhäm can provide 
knowledge that reason cannot give us. This is a very important assertion. 
This is because for al-Ghazäli. ilhäm is a source of knowledge that goes 
beyond reason. However, al-Ghazäli qualifies the knowledge that ilhäm 
provides us, by stating that this knowledge from ilhi m cannot be contrary to 
reason. This is because for the knowledge that ilhäm brings to be true, reason 
tAs already stated at the beginning of this chapter there will be two approaches 
to obtaining al-Ghazdli's concept of revelation, 1) direct approach- actual 
writing on the subject of revelation, and 2) indirect approach- analysing his 
theological positions which have a bearing on the concept of revelation. tal- a sad 170. David Burrell. 157. 
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must consider it possible and not impossible according to the standards set by 
reason. 
Al-Ghazäli in the above passage provides us with an example of the 
knowledge that ilham can give us. In this passage, he says " for example it 
may be revealed to a holy man that someone will die tomorrow and that will 
not be known by the powers of reason because reason falls short of it". The 
example he provides here deals with a very specific event, the foretelling of 
the death of a specified individual. It is difficult to understand how 
knowledge of when the death of a specific person will occur is significant in 
terms of the whole schema of religious knowledge. It is extremely difficult 
to draw any general principle from this example on the types of knowledge 
that ilhäm can provide us. 
Al-Ghazäli's discussions on ilhäm as a source of knowledge is 
important here because al-Ghazäli considers the knowledge that ithäm brings 
is beyond, he also considers that the knowledge that revelation brings is also 
beyond reason. Just as al-Ghazäli considers ilhäm a source of knowledge 
not derived from reason, he also considers revelation as another source of 
knowledge not derived from reason. Al-Ghazäli says: 
Just as a true understanding of discernment is difficult for an infant before it has attained the level of discernment, and a true 
understanding of reason and the true wonders revealed in this 
stage is difficult before the attaining to the level of reason, in a 
similar way understanding the stage of holiness and prophecy 
is difficult during the stage of reason. For holiness is a stage 
of perfection that comes after the creation of reason, as reason 
is a stage of perfection after the creation of discernment , and discernment is a stage after the creation of the sensesi. 
It can be deduced-from the above statement that al-Ghazäli recognises different 
means and stages of knowledge. He recognises from the two above 
tal-Magsad 135. David Burrell. 122 
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quotations at least four different means of gaining knowledge, senses, reason, 
ilh5m, and revelation. 
Al-Ghazäli also recognises different stages of knowledge. Sense 
perception is the lowest stage of knowledge. Reason is the next stage. 
Reason is followed by ilhim. The highest stage of knowledge is revelation. 
Ilhäm is higher than reason since it provides knowledge which is beyond 
reason. Similarly, al-Ghazäli considers prophecy to be "a stage of perfection 
that comes after the perfection of reason" 1. This statement seems to imply that 
revelation gives us knowledge which reason by itself is unable to arrive at. 
Referring back to the example al-Ghazäli provides in his explanation on 
ilhäzn, concerning the knowledge on the future of a particular individual, it is 
clear that ilbäm gives us knowledge which reason is unable to arrive at. 
However, al-Ghazäli does qualify the truthfulness of the knowledge that 
ilbäm brings by it being not contrary to reason. Al-Ghazäli is silent at least in 
this book on whether the knowledge that revelation brings is also subject to 
this criterion of not being contrary to reason. 
More importantly, al-GhazW1 is silent on the categories of knowledge 
which each of these means of knowledge provide us. He is silent as to 
whether the knowledge, which these four means of knowledge stated above 
provides us with, are different kinds of knowledge exclusively, or do they 
overlap and supplement each other. Without a direct discussion of revelation, 
it is extremely difficult to determine his views on the relationship of revelation 
to reason. 
lal-Magsad 135. David Burrell. 157. 
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(2) Transmission of Revelation: How Revelation is Received? 
In al-Magsad, al-Ghazäli does not discuss the technical aspects of 
how revelation is transmitted to the prophets nor in what form it is transmitted 
to the prophets, whether the revelation is in literal form or in symbols. 
However, al-Ghazäli does categorically state that God has sent prophets to the 
world. He says: 
So the creation of sensory perception after creating the spiritual 
foundation is another creation, while the creation of 
discernment which appears after seven years is yet another 
creation, and the creation of reason after fifteen years (or 
thereabouts) is further creation. So each origination is a stage, 
so He created you by [divers] stage (71: 14). Futhermore, the 
appearance of the characteristics of holiness (wiläya) in the 
ones endowed with this quality is another creation, while the 
appearance of prophethood after that is yet another [creation], 
indeed it is a kind of resurrection. So God-may He be praised 
and exalted-is the one who raises (With) up the messengers, 
as He is the one who will raise us all up on the day of 
resurrection. I 
In al-Magsad, al-Ghazäli does not say much on the transmission of 
revelation except to affirm the transmission of revelation through medium of 
the prophets. 
1-a sad 135. David Burrell. 121-2. 
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3) Prophets: The Medium of Revelation 
Al-Ghazäli seems to imply that there are some intellectual 
qualifications for becoming a prophet. Comparing this view with the 
philosophers who insist that the prophets not only have a intellectual faculty 
pre-requisite but also an imaginative faculty pre-requisite', al-Ghazäll 
considers that the prophets do not need any directions or help from others but 
he qualifies that to that knowledge concerning the next life from anyone 
except God. Al-Ghazäli says: 
This is the level of the prophets--may God's blessings be upon 
them. For they have no need for directions to the next life 
from anyone except God-great and glorious- while everyone 
needs it from them. They are followed in this kingship by 
religious scholars, who inherit the legacy of the prophets. 
Their kingship, however, is proportional to their ability to 
guide the people, and to their lack of need for asking for 
guidance2. 
Prophets are exceptional human beings who need no guidance concerning the 
next life from anyone else except God. 
Prophets are also exceptional human beings in comparison with other 
human beings. The prophets have attained the rank of the highest human 
beings. Al-Ghazäli says: 
It is inconceivable that man be absolutely high, since he does 
not attain any rank without there being a higher existence, 
namely the rank of prophets and angels. Of course it is 
conceivable that one attain the rank such as there is none above 
it among people, and that is the rank of our prophet 
Muhammad-may God's blessings and peace be upon him. Yet 
even he falls short by comparison with the absolute height3. 
11 
'For the philosophers' discussion on the pre-requisite qualifications of the 
prophet, see Chapter One: Section on Prophets: The Medium of Revelation. 2-a sad 71. David Burrell. 58. 
3-a sad 118. David Burrell. 104-5. 
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Thus, for al-Ghazdli the prophets are the highest ranking human beings. 
However, even among the prophets there are different rankings. Al-Ghazäli 
considers the Prophet Muhammad to be the highest ranking prophet and 
therefore the highest ranking human being. He cites a prophetic hadith in 
order to show that had any other prophets lived in the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, they would be below him in ranking in comparison to him and 
therefore would have to follow him. 
The master of men (Muhammad)-may God's blessing and 
peace be upon him-enjoyed this attribute, inasmuch as he said: 
' Were Moses the son of `Imran alive he could not but follow 
me, for I am the master of Adam's offspring-and that is no 
boast. ' 
For al-Ghazäli, prophets are exceptional human beings who are the highest 
ranking among human beings. They have no need for guidance nor assistance 
concerning the next life from anyone else except God, but they are the ones 
who guide and direct human beings to the happiness of the world to come. 
(4) The Mission of Prophecy: The Purpose of Revelation 
The mission of the prophet is to convey the message that he receives 
from revelation to everyone. This mission points to the purpose of prophecy 
and thus ultimately to the purpose of revelation itself. Al-Ghazali summarises 
the essential task of prophecy as being to convey knowledge to people which 
will bring them towards God. He says: 
And should a man have a way of conveying knowledge to 
people and calling them to the Most High that would be a kind 
of revivification, and such would be the level of prophets and 
the scholars who are their heirs. 2 
'al- a sad 78-9. David Burrell. 66-7. 
Z-a sad 136. David Burell. 123. 
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The task of prophecy and the message of revelation is essential for the benefit 
and salvation of man. 
Those men will be most worthy of the name 'faithful' who are 
instrumental in protecting a man from the punishment of God, 
by guiding him to the path of God-great and glorious- and 
directing him on the path of salvation. Now this is the 
vocation of prophets and scholars, and to that effect the 
messenger of God-may God's blessings and peace be upon 
him-said :' Indeed you are rushing into the fire as moths flock 
to it, and I am pulling you back. I 
The message of revelation is concerned with man's eternal happiness and the 
next life. Al-Ghaz5E says: 
One is 'eminent' among people when God's people have need 
of him in matters most important to them, like the next life and 
eternal happiness. That is exceedingly rare and difficult to 
attain, except by those who hold the rank of prophet-may 
God's blessings be on all of them. 2 
The task and mission of prophecy and the message of revelation is 
clearly aimed at man and for the benefit of man. Thus the message of 
revelation must be able to be understood by man. However, al-Ghazä. li does 
not elaborate on the types of knowledge that revelation provides us except 
with a vague and broad category that it is the knowledge necessary for the 
man's eternal happiness and 
the next life. 
'al- a sad 76. David Burrell. 63-4. 
Z-a sad 78. David Burrell. 66. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Al-Ghazäli's Theological Positions and Their 
Implications on Revelation : An Indirect Method 
Anal 
Introduction. 
The issues surrounding the concept of revelation are essential 
questions to ask in any religion. They are an important questions even for 
religions which reject the very existence of revelation or are not based on it. l 
However, they become fundamental questions for a religion whose raison 
d'etre is based upon and justified by revelation to answer, above all the 
three great monotheistic Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
Due to the limit of this scope of study, we will restrict our comments 
henceforth to the last of the Abrahamic faiths, Islam. 
'An example of a religion that rejects outright prophecy and thus revelation is 
Hinduism. Other examples of religions that are not based on revelation are 
Buddhism and Confucianism. For an interesting viewpoint on religion without 
revelation, see, Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, ( New York: 
Harper & Brothers Press, 1957). For a rejection of revelation in the history of 
Islamic, see, Abil Bakr Muhammad b. Zakariyyä al-Rani (the Rhazes of Latin 
sources), Opera Philosophica: Fragmentaque Ouae Supersunt, ed. Paul 
Kraus, (Beirut, 1982) 295. See also the Muslim debates against the Brahmans 
for their rejection of revelation in Fazlur Rahman, "Barähima", Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (2nd Edition) and Sarah Stroumsa, The Barahima in Early Kalam, in 
Journal of Semitic Studies, vol. 6,1985.229-241. 
137 
Islam is a religion whose raison d'etre is not only based upon its 
own revelation, i. e. the Qur' än revealed to its own prophet, Muhammad, but 
it also proclaims the truth of all previous revelations revealed to all previous 
prophets. The Qur' än proudly proclaims that God has sent prophets and 
revelations to all peoples. The Qur' än says, " For We assuredly sent amongst 
every people an apostle (=sill), (with the command) Serve God and eschew 
evil. "1 Thus, the Qur'an not only accepted that God has sent messengers with 
revelations to all peoples but also for the same purpose and with a similar 
message telling them to serve God and to abstain from evil. 
The Qur' än places great importance on the mission of the prophets 
and their messages, i. e. revelation. In the voluminous writings of the 
Muslim religious thinkers (ulamä'), we find pages and pages dedicated to the 
history of the prophets. A whole genre of literature evolved solely dedicated 
to telling the stories about the prophet Muhammad and previous prophets 
utilising materials from the Qur' iin and materials outside the Islamic tradition, 
the Isrä'iliyyät material. '- This genre came to be called Qisas a! -Anbiyä'. 
However, even in this great Islamic intellectual tradition, little is discussed on 
the issues surrounding the concept of revelation. Rather, they focus on the 
bringer of the message, the messenger , 
i. e. the prophets3. Pages and pages 
'Qur'an 16: 36. See also, similar verse 10: 47. 
2lsrä'iliyyär material is drawn from Jewish religious and mythical tradition and 
incorporated into the Islamic tradition. Newby explains the use of the 
Isrä'iliyyät material as follows: 
"Tradition of the type called isrä'iliyyät have had little acceptance among 
Muslim scholars since the second Islamic century except in restricted genres like 
gisas al-anbiyä' (stories of the prophets), but during the first century, material 
from the haggadic and midrashic sources of Judaism and the hagiologic writings 
of the Eastern Christianity were assiduously collected for commenting on the 
Qur' än and for constructing histories of the pre-Islamic world........ In 
addition, Isrä iliyyät traditions contributed to the development of techniques of 
commentary on the Qur'an as well as helping develop a proper Islamic way of 
reading Jewish and Christian Scripture and para-scriptural material. " Gordon 
Newby, "The Development of Qur'an Commentary in early Islam in Its 
Relationship to Judeo-Christian Traditions of Scriptural Commentary", in 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion. vol. 47 (1985). 685. 
3This focus on the messenger, rather than the message is indeed very significant 
because they considered proof of the truth of the message does not lie in the 
message itself but in the verification of the messenger. 
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of scholarly writings have been devoted to recording every minute detail of the 
messenger to Islam, the prophet Muhammad's life, both words and actions 
even to the extent of recording his likes and dislikes. None of his actions 
were too minor nor tedious to take note of. Everything that the prophet 
Muhammad said and did was recorded, examined, analysed and was held up 
as the ideal for every Muslim, man, woman and child. 
Turning our attention away from the messenger to the message i. e. 
revelation itself, we find some important questions left unanswered by the 
ulamii' on issues surrounding revelation. This is not to say that the ulamä' 
did not go through each and every verse of the message with a fine tooth 
comb. However, the ulamä' accepted revelation as a given source of 
knowledge needing neither further examination nor analysis as a source of 
knowledge. They saw revelation as building blocks to build up a whole 
structure and framework of knowledge to explain everything. Thus, they did 
not see it as their task to examine and analyse this source of knowledge but 
rather, they saw their duty only as preservers and transmitters of revelation. 
They saw their role as explainers and elaborators of the content of revelation 
and how to apply it in practice. 
It is in their explanation and elaboration of the content of revelation 
from which we can deduce indirectly their concept of revelation and the 
issues surrounding revelation for which we are seeking answers here. From 
their explanation and elaboration of the content of revelation, we can deduce 
how they perceived revelation as a source of knowledge and what kinds of 
knowledge they derived from it. Did they perceive revelation as an absolute 
unquestioned source of knowledge? Or did they perceived revelation as an 
absolute unquestioned source of knowledge which needed human 
intervention in order to understand it correctly? If revelation required human 
intervention through human interpretation, to what extent and how should this 
interpretation be done? If revelation required human interpretation in order 
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to be understood, it is the human mind through the application of reason 
which has to be utilised. 
Al-Ghazälian Ethics: Theological Perceptions and their 
Implications on Ethical Concepts 
Introduction : Ethics and Revelation 
The ethical system of any religion speaks volumes about how it perceives 
itself and its concept of God if it has one and if so God's relationship to His 
creation. The ethical traditions of the three great Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam not only reflect their weltanshauung but can be utilised 
to investigate how they perceived their relationship and responsibilities to 
their Creator and vice-versa. Ivry points out the importance and the role of 
the ethical traditions which pervade and reflect the essential nature of these 
three great Abrahamic faiths. He says: 
The ethical traditions of Judaism and Islam--as of Christianity- 
are the adornment of faiths, or rather part of their essential 
natures, for these are religions characterised as representatives 
of ethical monotheism. God's concern for the welfare of His 
creatures is reflected in the commandments urging them 
towards ethical behaviour. This behaviour is "ethical" in that it 
conforms, to standards to be such, standards which are implicit 
in the Bible and the Qur' än. There is, after all, no formal or 
explicit investigation of the nature of the good in these sacred 
writings. When Cain asks God, " Am I my brother's keeper? " 
the Lord does not deign to answer the question directly. I 
It is this very idea raised by Ivry that ' God's concern for the "welfare" of His 
creation is reflected in His commandments to man' which we will put to the 
test against al-Ghazäli. It this terse statement, Ivry speaks volumes about 
'Alfred L. Ivry, The Toleration of Ethics and the Ethics of Tolerance in Judaism 
and Islam, in Studies in Islamic and Judaic Tradition, eds. William Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks (Atlanta: 1986). 167. 
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the relationship of God and His creation. Ivry simply assumes that God 
imposes commandments on His creation out of His concern for their welfare. 
Ivry makes no attempt to justify this assumption because it seems obvious to 
him and in no need for any justification. We will pose the same question 
whether it is God's concern for man's welfare which results in God sending 
prophets with revelation to inform man of God's commandments to al- 
Ghazäli. The answer to this question will uncover not only how al-Ghazäli 
perceives how God sees His creation but also unveil the content and subject 
matter of revelation which is none other than God's commandments telling 
His creation what to believe and how to act. Ivry also aptly points out that 
"there is, after all, no formal or explicit investigation of the nature of the good 
in these sacred writings. "1 It is of no great surprise that these sacred writings 
make no great efforts to explicate a systematic exposition of ethical theory, for 
their main concern are providing right reasons, i. e. right intentions for right 
action. These sacred writings were never meant to be systematic 
philosophical expositions of theoretical ethics. But one cannot help but 
wonder if there is one underlying reason which seemingly connect these 
different acts as right acts, thus uncovering the nature of the good. Therefore, 
we will also investigate what al-Ghazäli considers as good acts to discover al- 
Ghazäli's concept of the nature of the good We will examine and scrutinise 
al-Ghazdli concept of ethics in hope that it will shed light on how 
revelational commandments unfolds in ethical practice and thus, enlightens us 
on al-Ghazäli's ethical rationale. 
'Ivry, "The Toleration of Ethics and the Ethics of Tolerance in Judaism and Islam" 167. 
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The Significance of Ethics 
In all of al-Ghazäli's works, ethics appears as an important , if not the 
central issue. MacDonald argues ," 
He [al-Ghazäli] was emphatically ethical 
in his attitude; he lays great stress on the value for us of a piece of 
knowledge. "1 The importance of ethics to al-Ghazali is not because of ethical 
action per se but it is a means for achieving another purpose, man's supreme 
end, eternal happiness in the hereafter and that acts are good if they produce an 
effect in the soul that helps towards that end and evil if they thwart it. 2 
Al-Ghazäli calls his ethics the science of the path of the hereafter( 'i lm 
rarlq al-äkhira)3. He also calls ethics the science of practical religion/science 
of conduct (`ilm al-mu `ämaia)4. These two terms he uses for ethics 
correspond to their usage in Sufism-5. Abul Quasem points out that " in the 
[al-Ghazäli's] works composed during the mystical period, he does not seem 
to have used the phrase 'ilm al-akkläq (the science of character) for ethics"6 
1Duncan MacDonald, Life of al-Ghazali with Special Reference to His Religious 
Experiences and Opinions, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 20, 
(1899). 120 
2J., 32, Nabih Amin Faris, 49. 
3Ihvä. . 31-2, Nabih Amin Faris 48. 41byaj., 32, Nabih Amin Faris, 49. 
5a1-Hujwiri, Kashf al-Mahjüb, translated by R. A. Nicholson, (Leiden, 1911). 
86,115. 
6 Muhammad Abul Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghaz' l: A Composite Ethics in 
Islam, (Malaysia: 1975), 37. He says: 
" In the M. A. [Mize al-'Amal, ( Cairo, 1910) p. 54, al-Ghazäli used 'ilm al- 
akhläq for ethics. Here he seems to have followed Avicenna, since the 
classification of the practical sciences given here agrees with the division of the 
practical sciences in bis ash-Shifä': Introduction, ed. by Ibrähim Madkür, 
1952, pp. 12-14, and in his Fi Agsam al-'Ulüm al-'Aqliyya in Tis' Rasäil ff 1- 
Hikma wa tt-Tabi `iyyät" (Cairo, 1326/1908). 105 and 107-108. 
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Ethics for al-Ghazäli is the study of religious beliefs( `itigäd. pl. 
'itigädat' ), works(fi'l pl. af'dl, fl'51), and prohibitions( tark pl. tur ik)l for 
the purpose of actions and not just mere knowledge. Al-Ghazäli defines his 
ethics as follows: 
By 'ilm al-mukäshafa I mean knowledge and only 
knowledge. By the science of practical religion ('ilm al- 
mu'ämala) I mean knowledge as well as action in accordance 
with that knowledge...... the science of practical religion ('ilm 
al-mu'ämala) is divided into outward science ('ilm al-zähir), 
by which is meant that of the function of the senses, and the 
inward science ('ilm al- bätin]), by which is meant the 
function of the heart. The bodily organs perform either acts of 
worship or usages of life, while the heart, because it is 
removed from the senses and belongs to the world of dominion 
('älam al-malakut), is subject to either praiseworthy 
(mahmüd) or blameworthy (madzmUm]) (influences). 
Inevitably, therefore, this science divides itself into two parts- 
outward and inward. The outward, which pertains to the 
senses, is subdivided into acts of worship and usages of life; 
the inward, which relates to the condition of the heart and the 
qualities of the soul, is subdivided into things which is 
praiseworthy (mahmüd) and things which is objectionable 
(madhmüm). 2 
For al-Ghazäli, ethics consist of discharging the outward acts prescribed by 
the law (shari'a)) which impacts on the inward condition of man, the 
condition of his heart and the qualities of his soul. Thus, al-Ghazal! seeks the 
underlying meaning of the acts prescribed by the law and how it influences, 
shapes and cultivates the inward soul of man. 
We will not examine one by one the actions put forward by al-Ghiazäli 
in his ethics, but we will rather focus our attention on examining and 
analysing the underlying foundation that creates and makes up al-Ghazäli's 
ethics. 
In his introduction to his exposition on Islamic ethics, Ethical 
Theories in Islaar3, Fakhry defines ethical theory and its rationale by saying: 
1hä. 25. Nabih Amin Faris 31. 
2hä. 12. Nabih Amin Faris. 6 
3Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, ( Leiden: E. J. Brill: 1991) 
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An ethical theory is a reasoned account of the nature and 
grounds of right actions and decisions and the principles 
underlying the claim that they are morally commendable or 
reprehensible. Ethical enquiry has therefore always placed a 
special stress on the definition of ethical concepts or the 
justification or appraisal of moral judgements, as well as the 
discrimination between right and wrong actions or decisions. 
To be complete, an ethical system must deal adequately with 
these aspects of moral enquiry in an articulate and coherent 
manner. I 
Utilising this definition of ethical theory and its rationale provided to us by 
Fakhry and applying it in order to analyse al-Ghazäli's ethics, our task is to 
seek out the grounds of right action for al-Ghazäli providing his justification 
of moral judgements enabling him to discriminate between right and wrong 
actions or decisions. 
However, where do we find answers to these theoretical ethical 
questions from al-Ghazäli's writings? We find that al-Ghazali has written no 
book dedicated to ethical theory, but instead he wrote a number of books on 
how to act ethically. This is, however, not surprising. In the classical Islamic 
intellectual tradition, with the exceptions of some Mutazilites and the 
philosophers, there have been few books dedicated to the elucidation of 
theoretical ethical inquiry. 2 Fazlur Rahman laments this sad lack of a 
theoretical ethical inquiry in the Islamic tradition by saying: 
The effective link between theology and law could be supplied 
by a moral philosophy. It is, indeed, remarkable that a rational 
system of "right" and "wrong" or "good" and "bad", that is a 
moral philosophy, was never worked out in the religious 
history of Islam. Not only did such a system not emerge 
among the orthodox who declared "good" and "bad" to be 
star'! not 'agli; neither do the Mu'tazila appear to have made 
'Ethical Theories in Islam. I. 
2Watt also complaints even up to present times there is still a lack of study on 
Islamic ethics . 
In the Introduction of Abul Quasem's The Ethics of al-Ghazäli. 
Watt says: 
" There is yet no comprehensive history of Islamic ethics, as was noted by 
Richard Walzer in the article on Ablak, in the new Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
Much of the field was covered, but in an uneven fashion, by: Dwight M. 
Donaldson in his Studies in Muslim Ethics (1953), and subsequent works have 
dealt with various aspects of the theme". Abul Quasem, The Ethics of al- 
azdl' i. 
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such an attempt. Indeed, even the pure philosophers failed to 
produce a moral philosophy. Whereas the religious circles 
stop at theology and leave the practical field to law, the 
philosophers are content with pure metaphysics and equally 
leave the practical field to law. The Sufis imposed on the law 
an elaborate scheme of spiritual purification in order to render it 
genuinely "good", and developed a substitute for moral 
philosophy called 'ilm asrär al-din which by its very nature 
could not take the place of a proper moral philosophy. ' 
Faziur Rahman argues that the study of moral philosophy or ethics 
was underdeveloped in the religious history of Islam. Instead the study of 
ethics was subsumed under the study of theology and law. The study of the 
traditional Islamic sciences is divided into the study of the Qur' än and Hadith, 
theology (kaläm) and jurisprudence (shari'a). 2 If the traditional Islamic 
sciences do not have a category for ethics ('ilm al-akhläq), this does not 
mean that ethics is not discussed or studied in Islam. Ethics is studied but its 
study is subsumed under theology for the ethical component of belief and 
jurisprudence for the ethical component of implementation. Thus, instead of 
trying to find a straight forward discussion solely dedicated in the elucidation 
of ethical theory i. e. the grounds and justification of why an action is right or 
wrong, we will have to work backwards and derive al-Ghazäli ethical theory 
from his theological and jurisprudential positions. 
'Fazlur Rahman, "Functional Interdependence Of Law and Theology" in 
Theology and Law, ed. von Grunebaum, ( Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 
1971). 94. Fazlur Rahman laments that a systematic moral philosophy was 
never seriously pursued and developed and envisages what might have happen 
if it had been. He says: 
" Yet the orthodox theologians not merely allowed but demanded - in the teeth 
of the Hanbalite opposition -a rational investigation into the true and the false 
(al-nazar Jima `rifat Allah) on the basis of the Koran. Why could not the same 
procedure be adopted with regard to the good and bad (al-nazarfi 'amrAllah)? 
Had such a body of thought emerged through a systematic rational search for 
morals in the Koranic teachings, not only would the law have received a new life and become law in the proper sense, but it would have rebounded on 
theology itself with major consequences. " ibid. 94. 
2It may be argued that the Islamic sciences are only two instead of three. Al- Ghazäli places the study of Qur än and Hadith under the study of theology and jurisprudence. The rationale is that the Qur'ann and Hadith are utilised in order to derive belief for theology and the laws for jurisprudence. 
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Theology and Ethics 
In his quest to place God's power and will above everything else, al- 
Ghazäli paints a picture of a God that is absolute and acts out of His will 
without any consideration for anyone or anything else. However, instead of 
ending up with a God who is compassionate and concerned with the welfare 
of those He created, this results in a God that is cold and aloof. In al- 
Igtisäd ,a book which he wrote before his public declaration in favour of 
Sufism, al-Ghazäli describes the relationship of God to his servant, man and 
clearly exhibits his own quest to place God's power and will above 
everything else. This causes him to argue that there is absolutely nothing 
necessary for God to do. The implications that he draws out from this initial 
premise, are difficult to reconcile with the view of God in the Qur' änic 
revelations, He is compassionate but stern, and makes promises to reward and 
punish his servantsl. Al-Ghazdli says: 
We claim that it is possible that God, the Most High does not 
impose at all obligations upon His servants. And that it is 
possible that He imposes obligations on them (His servants) 
which are beyond their ability to bear. It is possible that 
(God) inflicts pain on the servant without recompense or 
crime. It is not necessary for Him to consider the best for them 
(His servants). It is not necessary for Him to reward the 
obedient nor punish the disobedient. As for the servant, it is 
not necessary for him to have any obligations because of 
reason (bi al-'aql) but [because of the impositions] of the 
revelation (bi a]-star'). It is not necessary for God to send 
messengers. 2 
1For further elaboration of the Qur'änic concept of God, see, Fazlur Rahman, 
Major Themes of the Our'an, Chapter 1, God. 
Z -I tisäd , 160. See also hä, 133-4. 
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There emerges from the above passage, that first and foremost, al-Ghazäli 
seeks to establish clearly and decisively that there is absolutely nothing 
necessary (al-wäjib) for, or incumbent upon, God. God does not have to do 
anything or act in a certain manner. There can be no constraints on God's 
actions. 
Al-Ghazdli is even willing to concede the concept of a God willing to 
act towards His servants in what seems to be in an arbitrary manner, even to 
the point of what seems to be cruel. Al-Ghazäli's God may impose 
obligations or not on His servants as He pleases. God may even go as far 
as imposing upon his servants obligations which are beyond their ability 
which He Himself has created in them. Al-Ghazäli's God even may seem to 
act cruelly and inflict pain on His servants for no cause or reason, neither has 
He to recompense His servants. 
Al-Ghazäli appears to almost deny the caring and compassion from 
God towards His servants when he asserts that God does not have to act in the 
best consideration of His servants. However, if God's actions are not for 
benefit of His servant, then who are they for? Is it possible that these actions 
can be for the benefit of God? But that is also impossible since God is perfect 
and perfection entails that He is in need of nothing and cannot be benefited or 
improved upon one iota. Are these action for no purpose, arbitrary, random 
and therefore ultimately futile? It is inconceivable that God's actions are 
futile. Then what are these actions for? Al-Ghazäli's formulations aimed at 
making God's power and will absolute only seem to lead to more unanswered 
questions. 
God's imposition of obligations on man can be ascertained not 
through reason which is also a gift of God to man, but only through 
revelation. Al-Ghazäli, therefore, reduces the obligations imposed by God 
upon man to obligations which are incomprehensible for man to arrive at by 
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his own reason. Why are men unable by themselves to arrive at these same 
obligations and impose them upon themselves for their own benefit? Al- 
Ghazäli's answer is painfully simple. It is because these obligations may or 
may not be imposed for the benefit of man. 
Even the proof of the truth of the prophets that God has sent to man is 
not judged by soundness or truthfulness of their message because there is no 
absolute standard of truths to judge it against. Thus, the proof of the truth of 
the prophets is reduced to the prophets merely being able to prove themselves 
by means unrelated to what makes them a prophet, their message, but 
instead reduced to proving their prophecy by being able to produced 
miracles2. 
One cannot but fail to wonder whether this rather detached view of 
God's relationship to man is a sombre response of a detached theologian, but 
we find al-Ghazäli making similar comments after his public declaration in 
favour of Sufism in the Iliyä in the section on theology which forms Book 
Two of the Ihyä under the title of Kitab Qawä'id al-'Agä'id. He says: 
.. . it is His [God's] prerogative to impose duties (taklif) beyond the capacity of [His servants], and to cause pain (iläm) 
to the innocent; that it is not incumbent upon Him to do the 
most favourable [to His servants]; that [man's] obligations are 
all laid down in the divine law (shard); that His sending of 
prophets is not impossible (jä'iz); and that the prophethood of 
our prophet (God bless and save him) is proved and confirmed 
by miracles. 3 
There emerges from the above passage of al-Ghazäli written after his public 
declaration in favour of Sufism that he still has a very similar perception of 
God's relationship to man, at least as far as his theological formulations are 
1For al-Ghazäii, there is no objective standard of truth. Things are true because 
God says so. Everything is subjective to God's standards. For further 
elaboration, see below, section on Al-Ghazäli's Definition of Necessary (al 
wäjib). Good (al-hasan) and Evil (al-gabih, ). 
2This is why miracles are so important to the prophets according to al-Ghazäli. 
I will elaborate on this point when discussing the later section on the proof of 
prophecy. 
3d 125; Nabih Amin Faris, 56. 
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concerned. In Kitab Qawä'id al-Agä'id, again we see al-Ghazali 
regurgitating the standard Ash'arite theological positions. In both of these 
texts, al-Igtisäd and the Ihyä, al-Ghazdli only reaffirms his position that 
God acts in any manner He wishes. There is nothing, absolutely nothing 
which is necessary (al-wäjib) or incumbent upon God. It is true that the 
Mu'tazi ite fundamental premise that God is just' results in a God that must act 
in a certain manner in the best interest of His servants' and seems to lead to 
God's hands being tied and thus poses some problems against God's power 
and will2. However, al-Ghazäli's and the Ash'arites' position of placing 
God's power and will above all other considerations leads to at least as many 
problems also left unresolved. 
Al-Ghazäli's Definition of Necessary (a! -wijib). Good (al- 
hasan) and Evil (al-gabm) 
Before we can pass such a harsh judgement on al-Ghazäli's perception 
of God's relationship to man as cold and arbitrary, we must pay closer 
attention to al-Ghazäli's use of the term necessary (a1-wäjib). It is essential to 
'Abu al-Husayn ibn 'Uthmän Al-Khayyät(d 902), Kitib al-Intisar, ( Beirut, 
1957). 30. The five basic tenets of the Mutazilites are, unity and justice, the 
inevitability of God's threat and promises, the intermediary position, the 
injunction of right and the prohibition of wrong. 
2For example the Mutazilites carried the fundamental premise of God's threat to 
the extreme conclusion that God cannot pardon the evil doer. Faziur Rahmaa 
elaborates the Mutazilites conclusion by saying: 
" From among the various constituents of the Quranic concept of God, power, 
mercy, will and justice, they isolated this last one and carried it to its logical 
conclusions that God cannot do the unreasonable and unjust. In this connection 
they developed their doctrine of the 'Promise and Threat" according to which God can neither pardon the evil doer ( and therefore violate His Threat) nor 
punish the good-doer (and therefore violate His Promise)". Isla, 89. 
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comprehend al-Ghazäli's understanding of the term in order to understand the 
crucial role it plays in his concept of God and how it directly affects his 
definition of good (hasan) and evil (gabih). Al-Ghazäli points out that the 
misconceptions about God's actions is because of the misunderstanding of the 
term necessary (al-wäjib). He explains the results of misunderstanding of 
these terms as follows: 
All these assertions we based on the examination of the 
meaning of necessary (al-wäjib), good (al-hasan)and evil (al- 
gabih). People have plunged into it (this subject) and 
engaged in lengthy discussion on whether the intellect (a! -'aql) 
finds things good, evil or necessary. Much of the uproar is 
only because they have not comprehended the meaning of 
these terms and their technical differences. 1 
, Al-Ghazdli then proceeds to give us his own definition of the term 
necessary (al-wäjib). Necessary (al-wäjib) has two generic meanings. The 
first meaning is subdivided into two; logical necessity and necessity resulting 
from being prudent. Instead of using the explicit Arabic terminology al-wäjib 
al-ma `qül, al-Ghazäli still uses the term al-wäjib but the term is used in such a 
manner as to clearly mean logical necessity. Logical necessity is conceived of 
as that which requires the existence of anything whose non-existence is 
impossible. Thus, al-Ghazäli refers to God, the eternal being or to the 
existence of an object of knowledge where there is knowledge of it, as 
necessary existence because he argues as follows: 
It (the necessary) is that whose non-existence leads to an 
impossible matter, like saying that what is known to have 
happened (wugn'ubu), then its happening is necessary, (since) 
it means that if it did not happen, (then it) knowledge would 
have become ignorance and that is impossible. 2 
lal- tisdd 160. 
z -I tisdd 162. In the Ihyä, al-Ghazäli makes a similar argument. He says: "Anything [the assumption of] the non-existence of which would lead to what is impossible - such as the statement that [recognition of] the existence of what is known is obligatory, since its non-existence would lead to an impossibility 
which is the conversion of knowledge into ignorance" ha- , 133. Tibawi, 112. 
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The argument that al-Ghazäli is putting forward here is basically an argument 
based upon being able to deduce from the effect, its cause. The effect implies 
that there must be a cause. Therefore, from the above example, from the effect 
which is the knowledge of something, one deduces that the object of 
knowledge must necessarily exist. It must be borne in mind that while al- 
Ghazäli does not deny cause and effect outright, he strictly rejects the necessity 
of causal relationships. Thus, one cannot help but wonder why al-Ghazäli 
seems to put forth this definition of necessity so easily. 
The other meaning of necessary (al-wäjib) is necessity resulting from 
being prudentl or as Hourani coined the phrase prudential necessity2. Here, 
again this meaning is implied from al-Ghazäli's usage of the term, 
necessary(al-wäjib). Necessity as a result of being prudent refers to actions 
which are performed from the stand point of self interest. This is because the 
agent expects certain harm to himself/herself as a result of the omission of these 
acts. Thus, he/she performs these acts out of the self interest of avoiding 
harm. Therefore, an act is necessary (al-wäjib) when it is necessary for the 
agent to perform it in order to avoid harm. The performance of this act are not 
for the sake of the act itself. The act itself only serves as a means towards 
another end, the avoidance of harm. Al-Ghazäli says: 
It is well known that an action whose performance or neglect 
are neutral cannot be called necessary (a! -wäjib). If it was 
preferable and more deserving, it is (still) not called necessary 
(a! -wäjib) in every case, but it is inevitable in regard to the 
preference to the act. It is known that (the result) of the act in 
so far as neglecting it will result in harm or it is believed (that 
it will result in harm) whether that harm is in this world or the 
next-either immediately endurable (in this world) or 
unbearable (in the next life) 3 
lal-Igtisäd , 161-2. See also, h ! a, 133, Tibawi, 112 2George Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984). 138. 
3 -I tisäd , 161-2. 
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The key to understanding what makes an act necessary (al-wäjib) is harm or 
more accurately avoidance of harm. Al-Ghazäli does not seem to give any 
value to the act itself. The only value or worth of an act is that it will result in 
the avoidance of harm. It results in a subjective instead of an objective 
interpretation of necessity of an act. The necessity of an act is predicated on 
other than the act itself. In this case, it is predicated on the opinion of the actor 
that it will result in harm to himself/herself. Thus right action or wrong action 
is predicated on the opinion of the actor of the result of the act upon 
himself/herself. 
However, for al-Ghazäli, not all acts which avoid harm are to be 
called necessary (al-wäjib). Human reasoning, however, seems to lump 
together all these acts done to avoid harm as necessary (al-wijib). Al-Ghazäli 
limits this term and specifies the term necessary (al-wäjib) to delineate only 
those acts which are related to the unbearable harm in the next life. Thus, for 
al-Ghazdli, only those acts which affect the next life can properly be called 
necessary (al-wäjib). This distinction which al-Ghazäli makes between acts 
that affect this life and those that affect the next life is indeed very significant. 
As I will explain below, for al-Ghazäli those acts which affect the next life 
becomes the predominant consideration for how we judge and weigh all our 
actions. 
The second meaning of necessary (al-wäjib) is in relationship to 
where the harm is expected from this world or the next world. Al-Ghazdli 
argues that actions that may result in harm in this world may be known by 
reason. How does he reach this conclusion? Al-GhazZ argues that reason is 
able to do so because it can foresee the harm in neglecting such acts either 
through personal experience or by others telling of their past experiences and 
extrapolating from these experiences a prediction of future events concerning 
this predictable harm. Therefore, reason will consider it necessary (al-wäjib) 
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out of self interest for one to perform the acts which will avoid these 
foreseeable harms. Al-Ghazäli says: 
We say that it is known that the likely immediate harm is not 
called necessary (al-wäjib), since the thirsty, if he does not 
hurry to drink water, the harm is immediate (to that man). But 
it cannot be said that drinking for him is necessary (al-wäjib). 
(It is because) there is no intrinsic harm (to be avoided)by not 
drinking originally. Even though, in the act (of drinking), 
there is benefit, but it cannot be called necessary (al-wäjib). 
In trade and in the acquisition of wealth and booty there is a 
benefit and these are not called necessary (a! -wäjib). The 
designation of calling it(an act) necessary (al-wäjib) is that in 
neglecting it, there is an obvious harm....... (However) that 
(harm that occurs) in this world can be known by reason. It 
(reason) also calls that (avoidance of that harm) necessity 
(wäjib). The non-believers say that it is necessary (wäjib) 
for the hungry man who will die from hunger that he eats when 
he finds food. We mean by the necessity of eating that it is a 
preferable act contrary to neglecting it because of the harm 
from neglecting it. The use of this technical term (in this 
manner) is not precluded by the revelation (shad'a) . This 
technical term ( used in this manner) is permitted (mubähah) 
and not precluded by the revelation (shad'a)) and reason. I 
For al-Ghazäli, reason's assessments of an action is solely based on its 
outcome and not because of the value of the act itself. Reason considers these 
acts as necessary (a! -wäjib) because it is able to foresee the harm in neglecting 
them. However, al-Ghazäli does not clearly spell out how reason is able to 
foresee this harm. From the example given above, we can probably deduce that 
the predicted results of such acts are known either through personal 
experiences, observations and deductions or in believing others who inform 
you of this predicted result of harm based on their own past experiences, 
observation and deductions. Again here, the predicting of the outcome of 
these actions must be predicated on the assumption of cause and effect. Again 
here, we must question al-Ghazäli's commitment to his stand against the 
necessity of causal relationship. 
lal-Igtisäd , , 162. 
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Al-Ghazäli turns to the real task at hand of defining necessary(al- 
wäjib) and relegating it to its proper realm, that of those acts which affect the 
after life, those actions that affect one for eternity. It is only in relationship to 
those acts which affect the next life that, according to al-Ghazäli, can be 
accurately called necessary (a! -wäjib). Therefore, it is what occurs in the next 
life that al-Ghazäli is most concerned with. 
However, how does one know what will occur in the next life? Al- 
Ghazäli answers decisively that one can only know what will happen in the 
next life not through the use of one's reason but by listening to revelation. 
Thus, all events in the next life are known only through revelation. Since this 
is so, therefore, the expected harm in the next life which is the real harm, the 
eternal harm, the harm one must be most concerned with, can only be known 
through revelation. Al-Ghazdli says, " By that(harm) which results, I mean 
(that harm) in the next life, it(that harm) is known through revelation. We 
called it(these acts) necessary(wäjib). 1 He reiterates this position in the Ihyä 
by saying : 
Obligation here has two meanings: (a) either [the performance 
of] an act the neglect of which will result in the future or 
immediate injury- future as in the statement 'It is the duty of the 
servant to obey God so that He will not torture Him in hell-fire 
in the next world', and immediately as in the statement 'He 
who is thirsty must drink lest he dies'; (b) or anything [the 
assumption of] the non-existence of which would lead to what 
is impossible - such as the statement that [recognition of] the 
existence of what is known is obligatory, since its non- 
existence would lead to an impossibility which is the 
conversion of knowledge into ignorance. 2 
Again , even 
in relationship to the next life, al-Ghazäli carries over his 
explanation of the term necessary (a1-wäjib) in relationship to harm. Thus, in 
order for one to know what is necessary (al-wäjib) for oneself, one must 
1- t'säd , , 162. 2J h Ca 133, Tibawi, 112. 
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know what will result in harm to oneself in the next life. What will result in 
harm in the next life can only be known through the means of revelation. 
Even in relationship to the hereafter, man acts or should act above all 
for his/her own self interest, i. e. the avoidance of harm. Al-Ghazäli does not 
elaborate on whether these acts are carried out solely for the purpose of man's 
self interest, but he provides us with no other explanation. One cannot help 
but wonder why these acts could not be done for other than the reason of self 
interest but for a nobler, higher, altruistic purpose. These acts could have 
been done because God tells one to do so even without the threat of 
punishment nor the promise of reward for their obedience but out of their love 
for God and/or gratitude to Him, their Creator and Sustainers. Would not this 
seem a more appropriate relationship between God and His creation? Would 
this not seem just as valid a reason for doing such acts? 
efining Good and Evil 
From al-Gbazäli's understanding of what makes an action necessary 
(al-wäjib), we proceed to see how this concept then influences, shapes and 
defines two foundational concepts in ethics; good and evil. However, before 
we delve directly into discussing these two concepts in ethics, let us first 
'One can only wonder why he did not put forth here the sufis' explanation for 
obedience to God. For the Sufis' obedience to God is due out of love for Him 
and not one's own self interest. For example, the famous Rabi'a al-'Adawiya 
(d. 801) who is among the earliest Sufi expounds this doctrine of obedience out 
of love to God by saying: 
"I am going to light a fire in Paradise and to pour water to Hell, so that both 
veils may be taken away from those who journey towards God, and their 
purpose may be sure and they may look towards their Sustainer without object 
of hope or motive of fear. What if the hope of Paradise and the fear of Hell did 
not exist? No one would worship his Sustainer or obey Him". Margaret 
Smith, Rabi'a the Mystic and Her Fellow Saints in 
Islam. (Cambridge, 1928). 102-3. 
155 
contextualize ethics in a religious framework. In the introduction of a recent 
book discussing contemporary ethical issues in religion, entitled Ethical 
Issues in Six Religious Traditions, the editors Peggy Morgan and Clive 
Lawton set out the framework on how to discuss the question of right and 
wrong, good and evil in a religious context. 
The law of the land in most countries is a secular legal system 
enforced by police, judges and a penal system. Because 
religions are a way of life as well as belief-systems, they too 
have ideas about how people should behave and what should 
be done when they behave badly. They also have their own 
teachings about justice and a way for people to show that they 
are sorry for what they have done. But one of the main 
characteristics of religion is its sense that order, truth and 
justice are ultimate cosmic values and realities, not just human 
ideas. They are part of the way God wants things to be, to put 
in theistic terms, not just the creations of human societies....... 
Teaching about what is right and wrong is also related to 
beliefs about life after death and how a people's present life 
affects their future state. I 
What emerges from this statement on religious ethics is the strong 
dependence of ethics on God. What is ethical is defined not just by human 
ideas, but, rather by the ultimate cosmic values and realities determined by 
God. Therefore, right and wrong, good and evil, are defined by God and put 
in the way God wants things to be and not just the creation of human 
societies. 
Another essential determining characteristic of religious ethics is how 
it defines ethical concepts in terms of its relationship to its beliefs about life 
after death and how the people's present life affects their future state in the 
hereafter. It is this belief about the afterlife and how one's present actions 
affect it that dominates and shapes how to define what is ethical. 
Both these characteristics of religious ethics as described by Peggy 
Morgan and Clive Lawton that religious ethics are defined by God and 
dominated by the idea of life after death and how present actions affect one's 
1Peggy Morgan and Clive Lawton eds., Ethical Issues in Sic Religious 
Traditions, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996). xxii 
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future state in the afterlife are clearly evident in al-Ghazäli discussion on the 
two foundational ethical concepts, good and evil. However, before al- 
Ghazäli provides his own definition of good and evil, it is best to study the 
other possible meanings of good and evil he provides us with, in order to best 
understand how he finally arrives at his own definition. 
Al-Ghazäli begins his discussion of good and evil not as abstract 
concepts but in their relationship to concrete actions. It is in analysing how he 
defines an action as good or as evil, that we will hopefully be able to 
extrapolate his definition of the concept of good or evil. It is hoped that once 
we can extrapolate a definition of good and evil, we can then use it to apply it 
to any actions and deduce whether for al-Ghazäli that particular act is good or 
evil. 
Al-Ghazdli begins his discussion on good and evil by evaluating 
action. He argues that an act can be viewed in three ways. He lists them as 
follows: 
Part of the meaning (of an act is) that the act in the perspective 
of the actor is divided into three divisions. One of these (acts) 
is favourable to his aim. The second is that (an act) 
contradicts his aim. The third is (an act) which there is neither 
in doing it nor neglecting it anything(which affects) to (his) 
aim. This(third) division is futile according to reason. I 
From the above list of how al-Ghazäli divides each act from the perspective of 
the actor, it emerges that the aim is the determining factor on how an action is 
viewed upon. It is the aim and not the act per se which determines how the 
act should be viewed. Thus, the aim is not only the determining factor for 
how an act is to be viewed , but it becomes the only factor of any 
consideration in calculating whether an act is good or evil. " 
I -I tisäd , 163 
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Al-Ghazäli carries forward this idea of the aim as being the 
determining factor on how one views an act and applies it to determining 
whether an action is good or evil. He says: 
For those acts which the doer agrees with, he calls (them) good 
from his perspective. There is no meaning to good except that 
it is in agreement with his aim . Those acts which contradict his aim, he names evil. There is no meaning to evil except that 
it contradicts with his aim. Those acts which neither 
contradict nor agree (with his aim), he names as futile which 
have no benefit, not in the least. The doer of the useless act is 
called frivolous ('abath) Possibly, he is called stupid. The 
doer of evil, I mean the action which he suffers harm because 
of it, is (also)called stupid. (However) Naming him stupid is 
more accurate for the frivolous doer ('abatb). I 
It emerges from the above passage that firstly, the attribution of good and evil 
is an addition to the act. Good and evil are not intrinsic to the action. But, 
rather, a later attribution, an appendage added on to the action. Not only are 
good and evil reduced to only an appendage added on to an act, the attribution 
of good and evil is added on by the individual from his/her own perspective. 
Good and evil are reduced here, to the individual's attribution of these values 
on to the act in accordance to his/her perspective with regard to his/her own 
aims. Al-Ghaz li asserts that good as it applies to an act is only good when 
it is in agreement with one's individual's personalised aims and it means 
absolutely nothing else. Evil is simply the opposite of good, those acts which 
contradict one individual personalised aims and it means absolutely nothing 
else. Any act which neither promotes nor hinders one's own personalised aim 
is simply futile and thus, worthless. Therefore, the goodness or evilness of 
an act is to be viewed from the individual's perspective. 
However, few, if any acts only affect one individual. Most actions, if 
not all, have some effect either immediately or in the future on other than the 
doer of the action. Al-Ghazäli is well aware that most actions affect more than 
1- t'säd , 163. 
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one individual. However, since al-Ghazäli asserts that the attribution of good 
and evil upon an act is done by the individual in accordance to his/her own 
perspective, how then does al-Ghazäli modify his theory of good and evil to 
include the different perspectives by different individuals on the very same 
act? Al-Ghazäli's answer is very simple. He argues that the very same act 
can be viewed differently by different individuals. The same act can be 
viewed by one individual from his/her perspective as good and for another 
individual as evil. The determining factor of how to view an act remains the 
same, the aim. He says: 
All of these (actions) then are not related to another actor or the 
action is not ranked in accordance with the aim of another 
actor. For if it (the action) was ranked in accordance with 
another actor and it (the action) had agreed with his aim, (then) 
he would name it good in his perspective because of its 
agreement (with his aim). And if it (the action) contradicted 
(his aim), he would name it an evil (act). If it (the action) was 
in agreement to one individual instead of the other individual, 
(then) one of them would name it good from his perspective 
while in the perspective of the other, it would be evil. 
Therefore, the naming of the good and the evil is (based) upon 
agreement or disagreement. ' 
Al-Ghazäli sees neither problems nor contradictions in arguing that the same 
act can be seen by one to be good and by another as evil. All acts are seen 
from the eyes of the beholder and interpreted in accordance with his/her aims. 
Similar to the popular adage which subjects beauty to the eyes of the beholder, 
al-Ghazdli has subjected ethics to the eyes of the beholder and has reduced 
ethics to total subjectivity. 
Al-Ghazdli even proceeds to provide us with an example of how the 
very same act can be viewed differently by different individuals. He says, 
1- tisäd , 163 
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For (example), in the killing of a king. The action of the killer 
is considered good by his enemies, but is considered evil by all 
his supporters. I 
The example given by al-Ghazäli above demonstrates his unwavering 
insistence that the categories of good and evil are simply imposed on acts from 
the perspective of the individual. Even the extreme case of killing a human 
being is still only seen from the perspective of the aim of the individual. 
Thus, killing a king from the perspective of his enemies is a good act. But, 
from the perspective of the king's friends, it is an evil act. If even the taking 
of human life is not condemned objectively as an evil act, there can be no act 
that even comes close to be considered as either objectively good or 
objectively evil. The above example of the taking of human life clearly 
demonstrates that al-Ghazäli rejects any notion of the objective value in an act. 
For al-Ghazälii, there can be and there is absolutely no intrinsic value in an act. 
Therefore, for al-Ghazäli, all acts are subjective. The value of all actions are 
subject to the perspective of individuals. 
Al-Ghazäli reiterates his position that all actions are subject to the 
perspective of the individual and that there is nothing in the act itself that is 
objective or in its essence that makes it good or evil. However, while 
reiterating this position that these attributions of good and evil to an act are 
only latter attributions placed on these acts by an individual from his/her 
perspective and thus, reducing all ethics to subjectivity, he does recognise 
some form of objective knowledge. He says 
By this (definition) it becomes absolutely clear that good and 
evil are interpretations of the creation. They differ on these 
two additional attributions because of these attributions, and 
not on the nature of the essence which is not differentiated by 
the attribution.? Certainly. 
It is possible that the thing is good in the perspective of Zayd 
and evil in the perspective of 'Amr. But it is impossible that the 
- t'säd, 164 
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thing is black in Zayd's perspective but white in the perspective 
of `Amr because the colours are not the additional property. I 
Since al-Ghazäli's ethics are subjective ethics, at first glance one would 
have thought that he would have carried this subjectivity over to everything 
else and made all knowledge subjective. However, despite this statement 
made above that Zayd and 'Amr may come up with different judgements on 
ethical judgements on the status of an act, they would never disagree on the 
status of the colour of an object. This leads one to conclude that there must be 
different judgements used in ethical questions than in seemingly factual 
questions. This may lead one to conclude that al-Ghazäli accepts also some 
kind of objective knowledge since the colour of the object is agreed upon 
irrespective of the observer's perspective. However, with only this example 
given here, one is reluctant to generalise and further speculate on al-Ghazäli's 
understanding of objective knowledge. One can safely say that al-Ghazäli 
accepts some type of objective knowledge, but that all of ethics is subjective. 
For al-Ghazäli, the entire assessment as to whether an act is good or 
evil is subject to the perspective of the individual with regard to the outcome 
of the act. If the act is in agreement with one's aim, it is good. If it 
contradicts one's aim, it is evil. The outcome remains the deciding factor. 
However, the outcome of the act is ultimately decided by God. It is 
God who decides whether an act is good or evil by informing His servants 
through revelation. What is good is what the revelation imposes on him to do 
and promises him reward for these actions. What is evil is what the revelation 
imposes him not to do and promises punishment for these actions. Al- 
Ghazali says: 
When you understand (this) the meaning, you will know that 
the terminology in the expression of good is also three. A 
speaker applies it (good) to every (thing) which he agrees with 
the aim, immediately or in the future. The speaker distinguishes what he agrees with in regard to aims in the 
'a - tisäd , 164-5. 
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hereafter. The good is what the revelation (al-spar') imposes 
on him and he is promised reward. This is the terminology of 
our companions. Evil is difference which contradicts the 
good. I 
The individual judges the value of an act based on its outcome. However, 
since the outcome of an act is ultimately decided by God, al-Ghazdli is able to 
do away with the multiple subjective judgements on an act carried out by 
each individual in accordance to his/her own perspective. The aim of the 
individual must ultimately conform and be equivalent to the aim set out by 
God, because it is God who decides the outcome of the action. Thus, the 
subjective assessment of an act now is finally reduced to one, the subjective 
perspective of God. 
From Theology to Law: Legal Definitions of Good and Evil 
We now turn our attention away from theological text which many 
wrongly2 consider today to be only ivory tower discussions in books with 
little or no bearing on the application of religion to daily life. Instead, we will 
focus on a more down to earth subject affecting every aspect of a Muslim's 
life, Islamic law, to look for how al-Ghazäli defines these same terms, good 
and evil, there. 
By his own admission, al-Ghazäli wrote many books on law but 
al-Mustasfä fi `ilm al-usül ( The Quintessence of the Science of the 
Principles of Jurisprudence) is his major work on Islamic law . He says: 
1al-I tcl isäd , 165. 2This is clearly a wrong attitude to have. However, this attitude which relegates theology to a secondary role has been adopted by many in both the Islamic 
world and also by adherents of other faiths. 
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In the prime of my youth... I had composed many books on 
law and jurisprudence, then I turned to the science of the 
afterlife and learned the inner secrets of religion. I 
However, al-Mustasfä, his penultimate works serves as clear proof that he 
returned to write again on law and jurisprudence after he had turned to Sufism. 
His last work is a short treatise on kaläm entitled Iijäm a! -'Awämm'an 'Ilm 
al-Kaläm. 
However, since al-Mustasfä is his last major work, it must be the 
product of a culmination of his mature intellectual thoughts and thus, probably 
reflective of the opinions he had come to hold after his long turbulent 
intellectual journey. Al-Ghazäli wrote his famous intellectual autobiography 
the Mungidb either before or simultaneously with the Mustasfä as pointed 
out by Hourani, "the writings of these two works (al-Mustasfä and al- 
Mungidb) may well overlap"2. It must remain somewhat of a mystery, 
however, why a man who criticised law in a number of his previous works 
and came to attribute to it little importance would at the end of his life write a 
major work on law. Again this conundrum must be left aside for another day. 
The authenticity of this book, however, is beyond question. 
As has been pointed out earlier, there is no specific discipline of ethics 
in Islamic sciences;. This does not signify that ethics is irrelevant or 
unimportant in Islam but that the study of ethics is subsumed under the 
discipline of law. Thus, all ethical concepts can be found in legal texts. 
Therefore, we will ask his legal text the very same questions on these ethical 
concepts, good and evil as previously posed to al-Ghazäli's theological text. 
After all, is not the law only a logical expression and implementation of ethics? 
tal-Mustasfa fi 'i1m al-usül (Cairo: Dar al-fikr, no date). 4. Further, referred to 
simply as al-Mustasfä. 
2George Hourani, "A Revised Chronology of Ghazäli's Writings° journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 104 (1984). 302. 
3See above, Chapter Five: The Significance of Ethics. 
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In this legal text, we find al-Ghazäli is consistent in his definition of 
these ethical terminologies with those in his theological textst. In fact, in 
many places, he repeats himself using the same language or similar 
phraseology, providing at times the same examples in order to illustrate his 
point as he has done in his theological texts. This demonstrates that although 
al-Ghazäli had encountered and discussed these questions very early in his 
intellectual career2, there has been little change of his position on these issues. 
Defining Good and Evil 
Al-Ghazäli begins his discussion of good and evil by putting reason in 
what he considers to be its proper place by relegating it to a secondary position 
in his exposition. He says: 
The assessment (of an act) for us expresses the judgement 
(khitäb) of the revelation (shay') when [the judgement] is 
connected to the acts of those under obligation. Thus the 
forbidden is the declaration [of an act] in it (star): Shun it and do not do it. The obligatory is a declaration in it ( shat) : Do 
it and do not neglect it . The permitted is the declaration in it (shat'): If you wish, do it and if you wish, do not do it. For 
if this judgement is not from the Legislator, then, there is no 
assessment. Therefore, we say, the 'aql neither commends 
nor detests, and [the 'aqi ] does not make the thanking of the 
benefactor obligatory, and there is no assessment on an action 
before the arrival of the revelation (sbar'). 3 
'The theological texts being referred to here are, - t'säd and Kitab Oawä'id 
-'a ä''d 
2As mentioned earlier, at-lqtisdd was written very early in his career. 3- ustasfä, 55. 
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Thus, for al-Ghazäli what is forbidden and what is obligatory and even what 
is permitted are known only through the vehicle of the sbar'. Reason, 'aql, 
plays absolutely no role in discovering these matters. Why is this so? This is 
because all these matters are decided by the proclamation of revelation. Al- 
Ghazäli states clearly and decisively that before the arrival of revelation, there 
is not and cannot be any assessment of the ethical value of an act. Thus, were 
it not for the coming down of revelation to man, man could not, and would 
never have known any of these matters. Man's own reason, 'aql, cannot 
make any assessment of an action. For these matters are dicta imposed from 
on high, from God unto His creation, man. 
After stating his own position on the place of reason vis ä vis 
revelation in discovering ethical truths, he proceeds to provide us with a 
summary of his opponent's position, the Mu'tazilites, on these matters, along 
with his own counter-arguments. He summarises the Mu'tazilites' position as 
follows: 
The Mu'tazilites hold the view that acts are divided into (two) 
good (basana) and evil (gabiha). Some of these (acts), the 
mind perceives by necessityl (bi-darüri) (are good), like the 
goodness of rescuing drowning (gbarga) persons or perishing 
(al-balakä)persons, and the (goodness of) thanking the 
benefactor (mun'im), and the goodness (of telling) the truth 
(sidq); and( some of these acts are evil like) the detestability of ingratitude (al-kufrän) and inflicting pain on the innocent and lying when there is no purpose behind it. There are some of 
these (acts) which reason perceives (only) through rational 
inquiry (bi-na-Tar al-'aql) like the goodness of telling the truth 
even though it is harmful, and the detestability of lying even 
though useful. There are some of these (acts) whose 
(goodness and evilness) are perceived through revelation (bi 
al-sam'), like the goodness of worship (al-saläb), the 
pilgrimage (al-bajj) and the rest of the devotional acts. (The Mu'tazilites) claim that (these revelational acts) are distinguished from others (acts) by the attribute of their essence 
which is the benevolence (lutf) which prevents corrupt acts (al-fabshä') and invites (man) to obedience. Thus, reason, 'aql, is not (absolutely) self-sufficient in perceiving (bi- darakibi) these (actions). 2 
Idarvcz here must be understood in context. Here it refers to knowledge that imposes itself immediately on reason, 'aql. 
2a1-Mustasfa 55-6. 
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This above passage tells us a great deal about how al-Ghazäli perceived and 
understood the Mu'tazilites. According to al-Ghazäli, the Mu'tazilites divided 
acts into two categories, good or evil. These acts are divided into these 
categories by the attribute of their essence. Thus, these acts are by 
themselves, per se, good or evil. Reason, `aql, is capable of discovering 
whether these acts are good or evil. Reason, `aql, is able to judge either 
immediately or after some process of ratiocination whether these acts are 
good or evil. Reason is able to judge the value of some acts immediately 
without the need for ratiocination. This take place because the value of these 
acts immediately occurs to reason by necessity (bi-darürl). The act 
imposes itself immediately on reason as a good act or an evil act. Some 
examples of such acts are helping a drowning man, being grateful and telling 
the truth. 
The judgement of other than the above category of acts requires 
undergoing the process of rational inquiry before final judgement can be made 
on an act. Some examples of these acts are that one must always tell the truth 
even when it is harmful and must not lie even when there is a benefit in doing 
so. 
Al-Ghazäli attempts to undermine the Mu'tazilites' position by 
arguing that if all acts can be evaluated by reason, 'aql, how is it that the 
Mu'tazilites recognise the value of revelational acts? Al-Ghazali gives a fair 
representation of the Mu'tazilites' position on revelational acts by saying that; 
" (The Mu`tazilites) claim that (these revelational acts) are distinguished from 
others (acts) by the attribute-0 its essence, the benevolence (1utf) which 
prevents corrupt acts (al-fabshä') and invites (man) to obedience". This 
statement concerning the Mu'tazilites' position on the difference and value of 
revelational acts is a reasonable, although, oversimplified interpretation. 
However, it is the conclusion al-Ghazäli draws from this which is dreadfully 
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incorrect and misrepresents the Mu'tazilites' views. Al-Ghazdli draws the 
conclusion that "Thus, reason, . 
'aql, is not (totally) self-sufficient in 
perceiving ( bi-daralcihi) these (acts). Therefore, al-Ghazäli's objective here 
is to endeavour to show that the Mu'tazilites were inconsistent in their analysis 
of the capacity and ability of reason to uncover truths. 
Granted that for the Mu'tazilites, revelational acts possess great value. 
However, the value of revelational acts is not that it gives man knowledge 
that he could not have discovered by himself/herself. But, its value is in 
revelation's ability to transform general truths into specific action with the 
power of its language and symbols that impel and motivate man to right 
action. These devotional acts train him/her to choose and do the right action 
and prevents him/her from doing evil. 'Abd al-Jabbär (d. 1024), one of the 
most renowned of the Mu'tazilite theologians, explains the Mu'tazilites' 
position on the value of revelation as follows: 
The doctrine is refuted of those who say that if these 
messengers have taught what is according to reason, reason is 
sufficient without them, but if they have taught something else 
then their doctrine must be rejected and not accepted from 
them. For, in view of the situation we have stated, the 
teaching of the messengers is nothing but a detailed 
specification (tafsil) of what is determined in its generality 
(jumlatubu) by reason. We have previously mentioned that 
the obligation of [promoting] advantage and the evilness of 
[promoting] mischief are determined by reason. I 
Thus, it is clear that the Mu'tazilites place great value on revelation. Its 
value however, is not that it gives new knowledge but that it is able to 
transform general truths into particular actions. Therefore, al-Ghazäli's 
accusation against them that they were inconsistent and had conceded that 
reason, 'aql, was insufficient to evaluate an act is unfounded and rests upon 
1'Abd al-Jabbär, Sharh al-Usnl al-Khamsa, ed. 'Abd al-Karim 'Uthman, 
(Cairo, 1965). 564-5. I have used here a translation of this passage from 
George Hourani, in Islamic Rationalism: The 
Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbär, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 135. For an enlightening view of the Mu'tazilites' understanding of the relationship of revelation and reason, refer to Hourani, Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al labbär chapter six, Revelation. 
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either a misunderstanding of the Mu'tazilites' views on revelation or an 
attempt to misrepresent them. 
Al-Ghazäli counters the Mu'tazilites' argument that reason, 'aql, can 
inevitably discover whether an act is good or evil by tearing down the very 
foundation on which the Mu'tazilites had built their argument. The 
Mu'tazilites' argument basically comes down to the fact that all acts are either 
good or evil because it is inherent in their essence, acts are good or evil per 
se. Being grateful is good because it is good in its essence. Therefore, the act 
is good per se regardless of the outcome or of one's perspective. Lying is 
evil because it is evil in its essence. Therefore, lying is evil per se regardless 
of the outcome or of one's perspective. The assessment of an act is objective, 
regardless of either the outcome or one's perspective. 
It is this very assessment that an act is evaluated objectively that al- 
Ghazäli denies and rejects outright. A1-Ghazäli rejects the Mu'tazilites' 
foundational premise that an act is good or evil because of the attribute of their 
essence. Because of this , al-Ghazäli denies that there can any objective 
assessment of an act. Instead, al-Ghazäti argues that every assessment of an 
act is subjective. 
If for al-Ghazäli, every assessment of an act is subjective, the obvious 
question that follows is: Subject to what? Al-Ghazäli answers in al- 
Mustasf' äl as he had done in a! -Igtisäd2 that the assessment of an act is 
subject to the individual from his/her perspective based on his/her objective. In 
clear contrast to the Mu'tazilites who argued that the assessment of an act is 
objective and thus regardless of one's perspective, al-Ghazäli places the 
1AI-Ghazäli says: 
"Acts are divided into what is in agreement with the objective (gharad) of the agent 
and into what is contrary to it (his objective), and to what is neither in agreement nor 
contrary to it (his objective). (Those acts) in agreement (with his objective) are called 
good (hasaa). (Those acts) contrary (to his objective) are called evil (gabih); the third 
(category are those acts which are neither in agreement nor contrary to the objective) 
are called futile. " al-Mustasfä. 56. 
2a1-Igtisäd, 163. 
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assessment of the act solely on the agent. Al-Ghazäli has turned on its head 
the Mu'tazilites' basic assumption that the assessment of an act is in the act 
itself . Instead, al-Ghazäli has begun with the opposite basic assumption that 
the assessment of the act is made by the agent of the act. 
Al-Ghazäli then proceeds to deal with the question of the basis on 
which the agent make his/her assessment? Al-Ghazäli argues that the agent 
makes these assessments out of self-interest. Thus, an act is considered 
good when it is in agreement with the agent's objective and evil when it goes 
contrary to the agent's objective. Any acts which fall into neither category is 
simply considered futile ('abatb). 
Al-Ghazäli sees neither problems nor contradictions in arguing that 
the same act can be seen by one to be good and by another as evil. All acts are 
seen from the eyes of the beholder and interpreted in accordance with his/her 
aims. 
If all acts are seen only from the eyes of the beholder and interpreted 
only in accordance with his/her aim at that particular time, may not this same 
individual's aim change and the very same act that he/she had judged earlier as 
good may now become evil. This is possible since the aim of the individual 
may have changed. G. E. Moore concludes that subjectivist ethical theory 
will lead to the paradoxical conclusions that the same action could be both 
right and wrong, and that the same action could change from being right to 
being wrong. Harrison summarises Moore's argument which cites 
coincidentally the same example of the killing of a king as al-Ghazäli had 
given above as his explanation of how this subjective ethical theory will 
inevitable lead to paradoxical conclusions. He says: 
If Jones approves of Brutus' assassination of Caesar and says Brutus was right, it follows from the theory that Brutus was 
right. Similarly, if Smith disapproves of Brutus' assassination 
of Caesar and says Brutus was' wrong, then Brutus was wrong. Hence Brutus was both right and wrong to assassinate Caesar. Second to show that Brutus' assassination of Caesar can change from being right to being wrong, all Moore thought 
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he needed to do was to point out that if Jones says (at the time 
when he approves of Brutus's action) that Brutus was right, 
then according to this theory Brutus was right; if he later had 
come to disapprove of Brutus' action, then, if he says Brutus 
was wrong, according to the theory, Brutus was wrong. If 
Jones can truly judge that at one time that Brutus was right and 
at a later time that Brutus was wrong, it must follow that 
Brutus' action has changed from being right to being wrong. I 
Leaving all ethical judgement to the individual leads to a great number of 
problems. From the above example, Moore points out the dilemmas one 
would have to face and accept if we were to argue for all ethical judgements to 
be subjective, subject only to the whims and fancies of the particular 
individual at particular moment in time. Moore points out the dilemma that 
the same individual may have to face. He may at one time think that his action 
was right and later with changed circumstances rethink his position and the 
very same action which was right before has become wrong without the act 
itself changing one iota. Thus, the ethical judgement of an act does not only 
depend entirely on the individual but entirely on the individual at a particular 
moment in time. 
However, al-Ghazäli's subjectivist ethical theory is not as subjective 
as the one Moore is disparaging above. Al-Ghazäli qualifies his subjectivist 
ethical theory by removing the subjectivity of judgement of an act from the 
individual's hands and places it in the hands of God. However, before we 
explain how al-Ghazäli qualifies his subjective ethical theory, it is important to 
point out that since al-Ghaz . li considers ethical judgements to be subjective in 
the eyes of the beholder, one might jump to the wrong conclusion that for al- 
Ghazäli, all knowledge is subjective. Al-Ghazäli does in fact accept some 
types of knowledge as objective knowledge, knowledge which is agreed 
upon by all regardless of their objective or perspective. He repeats the same 
example given in al-Igt4äd to argue this point. He says: 
tJonathan Harrison, "Ethical Subjectivism", in E_acvclonaedia of-Philosophy, 
vol. 3,79. 
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For them (good and evil) represent agreement or 
disagreement. These two matters (good and evil) are 
relational ('idäfiyäni) not like (the colour) black and white 
since it would be inconceivable that a thing is black in the 
perspective of Zayd and white in the perspective of 'A. mr. I 
This clearly demonstrates that al-Ghazäll distinguishes this kind of 
knowledge from ethical judgements. It is not, however, altogether clear 
what types of knowledge fall exclusively into this category of objective 
knowledge. 
All this talk of ethical judgement being in the hands of each 
individual may lead one to the absurd conclusion that for al-Ghazäll the 
evaluation of all acts is subjective to the whims and fancies of each 
individual. Al-Ghazäli removes the subjectivity of judgement of an act from 
the individual's hands and places it in the hands of God, so to speak. For al- 
Ghazdli, it is God who decides the outcome of every act. Therefore, it is 
God who decides the value of every act. He says: 
The' application of good is on what the revelation (spar') 
(considers) good by commending it to its doer. (Thus) the 
action of God is good in every circumstance (regardless of 
whether) contrary to (a person's) objective or in agreement 
with it. The matter which the revelation (spar`) assigns, will 
necessarily be good. 2 
In a! -Igtisäd , al-Ghazäli prefaced this discussion of removing the subjectivity of 
judgement from the individual's hands and placing it in the hands of God by 
pointing out that this occurs because it is the outcome of the expected harm or 
reward in the next life that one must be most concerned with. This is because the 
harm or reward in the next life is the real harm or reward, the eternal harm or 
reward. These harms or rewards are decided by God and can be known only 
from revelation. 3 Therefore, without repeating this assumption again in al- 
Mustasfä, al-Ghazäli draws out and therefore, repeats the same conclusions. 
1a1-Mustasfä_ 56. 
2a1-Mustasfä. 56. 
3 -I tisäd , 162. 
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Since the outcome of an act is ultimately decided by God, al-Ghazäli is able to 
do away with the multiple subjectivity in perceiving an act. The aim of the 
individual must ultimately be equivalent to the aim set out by God because it is 
God who decides the outcome of the action, the reward or harm incurred from 
each action. Thus, the subjective assessment of an act now is finally reduced 
to one, the subjective perspective of God. 
Some Problems in Subjective Ethics 
Even after arguing that ethical judgements are subjective and ultimately 
reducing the subjectivity to one perspective, God's perspective, al-GhazffE is 
still left with some nagging problems raised by the Mu'tazilites' objective 
ethics. Al-Ghazdli rises to the defence of his position that all ethics is 
subjective and provides some very interesting answers in his reply to the 
Mu'tazilites' challenges. 
For example the Mu'tazilites point to the fact that even men who have 
no religion and therefore are not bounded by religious stipulations of 
punishment or rewards, seem to share similar values of good and evil. They 
consider it good to help people in need even when they do not expect to 
receive any benefit either in terms of reward or even gratitude. In fact, these 
actions may even prove detrimental to themselves. But they still consider it 
good to do such acts. This must be because these acts are good in themselves. 
Al-Ghazäli cites the Mu'tazilites' example for these acts here: 
(The Mu'tazilites) argue that we know absolutely that one to 
whom the telling of the truth and lying are equal (to his self- interest), prefers the telling of the truth and he is inclined (mäla) to it if he is a person in full possession of his mental faculties ('ägilan). There is nothing to this (preference) except 
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[because] of its [the act's innate] goodness. A great king who 
rules over a region, if he sees a weak person (who is) near 
destruction, he(the king) is inclined to save him, even if he 
(the king) does not believe in religion, and therefore, (does 
not) anticipate a (religious) reward (from God) and also he 
does not seek from him (the person being rescued) repayment 
(mujäza) nor gratitude. Also (perhaps) this (rescue may) not 
be in agreement with his (the king's) objective, indeed, he (the 
king) may be made difficult by it. However, the person in 
full possession of his mental faculties ('ägilan) judges it good 
to endure against the sword when he is forced to a declaration 
of unbelief or to reveal a secret, or to violate an agreement. 
(Although) These are contrary to the objective of the one 
(being) compelled. On the whole, the considering as good 
(these) noble characteristics and open-handedness are among 
them (the things) no person in full possession of his mental 
faculties ('ägilan) would deny, except from obstinacy. I 
This example given by the Mu'tazilites seems to be fairly convincing in 
proving the existence of at least some form of universal values held by all 
reasonable men. The Mu'tazilites' explanation of how men obtain these 
same values is because they are able by themselves to discover that these acts 
are good or evil. They are able to do so because these acts are good or evil in 
themselves, because their essence is good or evil. 
Al-Ghazäli accepts part of the Mu'tazilites' claim. He accepts that 
there exists widespread acceptance that certain things are good or evil. To 
deny this would be sheer stupidity. However, al-Ghazdli gives his own 
explanation of how these judgements became widespread and accepted. He 
attributes that as being due to religious commitment to revelational 
stipulations or in agreement with one's objectives. He says in reply to the 
Mu'tazilites: 
Answer. We do not deny the widespread (acceptance) of 
these judgements among men and they are praiseworthy and 
well known. But their basis is either commitment to religious 
presciptions (al-tadayyun bi al-sharä'i') or ( one's own) 
objective. 2 
la! -Mustasfä. 58. 2a1-Mustasfä. 58. 
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Al-Ghazäli does not explain further here how these judgements became 
widespread and accepted by all reasonable men nor, more importantly, how 
religious stipulations became the basis of these judgements. One may 
speculate that since God had been sending prophets since the creation of man, 
and to all peoples, with basically the same message, it is possible that the 
same religious stipulations became widespread and accepted by all reasonable 
men because of the different prophets spreading the same message to all 
peoples. However, without al-Ghazäli explaining his reasons further on this 
matter, this speculation must remain only a possible explanation. 
In another similar example given by the Mu'tazilites, al-Ghazäli gives a 
different very interesting counter argument, the psychological argument. Al- 
Ghazäli had accepted as fact that most people would rather help others in dire 
need than be indifferent to their distress. Al-Ghazali first sets up the problem 
by saying: 
We say: One prefers the rescuing ( of a man) against 
indifference (even) in the perspective of one who does not 
believe in the religious laws (sbard'i') in order to defend 
against the harre which befalls the man. This is because of the 
affections of the same(species of) creature ( rigqa al- 
jinsiyya)1. It (this feeling) is a natural characteristic (tab ). 2 
It emerges from the above statement that even a man who does not believe 
in the sbarä'i' (divine laws)would prefer to help others in dire need rather 
than display indifference to them because of some feeling of amiability among 
the same human species. However, al-Ghazäli, instead of following this line 
of thought, that man's concern for other men is natural, turns the argument 
around and places this concern to help as not being for other men but for 
himself, his own self interest. Al-Ghazäli continues the argument: 
'This amiability of the same species of creatures towards each other is based 
upon the notion that members of the same species are naturally inclined to help 
each other. This sympathy of man inclined to help other men must be 
contrasted with men not having the same sympathy for animals, especially those 
he consumes as food. 
tal-Mustasfä. 59. 
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He imagines (himself) in (that same) distress. It causes him to 
envision himself in that (same) distress and he envision 
someone else abandoning him and his rescue. He considers 
evil (the act of abandoning him and his rescue because it ) 
being contrary to his objective. He re-assesses (his own 
situation) and this evil, the destruction of a man. He appraises 
it from his own perspective (as if he was the one in that 
distress situation) and he scolds for himself this imagined evil. I 
Al-Ghazdli provides a psychological answer as to why one man would want 
help another. One man would want to help another because he can imagine 
himself some day being in that situation and he would want someone to help 
him. He would despise anyone who could help him were he in that situation 
but would not. Thus, he would not want to be that man he would himself 
come to despise. Therefore, out of his own interest of wanting others to help 
him, he would help others in dire situations. Again al-Ghazäli here stands 
firm on his position that there is no objective value in an act. 
Theological Conclusions and Their Implications: Ethics 
Al-Ghazäli's ethical theory is based on the consequence of the action. 
According to al-Ghazäli, man evaluates all acts in terms of whether it is in 
agreement with one's aim or not. If it is in agreement with one's aim, the act 
is considered good and the act is considered the opposite, evil, if the act is 
not in agreement with one's aim. If these acts are neither in agreement nor 
disagreement with one's objective, they are just worthless or futile. 
Therefore, all acts have no intrinsic moral value. Thus, all acts are evaluated 
solely on the basis of the result of the consequence of the action in 
accordance to the personalised individual's perspective. All acts are evaluated 
based upon one's own self interest. 
al-Mustasfä, 59-60. 
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If one were to stop short and terminate the analysis of al-Ghazdli's 
ethics at this point, one would be misled into concluding that for al-Ghazäli all 
acts are evaluated differently by different individuals according to their 
judgement of the situation at that particular moment in time. This conclusion 
would be a grave error and a serious misrepresentation of al-Ghazäli's ethics. 
Such a conclusion would be impossible for a religious scholar to make for it 
would result in each individual creating his own way of life, resulting in his 
own religion, worshipping himself. 
After al-Ghazäli has vigorously argued that all actions are evaluated 
subjectively, subject to the result of the consequence of the action, he pulls in 
the reins and turns the focus of the analysis to who decides the results of the 
consequence of the act. In the final analysis for al-Ghazäli, it is God. who 
ultimately decides the result of the consequence of each and every action. 
Therefore, al-Ghazäli is able to remove the subjectivity of judgement from 
the individual's hands and place it in the hands of God. 
Man, al-Ghazdli argues, evaluates the consequences of an act based 
either on personal experience or by others telling from their past experiences 
and extrapolating from these experiences a prediction of future events 
concerning this predictable harm or benefit. Therefore, man's reason will 
consider it necessary (al-wäjib) out of self interest for one to perform the act 
that will avoid this foreseeable harm. However, man's reason is unable to 
know the outcome of the expected harm or reward in the next life with which 
he must ultimately be most concerned. This is because the harm or reward in 
the next life is the real harm or reward, the eternal harm or reward. These 
harms or rewards are decided by God and can be known only from 
revelation. I The result of the consequence of the act is taken away from each 
individual and decided solely by God. Since the outcome of those acts is 
ultimately decided by God, al-Ghazäli is able to do away with the multiple 
lal- tisäd , 
162. 
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subjectivity in perceiving an act. The aim of the individual must ultimately be 
equivalent to the aim set out by God because it is God who decides the 
outcome of the action, the reward or harm incurred from each action.. Thus, 
the subjective assessment of an act now is finally reduced to one, the 
subjective perspective of God. 
Acts are evaluated on the basis of an objective end, the happiness of 
man in the next world decided by God. Men attain this goal of happiness in 
the next world by obeying all the dicta expressed in the revelation. How to 
act and what to do and not to do is known solely through the means of the 
revelation. 
What is forbidden and what is obligatory and even what is permitted 
are known only through the vehicle of the sbar'. Reason, 'aql, plays 
absolutely no role in these matters since all these matters are given their value 
by the proclamation of revelation. Therefore, before the arrival of revelation, 
there is and cannot be any assessment of the ethical value of an act. Thus, 
were it not for the coming down of revelation to man , man could not and 
would never have known any of these matters, for there would not exist any 
value of an act to evaluate. Man's own reason, 'aql, cannot make any 
assessment on an act because there is no intrinsic value in an act itself except 
what God imposes on the act, about which He informs man through the 
means of revelation. Every evaluation of an act is therefore subject to the 
subjectivity of the divine will of God. 
Since all acts have no intrinsic moral value and are morally neutral 
before God had imposed upon these acts a value through His commands and 
prohibitions in the revelation, al-Ghazäli must presume that the revelation 
itself with its commands and prohibitions has no intrinsic value. Its only 
worth is that it informs us of what God commands or prohibits. Thus, as for 
I 
the first question we had raised concerning revelation, what is revelation: 
what kinds of knowledge does it actually give us?, we can conclude that since 
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there is no objective intrinsic moral value al-Ghazäli must presume that 
everything about which the revelation informs us is totally new to us since we 
have no way to arrive at objectively at this knowledge by ourselves since it is 
not objective knowledge. Thus, the knowledge that revelation provides us is 
not only totally new to us but we would have never been able to obtain it by 
ourselves. The purpose of this revelation revealed to man is to tell man what 
God commands and prohibits him to do. Without this revelation, man could 
not and would not be able to know what God expects from him. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Proof of the Truth of Revelation: The Miracles of Its 
Messengers. 
Introduction. 
Since al-Ghazäli rejects any objective evaluation of good and evil 
leading inevitably to a rejection of any objective evaluation of the truth of 
revelation, he posits that it is revelation that tells us what is good and what is 
evil. Revelation's designation of an act makes it good or vice-versa, evil. It is 
revelation that determines good and evil and nothing else. The role of reason 
is simply to submit and accept the decrees of revelation without question. 
This is because there need not be any reasoning' behind these decrees. These 
decrees are solely within the purview of God, His subjective judgement.. 
On the surface, without going into greater depth into the problems of 
the limitations of human understanding, interpretations and language, it 
seems simple enough that once one is told what is good and evil as stated in 
the revelation, this should determine how one should act. However, if we 
were to take a step back, without being able to judge using this God given 
1The only modus operandi that al-Ghazäli accepts reason utilising is that reason judges on the basis of benefit. Since these dictates of revelation are neither 
necessarily intended for the benefit of man nor certainly for the benefit of the all 
perfect God who is in need of nothing, reason has no basis to make a judgement and therefore cannot be utilised here. 
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instrument of reason which all men possesses, how do we know this 
revelation is actually revealed by God to man? Taking away rational 
justification from the commands of revelation results in removing reason's 
ability to evaluate the truth of revelation. Al-Ghazäli is well aware of this 
consequence. Thus, al-Ghazdli posits another means by which we can 
evaluate the truth of revelation. Since we cannot objectively evaluate the 
message of revelation, since the message is totally subjective to the will of 
God, al-Ghazäli posits that we must evaluate the bringer of the message, the 
Prophet. If the bringer of the message is proven to be a messenger from God, 
then the message he brings must be true. Thus, we will focus our attention on 
how al-Ghazäli' seeks to prove not only the existence of messengers of God, 
but also how to identify one. The method and means al-Ghazdli utilises to 
prove the existence of messengers of God and ultimately, how to identify one, 
will have implications on how he, al-Ghazäli, perceives how God acts. 
Therefore, we hope, as suggested earlier in the introduction of chapter four, 
Ai-Ghazäli's Theological Positions and Their Implications on Revelation: 
An Indirect Method Analysis, that by using an indirect method of 
understanding al-Ghazäli's positions on certain theological issues, we will 
ultimately arrive at his concept of revelation itself. Since al-Ghazäli's position 
on how to prove the existence and how to identify a Prophet demonstrates 
how al-Ghazäli understood one aspect of how God acts, and since the sending 
of revelation is also an action of God, we hope by examining his 
understanding of how God differentiated His messengers from others will 
shed some light on our attempt to extrapolate al-Ghazdli's understanding of 
another of God's actions, revelation. 
Before even attempting to answer the question of trying to prove 
individual persons as messengers of God, we first have to establish that God 
has even sent messengers to mankind? If the answer is yes, only then, can we 
move on to the next question, how does one determine if that particular man 
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who claims to be the bringer of the message is actually sent by God to man? 
What are the criteria in determining this? Even up to the present time, there 
are many who claim to be prophets representing God'. How do we determine 
one claim to prophecy is true while another is false? How do we decide? 
Al-Ghazäli is well aware of all these questions raised concerning 
prophecy. As to the first question concerning the possibility of prophecy, al- 
Ghazdli answers simply by reminding us again of his quest to place God's 
power and will above everything else. Al-Ghazäli argues that since God is 
All Powerful, He is able to do anything. Therefore, since God can do 
anything, it is possible that He may send messengers. He says, "that His 
sending of prophets is possible (jä'iz)". 2 
However, since there is absolutely nothing necessary for God to do, 
God's sending prophets remains a possibility among infinite possibilities. 
How then do we know that He has actually chose this possibility ? It is one 
thing to prove the possibility of prophecy and quite another to conclude the 
existence of prophecy. 
Al-Ghazäli had begun the discussion of God's actions with the 
supposition that there is absolutely nothing incumbent upon God. 
Superficially, this supposition does not seem to be controversial but the 
conclusions that al-Ghazäli draws from it with regard to God's relationship to 
man are difficult to accept. Al-Ghazäli begins his argument by pointing out 
that neither creation nor the imposition of duties upon His creation are 
incumbent upon God. He says: 
(God created ) creation from nothing and the imposition of 
duties (taklif) upon His servants are by His Grace and Favour, 
'For example, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), the founder of the 
Ahmadiyya sect, rejected by most Muslims, regarded himself as a nab! or 
prophet I 
2hä. 125, Tibawi, 96. See also al- 'säd 160. 
It is not necessary for man to carry out a thing (obligation imposed) because of his reason but because of the shad'a (law). It is not necessary for God to send 
prophets. If He does send them (prophets), then it is not evil or absurd. 
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the Most High. Neither creation nor such imposition was ever 
an obligation (wäjib) upon Him. I 
Next, he challenges any notion that these impositions of obligations which the 
Prophet tells man through revelation necessarily have any reasoning behind 
them. He rejects that these imposition of obligations brought by the means of 
revelation were for the interest of man. He says: 
The [Mu'tazilites'] assertion that [creation and imposition of 
duties are] obligatory in the interest of His servants is 
fallacious. For if no injury befalls Him through neglecting 
what is in the interest of the servants then such obligations 
would be meaningless. Further, the interest for the servant is 
for Him to create them in Paradise, and thus those endowed 
with intelligence find no comfort in [the fact] that He created 
the servants in the abode of calamities and exposed them in it 
to sin, and later He subjects them to the dangers of punishment 
and the awe of resurrection and judgement2. 
There emerges from the above passage two very telling ideas on al-Ghazäli's 
understanding of these impositions of obligations brought by revelation and 
thus, ultimately the revelation itself emerges from the above passage. The 
first is that the obligations imposed by the revelation are not necessarily meant 
to be in the best interest of man. However, the second is a more problematic 
and damaging implication which emerges from the above passage, that if 
God were really concerned with man, God would have created man to live in 
Paradise to enjoy life without exposing man to sin and punishment. It seems 
that al-Ghazäii sees little value in the trial and tribulation man is forced to face 
in this world and concludes that there is little or no benefit in it. 
I have not raised these issues here to question al-Ghazdli's conviction 
of the existence of prophecy. However, in the light of these statements of 
God's relationship to man here, one cannot help but feel that al-Ghazäli 
needs to make an attempt to provide us with some possible explanation as to 
why God had chosen this possibility of sending prophets instead of choosing 
another possibility. 
Ilb a, 133, Tibawi, 112-3. See also - ti äd, 86. 
2hä. 133, Tibawi, 113. See also al- tisäd 86. 
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In al-Igtisäd, which is one of his early works, al-Ghazäli does not 
dwell further on this issue of God's choice among infinite possibilities, 
instead he simply states that God had sent down prophets and the proof of 
prophecy is miracles. He says: 
....... that His sending of prophets is possible (jäiz); and that 
the prophethood of our prophet Muhammad (God bless and 
save him) is proved and confirmed by miracles' 
However, in the Mungidh, he provides us with a proof that God had chosen 
to actualise this possibility of sending prophets by pointing out the existence 
in this world of the product of revelation, knowledge. This knowledge refers 
to knowledge which al-Ghazäli argues could not conceivably be obtained by 
man's reason alone such as the knowledge of medicine and of astronomy. 
Since the knowledge of medicine and of astronomy exists in this world, and 
as al-Ghazäli argues this knowledge obtained through revelation cannot be 
conceived by reason alone, thus this knowledge can only be obtained from a 
source other than reason. Al-Ghazäli attributes the source of this knowledge 
to divine inspiration. 
Doubt about prophecy touches either its possibility, or its 
actual existence, or its belonging to a specific individual. The 
proof of its possibility is its existence. And the proof of its 
existence is the existence in the world of knowledge which 
could not conceivably be obtained by the intellect alone such as 
the knowledge of medicine (a! -tibb) and of astronomy (al- 
nujüm). For whoever examines such knowledge knows of 
necessity that it can be obtained only by a divine inspiration( 
bi-ilhäm ilahi) and a special help from God Most High, and 
that there is no empirical (bi al-tajriba) way to it. Thus, 
among astronomical phenomena there is a phenomenon which 
occurs only once every thousand years. How, then, could knowledge of that be obtained empirically? The same is true of 
the properties of medicaments. From this proof, it is clearly 
within the bounds of possibility that a way exists to grasp 
these things which the intellect does not normally grasp. This 
11W 125, Tibawi, 96. See also al-I tisdd 160 
It is not necessary for God to send prophets. If He does send them(prophets), 
then it is not evil or absurd. It is possible to show their truth by miracles. All 
of these claims are based upon the discussions of the meaning of the necessary (wajib), the good (al-hasan) and the evil (al-gabih) 
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is what is meant by prophecy. Not that prophecy signifies 
such knowledge only. ' 
Although the argument presented above as proof for the existence of prophecy 
may not seem very convincing, in fact even somewhat strange and surprising 
especially for us in present timest, however, more importantly for our 
purpose here is that al-Ghazäli felt that it was necessary for him to provide 
some form of explanation for the proving from the possibility of prophecy its 
actual existence, for without such an explanation, we would have been 
forced to work from the supposition that God is capable of sending prophets 
to the next supposition that God had actualised this potential and had sent 
prophets. 
Miracles 
It is not self-evident how the performance of miracles serves as proof 
of prophecy. It does not logically follow that a man who seems to be able to 
defy nature, such as transforming a stick into a snake, is providing proof that 
he must be telling the truth. However, the performance of miracles is certainly 
a great way at gaining someone's attention and serves as a convincing 
instrument to one's argument that one has been touched by the all powerful 
God. It does give one a preponderance (tarajjih) of evidence to prove that 
'al-Munqidh 89. Richard McCarthy. 98.1 
2McCarthy points out that; "the argument from the knowledge found in medicine 
and astronomy may seem strange. A similar argument with regard to nutriment 
and medicaments is developed by al-Bägilläni in his Tamhid, 
.... it is also used by Ibn Iiazm. " McCarthy, Freedom and-Fulfillment. note 204, page 138. 
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one has been touched by the God. However, before we evaluate the use of 
miracles as proof of prophecy, we must first examine what really constitutes a 
miracle. Only then can we turn to next question, evaluating the effectiveness 
of miracles as a proof of prophecy. 
Before we focus our attention on al-Ghazäli's explanation of miracles 
(mu jiza, pl. at) , 
let us first look at the Qur'än itself. This will help us to try 
to comprehend what constitutes a miracle. The attitude of the Qur' än towards 
miracles is complex. Gätje explains the term mu jiza: 
The word mu'jiza has come to designate the 'verification of 
the miracles' of the prophets. It does not appear in the Qur'än: 
however, the idea that the people could produce nothing 
equivalent to the Qur' än is clearly expressed (Süra 17: 88/90) 
The individual segments of the revelation in the Qur' än are 
called 'signs' (äyäc, sing. äya). This term then came to be 
used in the sense of 'verse (of the Qur'än)'. I 
The Qur'an does not use the term mu'jiaa for miracles. Instead the term used 
is ä7ät, sing. dya which means signs of God. Here the term 'signs' is used 
in the sense that the sign points beyond itself to its author, the Creator, God. 
Thus, the Qur' än points to natural and supranatural events as signs of God2. 
An example of a natural event as a sign of God in the Qur' än: 
Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the 
succession of day and night are signs for people of 
wisdom....... and those who ponder over the creation of the 
heavens and the earth (exclaiming): Our Lord, You have not 
created all this in vain. 3 
Thus, the Qur' än clearly points to the natural events occurring on earth, for 
example the passing of day into night and so forth as signs or miracles of 
God that point beyond the event itself to the creator of the event, God. 
1Helmut Gätje, The Our' än and Its Exegesis, (translated and edited by Alford T. Welch), (London, 1976). 264 
2For further elaboration on the Qur' än's concept of nature, see Fazlur Rahman, 
Major Themes of the Our' an, chapter 4. 
3Qur' än 3: 190-1. 
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The Qur' än also recognises supranatural events as signs from God, 
i. e. miracles. The Qur' än acknowledges miracles of past prophets'. The 
common denominator between these miracles of past prophets is that the 
miracles physically violate the laws of nature. Thus, another way of defining 
what a miracles is that it violates the laws of nature. 
However, with the prophet Muhammad, the Qur' än is the only miracle 
accorded to him. The Qur' än says: 
Say: If all mankind and Jinns were to gather together to 
produce the like of this Qur' än, they could not produce the like 
thereof, even if they backed up each other with help and 
support. For, indeed, many facets have We given in this 
Qur'än to every kind of lesson (designed) for (the benefit) of 
man. 2 
And nothing has prevented Us (God) from sending (this 
message, the Qur' än, like earlier ones) with miraculous signs, 
save that people of olden times gave the lie to them. 3 
These two verses show that the Qur'än is considered a miracle and it is the 
only miracle given to Muhammad. However, the prophet Muhammad himself 
seems a little uneasy that he was not given any miracles other than the Qur' fn 
in light of the challenges and criticisms thrown at him by his Meccan 
opponents to produce miracles as proof of his prophecy as the previous 
prophets had done in order to vindicate their claim. The Qur'än alludes to this 
situation faced by the prophet Muhammad and reminds him of the 
ineffectiveness of physical miracles to convince and convert people by saying 
as follows: 
We know indeed the grief which their words do cause thee 
[Muhammad]. It is not thee that they reject. It is the signs 
(ä7ät) of God which the wicked contemn. "Rejected were the 
1For example when the fire became cool and safe for Abraham when he was 
thrown into the fire (Q21: 69) or when Moses's rod turned into a serpent. (Q7: 117). 
2Quran 17: 88-9. 
3Quran 17: 59 
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Apostles (rusul) before thee [Muhammad]: with patience they 
bore their rejection and their wrongs until Our aid did reach 
them.... If their spurning is hard on thy [Muhammad's] mind, 
yet thou wert able to seek a tunnel in the ground or a ladder to 
the skies and bring them a sign-(what good? )..... Those who 
listen [in truth], be sure will accept. ' 
The Qur' än is considered a miracle because of its unique message. It 
is the only miracle accorded to Muhammad because the Qur'än considers the 
physical miracles unable to convince and convert people to the truth of the 
prophet. The Qur'än points to the low success rate of the miracles of previous 
prophet in convincing people of their message2. 
Swinburne summarises and evaluates the Qur'än's argument on 
miracles. He says: 
The appeal of Judaism, like the appeal of other great religions, 
must turn on the intrinsic plausibility of its doctrine. If that 
doctrine is in fact revealed, its intrinsic plausibility is the 
evidence thereof, and not vice-versa. (Of course, in so far as 
Christianity incorporates Judaism any miraculous evidence in 
its favour will count in favour of it with Judaism as a 
component. ) This point applies even more strongly to Islam. 
Islam claims very firmly that the Quran is God's revelation to 
Muhammad and through him to the world. But Muhammad 
explicitly denied any claim to have wrought a miracle other 
than the Quran. The Meccans asked, 'if he really was a 
prophet of God, why did he bring no sign to confirm his 
statements. Muhammad's answer was that the Quran with its 
inimitable language was itself the sign he brought'. The claim 
that the Quran is 'inimitable' has been based on three different 
grounds: (1) its success, (2) its content, including information 
which could not by normal processes have become available to 
Muhammad, an illiterate prophet, (3) its artistic style. The 
trouble is that we have no plausible cases of natural laws which 
the success of the Quran, things known to an illiterate, or the 
production of a new style of writing might seem to violate. We 
have no reason to suspect that illiterate creative genius cannot 
guess at truths normally accessible to the literate, or create a 
new style or a successful movement. So there is no strong 
reason to suppose that the natural law has been violated. We 
do not know what are the natural possibilities in this area. 
With Christ's resurrection it is different; if it happened in 
anything like the form recorded, it clearly violated natural laws. 
1Qur' än 6: 33-36. 
2See Muhammad Asad's psychological explanation concerning why the prophet 
Muhammad was not given physical miracles in The Message of the 
Our'iin, (Gibraltar, Spain, 1980). 427. 
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Islam may well be revealed, it has slender basis for appealing 
to us on those grounds, for it the truth and depth of its 
message are grounds for believing it to be revealed. I 
Swinburne's criticisms on the Qur'änic failure to convince him that it is a 
miracle are based upon the assumption that a miracle must violate the natural 
laws. However, as shown above, the Qur'an recognises both natural and 
supranatural events as miracles pointing to God. A more serious flaw in his 
argument here is his pointing out the resurrection of Christ as a miracle 
because it violates the natural laws. One is left with no doubt if that happened 
in anything like the form recorded, it constitutes a miracle. However, this 
miracle convinced very few to follow the teachings of Christ because in his 
lifetime he had very few followers compared to the millions of followers 
Christ has today who have never witnessed any of these miracles although 
they heard of them and believe in these miracles and his message. This seems 
to demonstrate that miracles which violate the laws of nature are ineffective in 
convincing people but the message of the prophets live on and convince and 
convert many more. 
Al-Ghazäli on Miracles 
The Qur' än states that it gave no miracles to the prophet Muhammad 
other than the Qur'an and points out that the ineffectiveness of miracles at 
convincing people to follow the message of the prophets did not, detei many 
'Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to nalo v, (Oxford, 1992). 96-7 
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' ulamä' from attributing numerous miraculous deeds to Muhammad. 1 As has 
been pointed out above, the term mu'jiza which has become synonymous 
with the Qur'änic term äya does not appear in the Qur'än. Wensinck points 
out the development of this term, mu'jiza. He says: 
Mu'djiza and äya have become synonyms; they denote the 
miracles performed by Allah in order to prove the sincerity of 
His apostles. The term karäma is used in connection with the 
saints; it differs from mu'djiza in so far as it denotes nothing 
but a personal distinction granted by God to a saint. Miracles 
of Apostles and Prophets, especially those of Muhammad, 
occur in the sira and badith. Yet in this literature the term 
mu'djiza is still lacking, as it is in the oldest form of the creed. 
The Fikh Akbar, ii, art. 16, mentions the ayät of the prophets 
and the karäma of the saints. Mu'djiza occurs in the creed of 
Abü Hals 'Umar al-Nasafi ........ And He has fortified them (sc. the apostles) by the miracles contradicting the usual course 
of events. 2 
This term mujiza has not only become synonymous with the term äya in the 
Qur'an but has become the term to designate the 'verification of miracles' of 
the prophets. 
What types of miracles the ' ulamä attributed to Muhammad and how 
they justified these attributions of miracle to the prophet in clear contrast to the 
Qur'änic statements is however outside the scope of our discussion here. 
Instead we will restrict our comments here to al-Ghazdli's understanding of 
miracles and why miracles play such a crucial role in his proof of prophecy. 
The discussion on miracles is closely related to the concept of nature. 
However, we will only gloss over the discussion of nature here since we will 
discuss it in detail in the following section. Instead, we focus on the how and 
why miracles become the crucial proof of prophecy. 
11 
1For a long list of the numerous miracles attributed to the prophet Muhammad, 
see Annemarie Schimmmel, And Muhammad is His MessengeriThe 
Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety, (London, 1985), Chapter 4. Legend 
and Miracles. 
2Wensinck, "Mu`djiza" Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd edition. 
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Al-Ghazäli's begins his discussion of miracles by placing the concept 
of miracle is the context of his framework of establishing God's power above 
everything else. He says: 
Therefore this question [natural causality] necessitates an 
inquiry for two reasons. Firstly , in order to prove the 
miracles. Secondly, in order to uphold a doctrine on which all 
the Muslims are agreed-namely, that God has power over 
everything. I 
From the above passage, there emerges al-Ghazäli's recurring theme of trying 
to establish God power above everything else. Proving the occurrence of 
miracles is just another means of arguing that God can do whatever He 
wishes. However, because al-Ghazäli had also argued against any rational 
justification for the commands of revelation, resulting in removing reason's 
ability to evaluate the truth of revelation, one must be left with another means 
by which we can evaluate the truth of revelation. This means is the bringer of 
the message, the messenger, i. e. the prophet. If the bringer of the message is 
proven to be a messenger from God, then the message he brings must be true. 
With the message of the prophet sidelined, thus, the miracles play a crucial 
role in proving the truth of the prophet. These miracles do not prove 
necessarily that the prophet is telling the truth but provide a preponderance of 
evidence to believe him. 
What are these miracles that provide a preponderance of evidence to 
prove the truth of the prophet ? Al-Ghazäli defines miracles as events which 
depart from the usual course of events. He says: 
.... the affirmation of miracles which mark the departure from 
the usual course of events-e. g...., the rod turning into serpent; 
the revivification of the dead;, and the splitting of the moon. He who thinks that the natural course of events is necessary 
and unchangeable calls all these miracles impossible. 2 
1Tabafut al-faläsifa 238, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 184 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa , 236 Sabih A. hmad Kamali, 181-2. 
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Thus, al-GhazMi does not consider those events that occur naturally as 
miracles. A miracle is only those events that are supranatural. Those events 
that mark a departure from the natural course of events. From this definition 
of miracles, we should be able to deduce that since al-Ghazäli recognises 
miracles as a mark of departure from the natural cause of events, that he must 
then recognise that there exists a natural course of events to depart from. If 
there was no natural course of events then how do we know that we have 
departed from it ? It seems that al-Ghaz ii must concede that there is a natural 
course of events but he rejects that this natural course of events are necessary 
(läzima) and unchangeable (d ruriyyan). Kogan examines al-Ghazäli's 
position on the natural course of events and says: 
Al-Ghazäli of course affirms omnipotence and denies 
necessary connections between causes and effects. In view of 
his treatment of agency this commits him either to the view 
that every existent is miraculous, since it is created [ibdäl ex 
nihilo and with an instantaneous temporal beginning or to the 
view that the miracles are only extraordinary moments-creation 
of God, not His ordinary, recurrent creations. Whichever it 
may be, al-Ghazdli's intention is to lend support to a source of 
knowledge he already has, namely, Scripture, which affirms 
the omnipotence of God. His project in the final analysis, is 
theological. I 
Kogan's statement points out that if al-Ghazäli accepts the first position that 
all existents are existents are created with an instantaneous temporal 
beginning, then pushing this supposition to its logical conclusion, all existents 
would be miraculous since everything would come out of nothing and thus 
could not be a natural course of events. If al-Ghazäli accepts the other 
supposition, that miracles are extraordinary moments, then God's interference 
in the course of nature is only occasional and intermittent. If so, what then is 
God's contribution to events that He does not interfere with? 
'Barry Kogan, The Philosopher Al-Ghazäli and Averroes on Necessary Connection and the Problem of the Miraculous", in Islamic Philosoph and Mysticism, ed. Parwiz Morewedge, (New York, 1981). 114. 
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What al-Ghazäli means by rejecting the natural course of events as 
necessary and unchangeable is indeed very complex and complicated by al- 
Ghazäli himself in his own various elaborations of nature. I Since this question 
centres on his concept of nature, we will relegate it to the next section. 
However, he ends this brief discussion on the relationship of nature and 
miracles with a damning conclusion that those who accept that nature is 
necessary and unchangeable must conclude that miracles are impossible2. 
However, in the very same chapter where he had began his discussion 
on miracles, chapter sixteen of Tahdfut al-faläsifa, al-Ghazäli seems either to 
qualify this damning judgement or he contradicts himself. He continues his 
discussion on miracles interestingly enough at first giving a qualified 
agreement to the philosophers' concept of miracles. 3 - However, this 
agreement is not to how the philosophers conceived that miracles occur but 
rather because they conceded that miracles can and do occur. Al-Ghazäli 
says: 
So this is their[the philosophers] opinion about the miracles. We do not deny anything mentioned by them here; for such 
things do belong to the prophets. But we must criticise them 
for stopping just where they do, and for denying the 
transformation of the rod into a serpent, or the revivification of 
the dead, etc. 4 
It emerges from the above passage that al-Ghazäl3's only agreement with the 
philosophers on the issue of miracles is that miracles can and do occur. If al- 
'His apparent acceptance of certain propositions in Tahäfut al-faläsifa as 
suppositions of argument convolute his own position. It becomes difficult to distinguish his own position from the position he uses and accepts only for the 
purpose of argument. See Michael Marmura, "Al-Ghazdli's Second Causal 
theory in the 17th discussion of the Tahdfut", in Islamic Philosoph y and Mysticism, ed. Parwiz Morewedge, ( New York, 1981). 85-112. See also Michael Marmura, "Al-Ghazdli on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahäfut and the Iqtisad", Aligarh Journal of Islamic Thought, 1989.46-75. 
2Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 236, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 181-2. 
3For a discussion on the philosophers'' concept of miracles with their Greek influences and underpinning, see Prophecy in Islam,, section on Miracle, Prayers and Theurgy. 45-52. 
4Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 238, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 184. 
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Ghazäli had concluded that the philosophers had accepted the occurrence of 
miracle, then, he must reconsider his previous conclusion that "he who thinks 
that the natural course of events is necessary and unchangeable calls all these 
miracles impossible"1 because this damning conclusion was directed at the 
philosophers who upheld the notion that the natural course of events are 
necessary and unchangeable. 
However, al-Ghazäli may not be much concerned with these technical 
details2 of how these miracles occur, rather what preoccupies him here is that 
a miracle is used to prove a more important idea, the idea that God is all 
powerful and therefore, He can do anything, at any time without any need for 
intermediaries, causation, or having to wait to undergo the natural preceding 
steps before attaining His desire. 
'Tahdfut al-faldsifa , 236, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 181-2. 2His wilingness to concede that the philosophers' concept of miracles may be 
right but seriously does not go far enough, seems to show that he is not too interested in the technical details of how miracles occur. However, this 
concession here is more likely done only for the sake of argument and does not 
prove that he accepts the philosophers contention but rather to demonstrate that 
even if one accepts the philosophers' contention at face value, it is still deficient. 
193 
CHAPTER SIX 
Nature and Causation 
God's Acting on Nature: Volition or Necessity 
Proceeding from our above discussion on miracles, we now turn our 
focus to al-Ghazäli's concept of nature to which we alluded previously in that 
discussion. It was felt that due to the complexity of the subject that it 
deserved to be discussed separately. The concept of nature in Islamic thought 
is a very complex and complicated subject which has been debated throughout 
the ages in the various schools of theology with wide implications on how 
one views God and His creation, the world, man's obligations and 
responsibility. 
However, al-Ghazäli's position on nature is far from clear. His 
position is complicated by him, himself. This is because of many factors. 
One of the factors is his style of writing. He writes presenting the ideas of 
others as he understands them, providing their assumptions and arguments 
and only then does he make an assessment of these ideas. At times, all he 
does is try to show that these ideas are flawed even if one were to accept all 
the assumptions on which the argument were based. When this occurs it 
becomes very difficult to conclude whether he actually accepts these 
assumptions or whether they are only utilised for the sake of the argument. 
This is further complicated since, at times, all he does is try to tear down 
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other peoples' positions without providing his own alternative position. 
Thus, one may know what his position on a given topic is not, rather than 
what it is. Other factors that add to these complexities are the difficulty of 
the subject matter, the discussion of this subject in many different works with 
varying lengths of discussion and with different degrees of complexity due to 
the different audience he is addressing, compounded by his mixing and 
utilising the vocabulary of both theology and philosophy which was still fluid 
with its meanings not yet crystallised. All these factors compound the 
difficulty in getting a clear picture of al-Ghazäli's understanding of nature. 
However, a more significant factor that must be kept in mind is the 
implications of these discussions of nature on theology. Al-Ghazäli's 
discussions of nature continually seek to uphold the power of God and to 
reject any notion that impinges on the limits of God's power. Thus, all his 
discussions of the subject must be seen within the context of this aim. 
However, due to the complexity of the subject compounded by al- 
Ghazäli s style of writing, there emerges a rift of opposing views among 
contemporary scholarship about al-Ghazäli's position on theology which 
inevitably includes al-Ghazali's position on nature. It has previously been 
accepted that al-Ghazäli was an Ash`arite and that all his writing should be 
seen in light of the Ash'arite school. In fact , Fazlur Rahman argues that al- 
Ghazäli played a crucial role in the spread and ultimately the dominance of 
Ash'arism in the Sunni world. He says: 
The main elaborator of Ash'arite doctrine, al-Bägilläni (tenth 
century c. e. ) even recommended that belief in the atomism of 
time and space, that is , the rejection of causality, should be "officially" required for Muslims! All this happened long 
before the destruction of the caliphate. It is true that 
Ash'arism succeeded only gradually in establishing its hold 
over the Muslim world and that the support of a Sufi like al- 
Ghazäli was crucial for its spread and ultimate dominance as 
the creed of a vast majority of Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, it is 
not an unfair indicator of the onset of rigidity in Islamic 
spiritual and intellectual life that the theological system of al- 
Ash'ari's contemporary the Hanäfi al-Mäturidi (born in 
Mäturid, a village near Tashkent), which held more reasonable 
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views than Ash'arite theology on all the issues just mentioned, 
was eventually drowned by Ash`arism in medieval Islam. I 
Thus, the established view as represented for example by D. B. MacDonald, 
Watte and many others had accepted that al-Ghazäli's views were broadly in 
line with the Ash'arite approach to theology and thus, his writings should be 
seen as arguing for and promoting Ash'arite theology. 
However, recently there have been some scholars who have argued 
that this perception that al-Ghazäli is an Ash'arite is a misconception. These 
revisionists point to many instances where al-Ghazäli produces arguments and 
opinions which do not seem compatible with Asharism and that these 
significant divergences from Ash'arism should lead to a reassessment of his 
thoughts as a whole which have previously been seen only in the light of 
expounding Ash'arite theology. Some examples of these scholars who held 
these revisionist views are Franks, Abrahamov4, and Nakamura. s 
1Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual 
Tradition, (Chicago, 1982). 27. Hourani also explain the rise of Ash'arism by 
saying: 
"The Ash'arite system of kaläm did not become a dominant orthodoxy till after 
the establishment of the Great Seljüq Empire (after 1040), and especially after 
the foundation of the Nizämiyya College in Baghdad (c. 1065) as a school of 
Sunnite theology. Before that, Shi'ite princes-Buwayhid, Fatimid, Hamdanid- 
had ruled Western Asia and Egypt, and had allowed more latitude for 
speculation for their subjects". 
George Hourani, Averroes on Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London, 
1961). 3-4. Makdisi informs us that al-Ghazdli taught at the Nizämiyya College 
in Baghdad from 1091 to 1095. George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges j 
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh, 1981). 20. 
21a fact Watt felt so strongly that al-Ghazäli was an Ash'arite that he proposed it 
as one of the three criteria for determining whether a work was written by al- 
Ghazäli. Watt says: 
" Hence we can say that any work where the author is not aiming at orthodoxy 
or where he criticises Ash'ariyah, cannot belong to al-Ghazäli's latest period". 
W. M. Watt, "Authenticity of Works Attributed to al-Ghazäli", Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, 1952,121. 
3Frank, Richard, Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazäli and Avicenna, 
(Heidelberg, 1982), and his, Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite School, (Durham, 
1994) 
4Benjamin Abrahamov, Al-Ghazäli's theory of causality, Studia Islamica, 67, 
75-98, and "Ibn Sina's influence on al-Ghazäli's non-philosophical works", Abr-Nahrain, 29,1-17. 
5Kojiro Nakamura, "Was al-Ghazäli an Ash'arite? The Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tovo Bunko, vol. 51,1993.1-24. 
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Fascinating as these discussions on whether al-Ghazäli is an Ash'arite 
or not, may be, I will mostly refrain from engaging in theml. First and 
foremost, I remain unconvinced by the revisionist arguments that al-Ghaz is 
not an Ash'arite even though it is obvious that he did not adhere strictly to the 
letter of Ash'arism and that he demanded some flexibility in theological 
formulations2. However, more importantly, he had generally accepted 
Ash'arism . 
Thus, I cannot concur with this call to reassess all al-Ghazäli's 
writings again from the new perspective that al-Ghazäli was not an Ash'arite 
for I believe that this method would result in al-Ghazäli being 
incomprehensible3. 
'For a review of this controversy, see Oliver Leaman, "Ghazdli and the 
Ash'arites", Asian Philosophy, vol. 6.1996.17-27. 
2A1-Ghazäli demanded this flexibility to differ from Ash'ari in some matters in 
the Fa sal: 
"These people pretend that these books [of al-Ghazäli"s] contain matter contrary 
to the teachings of the master of old and the leading mutakallimun [polemic 
theologians]. They also claim that deviating from the doctrine of al-Ash'ari by 
even so much as a palm's width is unbelief (kufr), and that differing from him 
in even trivial matters is error and perdition (or error leading to perdition). 
Compose yourself, 0 sympathetic and ardently devoted brother, and be not 
distressed by that. Dampen your impetuosity a little and bear calmly what they 
say and disassociate yourself from them courteously........ If he claims that the 
definition of unbelief is : That which is contrary to the doctrine of the Ash'arite 
, or that of the 
Mu'tazilite, or that of the Hanbalite, or that of others- then know 
that he is gullible [or inexperienced] and a stupid man fettered by servile 
conformisn (taglid) and one of the blind: so don't waste any time in trying to 
set him right. ....... Perhaps this fellow has a leaning, from among all the 
systems, towards the Ash'arites and alleges that opposition to it in any detail at 
all [lit. in any coming and return from water] is flagrant unbelief. Ask him 
then, whence comes his unshakeable conviction that the truth is so much his 
special endowment that he judges al-Bägillani guilty of unbelief because he 
opposes al-Ash'ari on God Most High's attribute of duration (al-baga) and 
claimed that it is not a quality of God Most High superadded to His Essence. 
And why is al-Bägillani more deserving of being charged with unbelief by 
reason of his opposition to al-Ash'ari than al-Ash'ari is by reason of his 
opposition to al-Bägillani? And why is the truth the special endowment of one 
of them rather than the other? Was that because of the precedence in time? But 
al-Ash'ari was preceded by the Mu'tazilites-so let the truth belong to him who 
preceded him". 
as, 131-2. McCarthy, 146-8. 
3Frank makes a tenable argument in his book Al-Ghazäli and the Ash'arite 
School, that al-Ghazdli had undermined the importance of kaläm and saw it 
only as a defensive tool. Frank says: 
" It is for this reason that in a number of important contexts in which al-Ghazäli discusses kaläm explicitly he speaks of it primarily as apologetic". 12. 
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More importantly, these debates although they have some effect on 
our current discussion, are largely peripheral. As I see it, even if one were to 
adopt either position, one would be hard pressed to deny that al-Ghazäli is 
seeking in all his arguments to uphold the ultimate power of God. This 
premise would be much clearer and more obvious if one were to adopt the 
more established position that al-Ghazäli was basically following Ash'arite 
theology whose very raison d'etre is to establish the power and will of God 
over everything else. 
The revisionist's position on causationl and that God could have not 
created no other universe2 seems to undermine this premise. Marmura points 
Frank proceeds to say: 
"Kaläm, that is, the common theology as taught in the schools, is essentially 
dialectic in its reasoning, and its arguments are founded on the Koran, which 
are directed towards simple people, while the "balance" of the demonstrative 
reasoning, which " gives genuine insight into the realities of things, " is for the 
intellectual elite (Qistäs, pp79ff) who are capable of a higher theology which he 
refers to consistently as " "ilm al mukäshafab, " i. e., that in which true insight 
into the essential nature of things and the universe and into God's being as 
Bator of every contingent entity and event, i. e. true tawb d, is attained". 21-2. 
Frank's pointing out that al-Ghazäli undermines the usage of kaläm and 
considers it as a apologetic tool is neither unsettling nor problematic. However, 
Frank's contention is that al-Ghazäli wants to replace kaläm with a higher 
theology, the Sufis' insight; mukasbafa, first of all it remains undemonstrated 
that Sufis have their own theology. Or it is possible that the Sufi theology is the 
same as the Ash'arite or Mu'tazilite theology but its method of reaching its 
conclusion is not dialectic but rather the Sufis' method of kashf. Thus, instead 
of producing a new theology, all it does, significant though it is, is to introduce 
a new method of arriving at the same conclusion. 
1Benjamin Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazäli' theory of causality", Studia Islamica, 67, 
75-98. 
2 Frank argues unconvincingly that all of al-Ghazäli's arguments against the 
Mu'tazilite claim that God must act in a certain manner are all done for a dialectic 
purpose rather than a substantive difference. Frank says: 
"Al-Ghazili uses the same conception of the nature and the grounds of ethical 
necessity to refute the Mu'tazilites' thesis that God is morally obligated to 
benefit His creatures by sending prophets, etc., if not to do what is absolutely 
best for them, on the principle that it is impossible that God suffer harm or 
benefit from the existence or non-existence of any creature. The argument is 
essentially dialectic, however, since al-Ghazäli in fact holds that God 
necessarily creates what He creates and can have created no other universe. 
This is indicated in the statement "al-gadim" [the eternal, a description unique to 
God] is an expression for that which exists necessarily in all its aspects" (mä 
huwa wdjibu al-wujildi f7 jami'i jibätibi). 36. 
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out that if one were to take this position of necessary causation to its ultimate 
logical conclusion, it would result in a serious restriction on God's power. 
He says: 
A proper understanding of al-Ghaz's rejection of the theory 
of essential efficient cause must take into account his 
theological motive. This motive pervades the Tahäfut. If God, 
as Avicenna holds, is the supreme essential efficient cause, 
then the world is the necessitated product of His Essence. As 
such God cannot be a free agent; He cannot but create the 
world. It also suggests for al-Ghazäli a more serious 
restriction on divine power. It denies God the attribute of life 
since it is only inanimate objects that are said to act by the 
necessity of their essence. 1 
It emerges from the above passage that Marmura firstly frames al-Ghazäli's 
discussion on causation in the context of a theological debate. How one views 
this question of causation has implications on how one perceives how God 
acts or does not act in nature , and thus ultimately 
how one perceives God 
Himself. Marmura concludes that if one were to accept the position that God 
is the supreme essential efficient cause, then one must accept that the world is 
the necessitated product of His Essence. Accepting this premise results in 
seriously restricting God's power since it reduces God's actions to Him 
acting out of the necessity of His essence. In contrast to Frank's notion 
pointing to the attribute of God as "qadim", the eternal and therefore "God 
necessarily creates what He creates and can have created no other universe. 
This is indicated in the statement "al-gadim" [the eternal, a description unique 
to God] ", Marmura instead points out that this position would be in conflict 
with another attribute of God, hayy, the attribute of life2, because only 
Frank seems to have made a mistake in translating the above Arabic phrase. 
The huwa in this phrase refers to God and not to creation. 'Thus, the phrase 
should be translated as "God is the necessary existence in all His aspects". 
1Michael Marmura, "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science", Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 3,1965.186. 
2Al-Ghaz . li in his work on the ninety nine names of God of which Frank is so fond of, comments on this attribute of God. He says: 
al-Ha , 
y7-the Living is both agent and perceiver, so much so that 
one that does not act or perceive at all is dead....... But the 
perfect and absolute living thing [God] is one under whose 
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inanimate natural objects act by the necessity of their essence!. Thus, this 
position reduces God to the equivalent of an inanimate object in His ability to 
choose to act. Therefore , it is difficult to conceive that al-Ghaz5H could have 
upheld the notion of necessary causation because its logical implication would 
be detrimental to one who wishes to uphold the power of God. 
The view that God could have not created any other universe is also 
detrimental to anyone who wishes to uphold the power of God. Ormsby 
frames this question on creation and the Creator by saying: 
This is a hidden problem of theodicy; to affirm the necessary 
rightness of things without simultaneously subjecting God to 
necessity. Leibniz faced the difficulty in affirming, against the 
necessitarianism of Spinoza, that God acts sub ratione boni, 
and not sub ratione perfecti. The problem is to assert the 
necessary rightness of things as they are, but to do so in a way 
that they are seen as proceeding from God's will, wisdom, and 
power, and not from a necessity of His nature. 2 
Ormsby frames the question in a general context to include in his discussion 
on theodicy not only that of al-Ghazäli whom we are scrutinising here, but 
also the theodicy of other contemporary authors, thus demonstrating that this 
issue is very much alive and people are even today still grappling to answer it. 
Ormsby continues his analysis of al-Ghazdli's discussion of this question by 
framing it in the context of Ash'arite theology. He says: 
Al-Ghazäli borrowed from a variety of sources in shaping his 
thought, but his peculiar version of theodicy was ultimately a 
logical outgrowth of orthodox Ash`arite theology. 3 
perception all perceived things are arranged, as are all existing 
things under its activity, so that no perceived thing escapes its 
knowledge and no action its activity, and that is God-great and 
glorious, for He is the absolutely living one. As for every living 
thing other than He, its life is commensurate with its perception 
and its activity, and all of that is circumscribed within narrow limits" 
-a sad 143, David Burrell, 129. 1Tahäfut al-faläsifa, 135, Sabih Ahinad Kamali, 64. 
2Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute ove al Ghazäli's Best of All Possible Worlds, (New Jersey: 1984). 264. 
3Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought 259. 
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Thus, Ormsby places any discussion on al-Ghazäli's theology in the wider 
perspective of Ash'arite theology. 
He concludes al-Ghazdli's discussion on this matter by providing us with a 
summary of the conclusion of the debate. He says: 
First, the actual world, at each instance of its continuance, is 
unsurpassable right and just; it has been determined by divine 
decree, specified by divine will, and effected by divine power. 
The world, at this precise instant, cannot be better. 
Nevertheless, it can change. The perfect rightness of the actual 
entails no unchanging and inviolate order of things. (That 
would imply that things possessed some intrinsic necessity, 
which they do not have. ) Rather, God can, and does, change 
the "most wonderful" order of the world, and He does so 
incessantly. However, each change, each new configuration 
of things, is right and just; each new configuration is "most 
wonderful. " The world is a succession of equally perfect and 
most wonderful states of affairs. 1 
It emerges from the above passage that clearly even if one were to argue that 
God has created the best possible world2, it is still possible that God could 
have created a different world, in fact an infinite number of different worlds 
just as wonderful as this world. Nonetheless, with God being able to create 
an infinite number of different possible worlds just as wonderful may 
arguably show that God may act in an infinite number of ways. Thus, it is not 
necessary for God to act in only one way, and therefore, restrict His power. 
Although I cannot agree with the revisionist views on al-Ghazäli, one 
cannot help but consider their contribution a welcome commentary and 
analysis which adds considerably to our understanding of al-Ghazäli and the 
influences of others on him especially Avicenna. It is exactly the revisionists' 
insistence on putting al-Ghazäli's thoughts in a wider philosophical 
IEric L. Ormsby, Theodicv in Islamic Thought 259. 
2A1-Ghazdli is this section of the Ihyä (Ihyä iv, 222-3) seems to argue that God had created the best of all possible worlds and gave some value to 
suffering as an enhancement for pleasure. However, this may seem to cause 
problems for his previous counter-argument against the Mu'tazilites' claims that God must act in the best interest of his servants which we had alluded to earlier 
and al-Ghazäli had argued vehemently against making it necessary for God to 
act in any such a manner. For further discussion on the matter see, Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought. 
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perspective that is probably their greatest contribution and sadly their own 
undoing. As I asserted above, I cannot concur with this call to reassess all 
al-Ghazäli's writings again from the new perspective that al-Ghazäli was not 
an Ash'arite for I believe that this method would result, as already mentioned, 
in al-Ghazäli being incomprehensible. Thus, the revisionists' greatest 
contribution of placing al-Ghazäli's thought in a wider perspective only 
undermines their conclusion since al-Ghazäli's writings taken as a whole, 
although there are some tensions clearly exhibit a desire to promote the 
Ash'arite theology of seeking to place the power and will of God above 
everything else. The more significant factor that must be kept in mind is the 
implications of these discussions on nature in theology. Al-Ghazäli's 
discussions of nature continually seek to uphold the power of God and to 
reject any notion that impinges on the limits of God's power. Thus, all his 
discussions on the subject must be seen within the context of this aim. 
Al-Ghazili on Nature and Causation 
Our discussion of al-Ghazäli's concept of nature and causation will try 
not to dwell too much on the technical details 1, but rather will focus on the 
purpose and consequence of adopting a certain position on nature and 
causation. Thus, we will concentrate on why al-Ghazäli chose such a 
position on nature and causation and what are its implications for al-Ghazäli's 
perception of how God acts. Therefore, we hope, as suggested earlier in the 
introduction of Chapter Four, AI-Ghazäli's Theological Positions and Their 
'There are many works which provide the details of the question of nature and causation in Islam. They are too numerous to list here. For a bibliographical list, see M. Marmura, "Causation in Islamic Thought", in Dictionary 
-of 
he History of Ideas, edited by Philip P. Weiner. vol. 1, (New York, 1968) 
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Implications on Revelation: An Indirect Method Analysis, that by using an 
indirect method of understanding al-Ghazäli's positions on certain theological 
issues, we will ultimately arrive at his concept of revelation itself. Since al- 
Ghazäli's position on nature and causation demonstrates how al-Ghazäli 
understands one aspect of how God acts, and since the sending of revelation 
is also an action of God, we hope that an examination of how he understands 
how God acts in nature will shed some light on our attempt to extrapolate al- 
Ghazdli's understanding of another of God's actions, revelation. 
Al-Ghazäli on God's Acting on Nature: Volition or Necessity. 
As we argued earlier, all of al-Ghazäli's discussion on nature and 
causality must be evaluated in the context of a theological debate. Al-Ghazäli 
seeks to uphold the power of God and to expel and reject any notion that 
impinges on the limits of God's power. Thus, all his discussions on the 
subject must be seen with this aim as their goal. 
Al-Ghazäli's discussions on nature must be seen in the context of him 
entering into an already raging debate which al-Ash'ari had initiated against the 
Mu'tazilites which has serious repercussions on how one perceives 
everything, even oneself. The Ash'arites' discussions of nature and causality 
were formulated and expounded in clear opposition to the earlier major school 
of kalýrn, the Mu'tazilites. The founding father of Ash'arism, Abu al-Hasan 
al-Ash'ari(d. 935) was previously a Mu'tazilite who broke from his 
Mu`tazilite master al-Jubbä'i (d. 915) and instead argued that God's divine 
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Justice could not be defined in human terms. 
1 Fakhry alludes to this debate 
that al-Ash'ari had with al-Jubbä'i and summarises the conclusions that al- 
Ash'ari had drawn from it. He says: 
We are told that al-Jubbä'i was unable to say what God's 
possible answer to such protestations2 might be, on the 
Mu'tazilite assumption of the unqualified justice of God. The 
corollaries drawn by al-Ash'ari constitute the substance of his 
view of God's absolute omnipotence and sovereignty in the 
world and the finality of His moral and religious decrees.... In 
their desire to stress man's moral freedom and responsibility, 
the Mu'tazilah had described him somewhat extravagantly, as 
"the creator of his deeds. " To al-Ash'ari, such blasphemous 
language was tantamount to the denial of God's uniqueness as 
the sole Creator and Sovereign of the world, and consequently 
implied the recognition of two creators, in the manner of 
Manichaens (Majüs). 3 
However, al-Ash'ari's conclusions on God's omnipotence and sovereignty 
were neither totally new nor foreign but he had rather formulated and 
expressed in a systematic manner the current unformulated thoughts of his 
time. Fazlur Rahman points this out: 
Al-Ash'ari's formulation of the dogma essentially represented 
an attempt at a synthesis of the hitherto largely unformulated 
orthodox position and that of the Mu'tazila...... But his actual 
formulations unmistakably show a character of a reaction of 
orthodoxy to the Mu'tazilite doctrine, a reaction from which he 
1 Majid Fakhry, History of Islamic Philosophy (London, 1983). 204-5. 
2-These protestations are in reference to a debate in which al-Ash'ari raised 
questions challenging his teacher, al-Jubbä'i, on the Mu'tazilite assessment of 
God's Justice evaluated in human terms. Fakhry summarises the story: 
" The pupil asks his master: What will be the fate in the after-life of three 
brothers, one of whom dies in the state of grace, one in the state of sin, one in 
the state of innocence (i. e. before he comes of age)? The righteous brother, 
answers al-Jubbä'i, will be consigned to Paradise, the sinner to hell, and the 
third to an intermediate position. A1-Ash'ari then asks: What if the third brother 
were to ask to be allowed to join his more fortunate brother? This privilege, 
replies al-Jubbä'i, would be denied to him on the ground that the first brother 
was admitted to Paradise on the strength of his good works. If the third brother 
were to protest that if he had been given a long life he would have lived 
righteously, God would have replied: I foresaw that you would not and 
therefore chose to spare you eternal damnation in hell. At this, the brother who 
died in sin exclaims: Surely Lord, You foresaw my own flight, as well. Why, 
then, did You not deal with me as mercifully as you had dealt with my other 
brother? " Majid Fakhry, History of Islamic Philosophy (London, 1983)--204. 
3Majid Fakhry, History of Islamic Philosophy , 204-5. 
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was unable to escape completely. The result is therefore a 
partial synthesis and a partial reaction. 
' 
Thus, al-Ash'ari's conclusions seek to uphold God's absolute omnipotence 
and sovereignty in the world and the finality of His moral and religious 
decrees. Therefore, all Ash'arite formulations must be seen with the aim of 
achieving this objective. 
Marmura places this Ash'arite debate on nature and causality also in 
this context. He says: 
In an endeavour to safeguard what is regarded as the Qur'änic 
concept of divine omnipotence the dominant school of Islamic 
theology (kaläm), founded by al-Ash'ari (d. 935), adopted the 
occasionalist doctrine that causal efficacy resides exclusively 
with the divine will. The Ash'arites denied the concept of 
"natural" causation, that is, that action proceeds from an 
existent's very nature or essence. They thus rejected the 
Aristotelian concept of natural efficient causality, subjecting it 
to criticism on logical and empirical grounds. They also 
rejected Aristotle's theory of eternal matter advocating a 
metaphysics of contingent atoms and accidents that are created 
ex nihilo, combined to form bodies, and sustained in 
temporally finite spans of existence by direct divine action. 
Accordingly, the orderly flow of these events has no inherent 
necessity, being more a habit ('Ida), decreed arbitarily by the 
divine will. Hence when God creates a miracle, that is , when He disrupts the habitual course of nature, no contradiction 
obtains. As for human volition, act, and cognitions, the 
Ash'arites regard these also as temporal events (hawädith), the 
direct creation of God. 2 
I have quoted this lengthy summary of the main positions of the Ash'arite 
school of theology here in order to identify its main principles and then utilise 
them to analyse al-Ghazäli's position on these same issues. From the above 
passage, it emerges firstly, that al-Ash'ari was concerned with establishing 
God's power and will above everything else. With this objective in mind, al- 
Ash'ari rejects natural causation as necessary because for him that would mean 
that all the actions of God would necessarily proceed from Him due to His 
1Fazlur Rahmaa, Islam. 91-2. 
2M. Marmura, "Causation in Islamic Thought", in Dictionary of the History of 
ideas. 286. 
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very nature or essence and that God could not choose to do otherwise. 
Instead, al-Ash'ari argues vehemently that all of God's actions are voluntary. 
Al-Ash'ari is not satisfied with making all God's actions voluntary, he then 
proceeds to strip away all voluntary action from both inanimate and animate 
objects and places these powers and will to act in the hands of God. Thus, all 
events are the direct creation of God, decreed arbitrarily by direct divine 
action, therefore stripping everything, both animate and inanimate objects, of 
any power and will and placing it all in the hands of God. 
Al-Ash'ari formulated his theology against the challenges he saw to 
God's power and will posed by the Mu'tazilites. Al-Ghazäli not only 
promotes these Ash'arite ideals, with, of course, his own individual 
preferred modifications but he also takes it a step further. Al-Ash'ari was 
primarily concerned with doctrinal questions within kaläm. Al-Ghazäli 
initiates and takes this argument outside kaläm, against the philosophers' 
explicitly for their necessitarian metaphysics. Thus, as al-Ash'ari challenged 
his main contemporary rivals, al-Ghazäli sees himself as continuing this 
task. 
Al-Ghazäli, like his predecessor al-Ash' ari, seeks in this challenge to 
the philosophers to uphold the absolute power and will of God. In order to 
achieve this objective, he rejects any idea that objects, either animate or 
inanimate, have intrinsic value. As previously concluded from our 
discussion of al-Ghazäli's concept of ethics, for him all acts have no intrinsic 
moral value. The only value that these acts have are those values that are 
imposed by God upon them. These acts become good or evil subject to 
God's commanding or prohibiting their performance. Before this act of God 
of imposing commands or prohibitions on as act, all acts in themselves are 
morally neutral. 
'Philosophers here refer mainly to al-Fdräbi and Ibn Sinä. 
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Al-Ghazäli applies this same logic that all acts have no intrinsic natural 
value by virtue of the act per se but acquire a value imposed upon them by 
God, to all objects having no intrinsic natural powers by virtue of their being 
objects but only acquiring the power to act by the direct creation of God. 
Thus, as al-Ghazäli has rejected the Mu'tazilite contention of intrinsic value 
in an act that makes it good or evil, because he had argued that it is God that 
gives these acts value and nothing else, al-Ghazäli rejects the philosophers' 
concept of necessary causation because once again it is God's actions that 
create these acts and not any intrinsic power of the object itself. 
Out of his desire to uphold God's absolute power and will, al-Ghazäli 
seeks to establish that there is no necessary causal relationship between the 
occurrence of two events, and once that is established, then to proceed to 
show that actually all events of animate and inanimate objects are the direct 
creation of God. Once we have realised that this was al-Ghazäli's objective, 
we can proceed to evaluate the means he utilises in order to achieve this goal. 
Theological Objectives and the Means Employed to Achieve 
Them: Al-Ghazäli's Rejection of Causation 
Al-Ghazäli's discussions of nature are basically executed on two 
fronts. The first front is directed at actively attacking necessary causation as 
presented by the Islamic philosophers, particularly Ibn Sind, while the second 
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front seeks to establish the Ash'arite explanation of causality. Thus, he 
does not only seek to challenge the philosophers' view on the subject but to 
present his own alternative view. 
In Tahäfut a! -faläsifa, his attacks on the philosophers seek to show 
that the philosophers' contention that there is a necessary causal relationship 
between the occurrence of two events cannot be proven either by logic or on 
empirical grounds. We cannot fully evaluate al-Ghazäli's arguments against 
the philosophers without first presenting the philosophers' views. Marmura 
presents a summary of the philosophers' position. He says: 
For Avicenna, when certain causal conditions obtain, the 
efficient cause and its effect are coextensive, the inferential 
relationship between them, reciprocal. Some of these 
conditions may be summarised as follows: 
(1) The efficient cause (a! -'illa al-fä'iliyya)l must be the 
proximate cause. (2) It must be actual, and the effect (al- 
ma'lul) in itself possible. (3) It must be a natural cause, and 
for the effect to follow necessarily, the recipient of the action 
must exist. When the cause is not a natural cause, as for 
example when it is a deliberate human faculty, the effect need 
not follow, even though the recipient of the action also exists. 
(4) The efficient cause must be a free cause, i. e. there must be 
no impediment. (5) It must be the sole efficient cause. The 
same effect may be produced by any number of proximate 
causes, but in this case the relationship is not reciprocal. From 
the existence of any one of these proximate efficient causes 
(other causal conditions obtaining) we can infer the existence 
of the effect. The relationship becomes reciprocal when the 
common element shared by these causes is ascertained and 
established by the one cause. 2 
Therefore, for Ibn Sind, necessary causation means that the connection 
between the cause and the effect is that if the cause exists, then its 
characteristic effect must necessarily occur. Not only must the effect occur, 
'These causes refer to the four Aristotelian causes. These are; 1. Efficient cause 
(a1-'illa al-fä'iliyya)--that by which some change is wrought, 2. Final cause 
(al-'ilia al-ghä'iyya )--end or purpose for which a change is produced, 3. 
Material cause (al-'ills al-mäddiyya)-- that in which change is wrought, 4. 
formal cause (al-'illa al-s-ürriyya)-- that into which something is changed. See 
Jamil Saliba, Mu'jam at Falsafä', ( Beirut, 1982). vol. 2,95-6. See also, A Dictionary of Muslim Philosophy., M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore, 1970). 77-8. 
An example of these four causes is, a chair which may be defined as wood (material cause) of such shape (formal cause) made by the carpenter (efficient 
cause) for sitting (final cause). 
2Michael Marmura, "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science" 184-5. 
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but it cannot fail to occur . This effect is necessitated to occur as a result of the 
very nature and power of the cause. Thus, from the existence of the efficient 
cause, we can infer the effect. 
However, when the cause is not a natural cause, for example a human 
being who possesses choice and will, the effect need not follow as such. 
Human actions are characterised by volition and choice. Human actions are 
preceded by will which is a result of human deliberation accompanied by 
human desire. However, even a man's choice is limited. It is limited by his 
own disposition or physical environment and thus there is also a causal 
relationship but not in a mechanistic form. Due to a man's disposition at a 
certain moment in time, he would react in a certain manner and may react 
differently if his disposition to the very same stimuli changes at another time. 
Thus, since the disposition of man continuously changes because it is a 
cumulation of his personality and experiences, his reaction to stimuli 
continuously changes unlike a natural object which never changes its 
disposition. 
In Ibn Sind's theoryof necessary causation, the efficient cause not 
only causes change but when in relationship to God produces existence. 
Marmura says: 
... Avicenna's emanative philosophy, the efficient cause is 
not confined to the production of motion, but-- as with God in 
creating the universe--it also produces existence as such. 
Avicenna refers to the efficient cause as an essential attribute 
('arad dlzätiyya). It is thus necessarily related to the agent's 
essential nature and is a specific kind of act determined by this 
nature. The action is also determined, however, by the 
essential nature of the recipient of the action. Thus when both 
the agent and the recipient exist and the other causal conditions 
obtain, the effect proceeds by necessity. I 
It is exactly this intrinsic nature of the cause that produces the effect. It is this 
inherent power or capacity of the cause that produces this effect. Because it is 
'Michael Marmura, "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science" 185 
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the inherent nature of the cause to produce the effect, the cause could not 
withhold producing the effect, nor produce a different effect, but necessarily 
produce this very effect. 
It is this very idea of the intrinsic nature of each and every thing which 
forms the basis for necessary causal relationship which al-Ghazäli rejects. If 
one held this view that each and everything has its own intrinsic nature and it 
acts on the basis of its intrinsic nature, then anything and everything which 
acts could not act otherwise. As such, God, Himself, would be constrained 
to act in accordance with His nature and could not act otherwise. Thus, God 
cannot be a free agent. 
Al-Ghazäli directs his vehement attacks against necessary causation 
because it would result in all action proceeding as a necessary consequence of 
a thing's very essence or nature. Instead, al-Ghazdli argues that only living, 
knowing and willing beings can act and that they act out of their own will and 
are not determined by any intrinsic nature. Al-Ghazäli says: 
An agent is he from whom an action proceeds because of the 
will for action: by way of free choice, and alongside of the 
knowledge of what is willed But in your [the philosophers'] 
view, the world bears the same relation to God as an effect to 
its cause. So it follows (yulzam u) from Him by way of 
necessary causation. And, therefore, it is not conceivable that 
God should have been able to avoid His action, even as the 
shadow is unavoidable to a person or light to the Sun...... But 
the agent is not called the agent merely because of his being a 
cause, but he is a cause in a special manner, viz., in the manner 
of will and free choice. Thus, it is when one says that the wall 
is no agent: the stone is no agent: the inorganic matter is no 
agent, for an action exclusively belongs to an animal, then 
this statement will not be disputed, and his word would not be 
untrue. But in their view, the stone does have an action -- 
namely, the inclination, or the gravitation, or the tending 
towards the Centre--and so does fire have an action--viz., 
production of heat. And they believe that which proceeds from 
God is like all these things. But this is absurd. I 
Thus, God's actions are not conditioned by anything intrinsic to His essence 
nor to anything external to Him. He is a free agent. 
1Tahäfut al-faläsifa 135, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 64. 
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The means aI-Ghazäli utilises to reject necessary causation is to show 
that necessary causal connection can neither be proven logically nor 
empirically. Both Ibn Sind and al-Ghazäli agree that cause and effect are not 
identical. If cause and effect are not identical, then what is their relationship? 
This is where the two of them part company. Al-Ghazäli says: 
In our view, the connection to what are believed the cause and 
the effect is not necessary. Take any two things. This is not 
That; nor can That be This. The affirmation of one does not 
imply the affirmation of the other; nor does its denial imply the 
denial of the other. The existence of one is not necessitated by 
the existence of the other; nor its non-existence by the non- 
existence of the other. Take for instance any two things, such 
as the quenching of thirst and drinking, satisfaction of hunger 
and eating; burning and contact with fire; light and the rise of 
the Sun; death and the severance of the head from the trunk; 
healing and the use of medicine ....... 
1 
Thus, al-Ghazdli seeks to undermine the idea of necessary causation by 
firstly questioning whether there is a logically necessary connection between 
the occurrence of two individual events. What is the logical relationship of one 
event to another? If two events are individual events and are not identical 
events, how then does the affirmation of one event affirm or deny the other 
event? Does the affirmation of one event logically necessarily affirm the other 
event or vice-versa? Logically necessary is defined as: 
Used of a proposition whose denial is self contradictory. Such 
a proposition is true by virtue of its logical form alone (in 
which case it is called a logical truth or logically necessary) or by virtue of its logical form and the meaning of its constituent 
term. An instance of logical truth is "It is raining or it is not 
raining"; an example of an analytical truth that is not a logical 
truth is that " All bachelors are unmarried. °2 
1Tahäfut al-faläsifa 239. Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 185. 
2 Boruch A. Brody, "Logical Terms, Glossary", En clopaedia of Philosophy. 
vol. 5-6,. 58. 
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Utilising the above definition of logically necessary, it is clear that the 
examples al-Ghazäli cites such as the quenching of thirst and drinking, 
satisfaction of hunger and eating, burning and contact with fire do not satisfy 
the requirements of logical necessity. Thus, from a logical standpoint, the 
occurrence of, for example, the quenching of thirst does not logically 
necessarily imply the occurrence of drinking. Therefore, when the quenching 
of thirst occurs, we should not and cannot immediately infer that drinking has 
occurred. 
However, al-Ghazäli while rejecting the occurrence of logical necessity 
in the occurrence of actual events in the physical realm, is willing to accept the 
notion of logical necessity in the sphere of mere logical relations. He accepts 
the logical categories of identity, implications and disjunction. He says: 
No one has power over the Impossible. What the Impossible 
means is the affirmation of something together with its denial; 
or the affirmation of a particular together with the denial of the 
general, or the affirmation of two together with the denial of 
one . 
That which does not fall under these heads is not 
impossible. And that is not impossible is within power. The 
combination of blackness and whiteness is impossible, for by 
the affirmation of the forms of blackness in a subject we 
understand the negation of whiteness, and the existence of 
blackness. 
.... 
It is not possible for one person to be in two 
places at the same time. For by being in the house, we 
understand his not being in the not-house. Therefore, it is 
impossible to suppose his being in the not-house together with 
his being in the house which only means the denial of his being 
in the not-house. 1 
Thus, al-Ghazäli accepts the notion of necessity in the sphere of logical 
relationship but what lies outside the scope of purely logical relationship is 
where he raises questions against and ultimately rejects this necessary 
connection. 
However, because al-Ghazäli accepts the notion of necessity in the 
sphere of logical relationship, he has to accept that God cannot do things 
which contradict logical relationships. This is the first time that al-Ghazäli has 
1Tahäfut al-faläsifa 249, Sabi. h Ahmad Karnali, 194. 
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admitted that there are things which are not only impossible but even God 
cannot. do the impossible. Instead of seeing this limitation as a constriction of 
God's power, he boldly declares that no one has power over the impossible'. 
Therefore, since no one has power over the impossible, thus al-Ghazäli argues 
that this then should not be construed as a weakness or constriction of God's 
power. 
Al-Ghazäli's acceptance of the notion of necessity in the sphere of 
logical relationships does cause a number of problems left unconvincingly 
answered. His bold declaration that no one has power over the impossible as 
the solution to this problem is lacking any sophistication to counter this 
problem. One has to wonder why one who is so bold in arguing for no 
necessary relationship in the physical realm would not only qualify his 
conclusions in the purely mental realm but in fact adopt the totally opposite 
position. One has to wonder why it is possible for a book to turn into a boy 
and not a square circle. Is it possible then that al-Ghazäli accepts logical 
axioms? It would have proved extremely enlightening if al-Ghazäli had 
elaborated his position on this issue. However, with his silence on this issue 
since he did not elaborate on it, we are again left wanting. , 
Even though al-Ghazäli accepts the notion of necessity in the purely 
mental realm, he rejects this necessary connection in the physical realm. After 
he challenges the contention that there is a logically necessary connection 
between the occurrence of two individual events, he then proceeds to try to 
show that this contention of necessary connection of cause and effect is not 
proven empirically either. Al-Ghazäli illustrates this claim by pointing out 
the above example of cotton coming into contact with fire. He says: 
Firstly, the opponent may claim that fire alone is the agent of 
burning, and that being an agent by nature (not by choice), it 
cannot refrain from doing what is its nature to do--after it 
comes into contact with the subject which is receptive to it. 
'Tahäfut al-faläsifa 249, Sabih Ahmad Kamali, 194. 
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This is what we deny. We say that it is God who--through the 
intermediacy of angels, or directly-- is the agent of the creation 
of blackness in the cotton..... Fire, which is an inanimate thing, 
has no action. How can one prove that it is an agent? The 
only argument is from observation of the fact of burning at the 
time of contact with fire. But observation only shows that one 
is with (ma) the other, not that it is by (bi) it (the fire) and has 
no other cause than it. 1 
Thus, al-Ghazäli attempts to prove here that the necessary causal connection 
between cause and effect between the occurrence of two events is not 
observable in nature. What we actually observe is cotton coming into contact 
with fire and the cotton burning but we cannot and do not observe the burning 
of cotton by the fire. These are arguably each separate events. 
After rejecting necessary causality by utilising the evidence that such 
contention can neither be proven either logically or empirically, al-Ghazäli then 
poses his own argument of how things occur. All thing occur as a result of 
divine decree and not because these events are necessary. He says: 
They are connected as a result of the Decree of God (holy be 
His name), which preceded their existence. If one follows the 
other, it is because He has created them in that fashion, not 
because the connection in itself is necessary and indissoluble. 
He has the power to create the satisfaction of hunger without 
eating, or death without the severance of the head, or even the 
survival of life when the head has been cut off2 
Therefore, al-Ghazäli argues that the occurrence of each and every event is the 
creation of the decree of God. Thus, al-Ghazäli affirms both the two major 
contentions of al-Ash'ari, the rejection of necessary causal relationship and 
stripping away all voluntary action from both inanimate and animate objects 
and placing these powers and the will to act in the hands of God. Thus, all 
events are the direct creation of God, decreed arbitrarily by direct divine 
action, thereby stripping everything, both animate and inanimate objects, of 
any power and will and placing it all in the hands of God. 
tTahäfut al-faläsifa 239-40, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 186. 
2Tahdfut at-faldsifa 239 Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 185. 
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Theological Conclusions and Their Implications: Nature and 
Causation 
We will, as promised at the beginning of this section, not go any 
further in discussing the technical details of al-Ghazäli's exposition on nature 
and the causal connect'. The above conclusions on a! -Ghazäli's position on 
nature as discussed above are sufficient for our purpose here. Our main aim 
in discussing al-Ghazäli's concept of nature and necessary causality is not for 
the details of how he explains the inner workings of nature and causality 
but, rather, to understand why al-Ghazäli chooses such a position on nature 
and causation and what are its implications with regard to how he perceives 
how God acts. 
We anticipated that by using an indirect method of understanding al- 
Ghazäli's positions on certain theological issues, we would inevitably be able 
to shed some light on his concept of revelation itself. Since al-Ghazdli's 
position on nature and causation demonstrates how al-Ghazdli understands 
one aspect of how God acts, and since the sending of revelation is also an 
action of God, we hope that an examination of how he understood God's 
acts in nature will shed some light on our attempt to extrapolate al-Ghazäli s 
understanding of another of God's actions, revelation. 
After a careful scrutiny of al-Ghazäli's position on nature and 
causation, we can conclude that its conclusions helps to explain how al- 
Ghazäli understands how God acts in nature in particular. This understanding 
'There are numerous modern works which go into details of the debate on 
nature and causality. Some examples are: Barry Kogan, Averroes and the 
Metaphysics of Causation(New York, 1985); Michael Marmura, A1-Ghazäli s Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of His Tahäfut in Islamic 
Philosophy and Mysticism (New York, 1981); Majid Fakhry, Islamic 
Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas (London, 1958); W. 
M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London 
, 1948) 
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has implications for how he understands another act of God, revelation. On 
nature and causation, we have concluded that al-Ghazdli rejects necessary 
causation and he upholds that everything, all existence and actions is a result 
of the creation of God, decreed arbitrarily by divine action. Al-Ghazäli rejects 
necessary causation because necessary causation would necessarily entail that 
objects, both animate and inanimate, would have to possess intrinsic natural 
powers by virtue of them being objects. Each and every object must, then, 
have its own intrinsic natural powers. It would be these intrinsic natural 
I 
powers that would cause the object to act in a particular manner determined by 
its intrinsic nature and the object could not act in any other manner. Its action 
would be determined by its nature or essence. If one were to accept this view 
and apply it to everything, al-Ghazäli concludes that God Himself would be 
constrained to act in accordance to His own nature. All of God's actions 
would proceed automatically because of His nature or essence. God could not 
choose to act in any other way. Thus, everything which has occurred could 
not have occurred differently or otherwise. Therefore, al-Ghazäli concludes 
that God can not then be considered a free agent. 
In place of this supposition of necessary causation, al-Ghazäli 
replaces it with its antithesis, the subjective divine decrees of God. Al- 
Ghazdl-1 bases this supposition on the premise that there is no intrinsic nature 
in anything. There is nothing intrinsic in anything which causes it to act or 
react in a certain predictable manner. Instead, all events are the direct creation 
of God. If one were to accept this view instead and apply it to everything, al- 
Ghazdli concludes that God Himself would be free to act as He pleases. God 
does not act because of anything intrinsic to His nature or essence nor to 
anything external to Him. God's actions are neither determined by His 
essence nor imposed upon Him by any external force. God acts out of His 
own free will. Thus, all events are the direct creation of God, decreed 
arbitrarily by divine action and effectively stripping everything, both animate 
216 
and inanimate objects, of any power and will and placing it all is the hands of 
God. 
Since al-Ghazäli concludes that there is no intrinsic nature in 
anything, then, we can infer that he presumes that there is no intrinsic nature 
in revelation itself. After rejecting any intrinsic nature in everything, he then 
proceeds to argue that all events are the direct creation of God. God does not 
act because of anything intrinsic to His nature or essence. God's actions are 
neither determined by His essence nor imposed upon Him by any external 
force. God acts out of His own free will. Thus, all events are the direct 
creation of God, decreed arbitrarily by divine action. Since all events are the 
direct creation of God, we can infer that he must then presume that revelation 
is not only created by God but that God has created revelation out of His own 
free will and that revelation is a creation subject to arbitrary decrees of divine 
action. Thus, like all of God's creation, revelation is also subject to none 
other than the subjective decree of the divine will. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
AI-GHAZALI'S CONCEPT OF REASON 
Reason as a Source of Knowledge 
We had begun our study of revelation in order to understand how al-Ghazal 
conceives of revelation as a source of knowledge. It would seem wanting, if we do 
not at least contrast how al-Ghazäli perceives revelation as a source of knowledge 
with the other source of knowledge, reason ('aql). We had raised basically four 
questions to revelation. These questions are: 1. what is revelation? what kinds of 
knowledge does it actually give us?; 2. how is this knowledge ultimately 
transmitted to us?; _3. 
to whom is it transmitted in order to ensure its purity and 
originality?; 4. and most importantly, what is the ultimate purpose of this revelation 
revealed to man? However, we cannot pose all four of these same questions to 
reason. We would have to modify question one and combine it with question two, 
and then pose it to reason and therefore attempt to discover what reason is in order 
to ultimately arrive at what kinds of knowledge reason actually gives us. For 
obvious reasons, we cannot pose question three to reason, since the conclusions of 
reason are not transmitted to us by someone or through someone. However, one 
may make a defence for this in the case of the acceptance of knowledge based on 
the authority of others or in the religious jargon taglid. Nevertheless, even if one 
were to accept knowledge based on the authority of others, reason still makes the 
choice of from whom and whose version it accepts this or that knowledge and thus 
in a way, this choosing indicates arguably a rational choice, choosing among the 
various choices. Questioä four is the most difficult to answer. What is ultimately 
the role of reason in gaining knowledge? What is the role of reason vis ä vis 
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revelation in gaining knowledge? What is the kind of 
knowledge that we can 
obtain from reason and not from any other source? Can reason 
be utilised to 
confirm what we know from revelation? If so then is reason used to 
judge the 
validity or correctness of revelation? 
It must be borne in mind that it is not our contention here that we will be 
able to resolve all these above questions posed to reason. 
We cannot even say 
whether al-Ghazäli even conceived of these problems as such. 
However, as I 
concluded above, it would seem incomplete in our exploration of 
how al-Ghazäli 
perceives revelation as a source of knowledge if we did not at least attempt to 
contrast it with how al-Ghazäli perceives the other source of knowledge, reason 
('aqi)" 
Harking back to the insightful words of Arberry when he attempted to 
grapple with this problem of revelation and reason in the Islamic tradition, he says 
in his introduction of his brief, thought provoking work entitled Revelation and 
Reason in Islam: 
The problem of the relationship between revelation and reason is 
indeed one of the most famous and profound topics in the history of 
human thought. It is a topic which, though debated without 
intermission now for some two thousand years, appears not to lose 
anything of its fascination and freshness, for all the dust 
overspreading the countless volumes of dead and seemingly dead 
metaphysics and theology..... If it were possible to institute a full 
review of this sublime dilemma as it affected and was affected by the 
Mohammedan faith, that would undoubtedly take us some 
considerable distance towards understanding and stating the problem 
as a whole. The problem has never yet, so far as I am aware, been 
anywhere stated; and until the whole problem has been correctly 
stated, it is obviously vain to look for anything approaching a 
satisfactory solution, assuming a satisfactory solution is in any case 
discoverable. 1 
This attempt here to study al-Ghazälf s understanding of the role of reason as 
a source of knowledge, therefore, should be seen in the same vein, as a study of how 
al-Ghazäli understands the relationship of revelation and reason. However, this 
'A. J. Arberry, Reason and Revelation in Islam. (London, 1957). 7. 
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work should be seen as a preliminary attempt to understand how al-Ghazäli 
perceives reason as a source of knowledge. 
The Constraints on Reason 
We have argued above that al-Ghazäli desires to place God's will and power 
above everything and thus, as he understood it that this concept requires that 
everything and every event must be subject to the subjective divine will. Hence, he 
concludes in the ethical arena that all acts have no intrinsic moral value and are 
morally neutral before God had imposed upon these acts a value through His 
commands and prohibitions revealed in the revelation. Therefore, al-Ghazäli must 
presume that the revelation itself with its commands and prohibitions has no 
intrinsic value except that it is the will of God. The revelation's only worth is that it 
informs us of what God wants us to know and what actions He wants us to do or not 
do. 
Since as we have seen, al-Ghazäli rejects both the intrinsic nature of objects 
and intrinsic moral value , thus, what is left is an all-powerful God impregnating on 
these acts a value by His commands and prohibition and with His free will and 
power causing each and every event to occur as He pleases. In a world where there 
are neither intrinsic moral value nor intrinsic nature of objects, how does reason 
function? Is reason able to derive under such conditions any axiomatic principles to 
build upon? Or does reason now play a secondary role and accept the precepts 
given by revelation as analogous to axiomatic principles and utilise them to build 
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a whole Weltanschauung? These questions have two basic themes: What can 
reason know by itself? ; and, 
revelation? 
The Nature of the Intellect 
what is the relationship of reason vis ä vis 
Before we proceed to attempt to deal with these issues on the role of reason, 
let us first discuss how al-Ghazäli conceives of the nature of reason itself. What is 
this thing called reason/intellect? 
We will study reason, using Kitäb al-'Ilm which forms the first book of 
Ibyä since it presents his mature thoughts. However, Kitäb al-'11M only provides 
us with general statements on reason. Thus, we will also refer to his earlier works 
on the subject to obtain more specific information, resorting especially to his works 
on logic. 
Al-Ghazäli devoted the final chapter in his Kitäb al-'Ilm to a short treatise 
on the exposition of reason which we will rely greatly upon but not exclusively in 
discussing al-Ghazdli's concept of reason. In this brief exposition of reason, al- 
Ghazäli conceives of reason as noble in nature because it is the source, 
fountainhead and foundation of knowledge and the means by which man attains 
happiness in this world and the next. He says: 
The noble (sharaf) nature of the intellect (al-'aql): It would be 
superfluous to show the noble nature of the intellect (al-'aql), 
especially because through it the noble nature of knowledge has been 
revealed. Intellect is the source (manba) and fountainhead (matla') 
of knowledge as well as its foundation (asäs). Knowledge springs from it as the fruit from the tree and light from the sun and vision from the eye. How then could that which is the means of happiness 
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(wasila al-sa %lda) in this world and the next not be noble or how 
could it ever be doubted? 2 
Thus, al-Ghazäli calls the nature of reason noble. Reason is noble because it is the 
source, the fountainhead and the foundation of knowledge. Knowledge springs 
from the use of reason. Reason is the means to happiness not only in this world but 
also in the next. All this high praise for reason is indeed very fascinating vis A ,; Is 
al-Ghazäli's previous discussions of the role of reason in discovering truths, but he 
does not give an adequate explanation for this. When al-Ghazäli says that reason is 
the source, fountainhead and foundations of knowledge, what does this actually 
mean? Does al-Ghazäli distinguish reason as an instrument of knowledge from 
reason as a source of knowledge or is reason both of these? Is reason only an 
instrument of knowledge or does it actually create knowledge and thus become a 
source of knowledge? It is one thing to discover that A had killed B and quite 
another to say that A has committed a right or wrong action which is a value 
judgement. Is it possible that when reason describes an action it is acting as an 
instrument and when it gives or discovers value judgements it is creating 
knowledge? It is unlikely that al-Ghazäli had made this distinction between reason 
as an instrument and reason as a source of knowledge. However, his loose usage 
of these terms, source and foundation do create problems. It is more likely that al- 
Ghazäli meant that reason is to be utilised as an instrument to attain knowledge 
rather than actually creating knowledge. Even if one were to accept this view that 
reason is an instrument to attain knowledge, there is still the question of how reason 
does this and how we know whether reason has reached the right conclusions or 
not. 
He concludes the above passage with a rather ringing endorsement of the 
role of reason in obtaining happiness for man. Not only is reason capable of 
obtaining what is good for man in this temporal world, but more importantly, reason 
is capable of obtaining what is good for man in the next world, where he will abide 
2,99. Nabih Amin Faris. 221. 
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forever. Al-Ghazäli cites a prophetic hadith to point to the importance of reason 
not only for the purposes of this world but also for the next world. He quotes the 
Prophet Muhammad as saying: 
Again, it was reported on the authority of 'Aishah that she once said, 
O Apostle of God! Wherein do people excel one another in this 
world? He replied, " In intellect, " And in the hereafter? " she added. 
"In intellect. " he again replied. Then 'Aishah said ," 
But are they 
not rewarded according to their works? " To which the Apostle 
replied :"0 `Aishah! Have they ever achieved anything except in 
proportion to what God has given them of intellect? Their works 
will always be in proportion to their intellect which God has given 
them, and their reward will be in proportion to their works. 
3 
Therefore, it is clear that for al-Ghazäll reason is the means for attaining happiness 
not only in this world but also in the next. In fact, al-Ghazäli is making a very 
strong relationship between knowledge and action and arguing that the good works 
men achieve are only proportionate to their intellect. 
Al-Ghazäli also says that reason is also the first thing God had created and 
its noble nature is known instinctively (bi al-darür). He also calls the knowledge 
derived from reason a spirit (rdb), an inspiration (wahy), and a life (hayya). He 
says: 
The Prophet also said, " The first thing which God created was the 
intellect. On creating it, God ordered it saying, "Return, and it 
returned". Thereupon God said, "By My power and glory I have 
created nothing more reverent to Me than thee. Through thee I take, 
and through thee I give and through thee I punish-. 4 
... the noble nature of the 
intellect is perceived instinctively ( bi al- 
darüri). It is our purpose, however, to relate what the tradition and 
the Qur' än say concerning its [reason's] noble nature. Thus, we find 
in the Qur' do that God called it light when He said " God is the 
Light of the Heavens and the Earth. His light is like a niche [in 
which is a lamp-the lamp encased in glass-the glass, as it were a 
glistening star] "The knowledge derived therefrom was called a spirit 
(rnh), a revelation (wahy) and a life (bayya). Said God, "Thus have 
We sent the Spirit to thee with a revelation.... Furthermore. whenever 
God mentions light And darkness He means thereby knowledge and 
3hä 100. Nabih Amin Faris. 224-5. 
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ignorance respectively, as evident in His words, "And He will bring 
them out of the darkness to the light. "5 
It emerges from the above passages that the noble nature of reason is known 
instinctively. Al-Ghazäli, however, does not provide any further explanation 
concerning this statement. However, more importantly, he calls the knowledge 
derived from reason a spirit, a revelation/inspiration, and a life. It remains unclear 
how exactly these terms apply to the knowledge derived from reason since al- 
Ghazäli neglects to provide us with further explanation other than to say that it 
means knowledge . 
The Role of Reason 
In this section, we hope to examine why al-Ghazäli considers that reason 
deserves his very high praise. What is it that reason does that makes it deserving of 
such high praise? 
Al-Ghazäli cites a Prophetic hadith to show that men should know God and 
be governed by their intellects. He says: 
The Prophet said, 0 ye men! Know God and be ruled (tawasu) by 
intellect, then ye will know what ye have been enjoined and what ye 
have been forbidden. Know ye that intellect is your glory before 
God. 6 
The next sentence, however, which says that "then ye will know what is enjoined 
and what ye have been forbidden" is vague. Does he mean here that if one knows 
Shä 99. Nabih Amin Faris. 222. 
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God and is ruled by the intellect, then, one discovers by the use of reason what is 
enjoined and forbidden upon man? Or is it more likely that he means that once one 
knows God, then, through the use of reason, one will be able to recognise and 
accept the revealed message sent by God through His messenger to man? 
He cites another Prophetic hadith to show the use of reason as an instrument 
for the believer. He says: 
It is also related on the authority of Ibn 'Abbas that the Apostle of 
God said, For everything there is an instrument (äla) and a tool 
('udda), and the instrument of the believer is the intellect: for 
everything there is a mainstay, and the mainstay of man is his 
intellect; for everything there is a support(di'ima) and the support of 
religion (di'ilma al-din) is the intellect; for every group of men there 
is a goal, and the goal of the worshippers is the intellect; for every 
people there is a missionary (who calls them to true faith), the 
misssionary of the devout is the intellect. 7 
After pointing out that the use of reason is an instrument for the believer, al- 
Ghazäli then proceeds to tells us what reason can do: 
The truth , however, 
is that the word intellect ('aql) is a term used 
interchangeably for four distinct meanings in the same way as the 
term for eye has been uses for several meanings..... 
First, it is the quality which distinguishes man from the other 
animals and prepares him to understand and grasp the theoretical 
sciences (al-'ulüm al-nazariyya), and master the abstract (fikriyya) 
disciplines...... Hence he who denies this and limits the intellect to 
axiomatic knowledge (al-'ulüm al-dartiriyya) only is wrong ... Hence, the relation of that instinct (namely the intellect), to the 
sciences is similar to that of an eye to vision; while the relation of the 
Qur'an and the law to that of instinct is like that of the light of the 
sun to seeing.... 
Secondly, the word 'aql is applied to that knowledge which makes its 
appearance even in the child who discerns the possibility of possible 
things (jä'izät) and the impossibility of impossible things 
(mustahilät), such as the knowledge that the two are greater than the 
one and that the one individual cannot be in two different places at 
the same time. It is what one of the scholastics meant when he 
defined the word 'aql as some axiomatic knowledge (al-'ulüm a! - darüriyya) . In the third place, the word 'aql has been applied to that knowledge 
which is acquired through experience (tajärib) (empirical 
knowledge) in the course of events..... 
In the fourth place, the word 'aql is used when the power of the 
instinct develops to such an extent that its owner will be able to tell 
what the end ('awägib al-'umür) will be, and consequently he will 
71hyd 101. Nabih Amin Faris. 225. 
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conquer and subdue his appetite which hankers for immediate 
pleasures. Whenever such a power obtains (sic), its owner, in view 
of the fact that he embarks upon an undertaking, or refrains from it 
only after a thorough consideration of its end rather than in answer to 
the urge of a carnal appetite, is called intelligent.... 
The fourth is the final fruit and the ultimate aim (al-ghäya al- 
quswä). The first two are natural (bi al-tab), while the last two are 
acquired (bi al-iktisdb) 8 
From the four definitions of reason given above, it seems that, for al-Ghazäli, 
reason is the means by which man attains theoretical knowledge, knows axiomatic 
knowledge, gains acquired knowledge and the means by which he considers what 
the consequences of his actions will be and thus, through the use of reason, is 
enabled to control his appetites. 
From the above definitions of reason, we can deduce that al-Ghazdli 
recognises at least two categories of knowledge, axiomatic (al-'ulüm al-darürlyya) 
and acquired (al-'ulvm bi al-iktisäb). He defines axiomatic knowledge as that 
knowledge which is inherent in all men and that all men know instinctively 
without either prior effort or learning since even a child has this knowledge. From 
the examples he provides, al-Ghazdli seems to confine the category of axiomatic 
knowledge to the sphere of purely logical relationships, the logical categories of 
identification, implication and disjunction. 9 Thus, we should keep in mind that this 
acceptance of axiomatic knowledge does not necessarily go beyond the purely 
logical realm into the physical realm. For this to occur, al-Ghazäli would have to 
accept the necessity of causation as an axiomatic fact and al-Ghazäli has gone to 
great lengths to challenge this idea. Therefore, his acceptance of axiomatic 
knowledge as confined to the purely logical realm does not contradict his rejection 
of causality. 
The other category of knowledge that reason can obtain is acquired 
knowledge. From the above explanation, he says "that this kind of knowledge is 
%, vä, 10 1-2. Nabih Amin Fads. 226-8. 
91n his Tahafut al-falasifa, al-Ghazdli accepts axiomatic knowledge but only in the sphere of purely logical relations. See, Tahäfut al-faläsifa 249, Sabih Ahmad Karnali, 194. 
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acquired through experience in the course of events. " Thus, he accepts knowledge 
which is obtained through experience, but, however, he neglects to elaborate what 
exactly he meant by experience. Is this experience gained through the physical 
senses, the process of ratiocination, or through other ways, for example, the 
experience of the heart (galb) or is it gained through all of the above ? It is most 
likely that he meant all of the above, but without further explanation, one is left to 
speculate. 
Another complication that al-Ghazäli adds into his discussion of these 
categories of knowledge is when he turns away from these two categories and starts 
discussing remembrance (tadhaklcur) as a means of obtaining knowledge which all 
men once had but have forgotten. He says: 
Consequently God said, " If you ask them who created them, they 
will be sure to say, God. " This meant that if they would only 
consider their conditions, their souls and hearts would subscribe to 
the fact that God has created them (in accordance with) "the nature 
(firra) which God has given them. " In other words every human 
being is created and born a believer; still more every human being 
is born with (an inherent) knowledge of reality: inherent since it is 
readily disposed to perceive reality. With belief installed by nature 
in the human soul, men have split into two groups: the one who has 
turned away from that belief and has forgotten all about it-it 
comprises the unbelievers; the others have pondered and 
remembered, resembling therein one who has a witness, and, in his 
oversight, has forgotten all about it, but finally has remembered it. 
For this reason God said, " Happily they may remember; and "that 
those embued with understanding may recall and remember; " and 
again, " And remember the favour of God upon you, and His 
convenant which He had convenanted with you; " and again , "And We have rendered the Qur'än available as a sign to be remembered - but is there anyone who will remember? " It is not, therefore, far- 
fetched to call this kind of remembrance (tadhakkur). Thus, 
remembrance is of two kinds: the one is to recall a picture which 
once existed in one's mind but has since disappeared, while the other 
is to recall a picture which is inherent in one's mind by nature (fitra).... In short, he whose insight is not keen will grasp nothing of 
religion except its husks and outward forms rather than its pith and 
truth. 10 
10hä 103 Nabih Amin Faris. 230-1. 
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This method, remembrance, seems to correspond with the idea of recollection 
(anamnesis)11 in Plato. I do not intend here to elaborate on the similarities or 
differences between these two ideas, for although that would certainly be 
interesting, in fact arguably demonstrating philosophy's influence on and 
contribution to mysticism which are rarely acknowledged, such a discussion must 
be left for another day, for it is outside of our scope of discussion. Instead, I have 
highlighted al-Ghazdli's remembrance because although we are discussing al- 
Ghazäll's idea of reason, he seems to recognise another means of obtaining 
knowledge besides reason and revelation and from the above passage demonstrates 
its importance. In al-Ghazäli's scheme of knowledge, the importance of 
remembrance must not be underestimated. 
Reason vis ä vis Revelation 
At the end of Kitäb a! -'ilm, al-Ghazäli attempts to reply to why some Sufis 
have mistakenly disparaged reason and from this reply he explains the importance 
of reason vis a vis revelation. It is through reason that men know God. It is through 
reason that men recognise the truth of the Apostles of God. It is also through the 
use of reason that the law (al-shari'a) is understood. He gives the following 
explanation why the role of reason has been misconstrued and disparaged: 
You may say, "Why then do some groups among the Sufis disparage 
the intellect (al-'aql) and reason (al-ma 'qül) (as well as rational and 
the reasonable)? " You should know, then, that the reason for it is 
that men have transferred the term intellect or reason('agl) and the 
term rational or reasonable (ma'güi) (from their real and original 
meaning to another and false meaning], namely argumentation (al- 
mujadäla)and debate (al-ruunäzara) over contradictions and 
For the Platonic theory of recollection, see G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought 
(Indiana, 1980). Refer to Chapter on Theory of Ideas. 1-50. See also, Francis 
Conford, Plato's theory of Knowledge (Indiana, 1957) 
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requisites which is scholastic theology (san ̀ a al-kaläm).... As a result 
they disparaged reason and rationalism. 12 
If reason is disparaged for its products, argumentation and debates, then, 
what is it praised for by al-Ghazäli. Reason is praised because only through reason 
man initially knows about God, then the truth of the Apostles of God and ultimately, 
even the law that they bring with them is understood through the means of reason. 
Al-Ghazäli says: 
Could it be imagined, however, that the light of insight (ndr al- 
basira), through which God is known and the truthfulness of His 
Apostles is recognised, will ever be disparaged or belittled when God 
Himself praised it ? And if it were ever disparaged what other thing 
could be praised? But if the praiseworthy knowledge be the law, by 
what is the truth known. If it were known through the blame worthy 
and unreliable intellect , then the 
law itself is blameworthy. No 
attention, however, is paid to him who says that the law is known 
through certainty itself ('ayn al yagin) and the light of belief (nür a! - 
ima: a) rather than through the intellect, because we mean by intellect 
what he means by certain sight ('ayn a! yagia) and the light of belief, 
namely the inner characteristics (al-sifa al-bdtina) by which man is 
distinguished from the animal and through which he comprehends 
reality (liagä'iq al-'nmür). 13 
It emerges from the above passage that al-Ghazäli considers that it is reason that 
establishes the knowledge of the existence of God, through reason, the truthfulness 
of His Apostles is recognised and also reason is the means by which the revealed 
law is understood. However, since these remarks which he made at the very end of 
Kiräb al-11m, we have to turn elsewhere for further explanation of what are the 
implications of these remarks. 
In our previous discussion of the Igtisäd, we have explained how a! -Ghazäli 
sought the use of reason to establish the existence of God. 14 After establishing the 
existence of God, al-Ghazdli used reason to prove at least three attributes of God, 
12 vä., 105 Nabih Amin Faris. 235. 
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power, knowing and will. 15 Al-Ghazdli produces a similar argument to prove that 
reason can deduce the existence of God and at least some of His attributes in his 
logical text, al-Qistäs al-Mustagim (The Correct Balance). 
We also say regarding speculative matters: "If the workmanship 
[san'a: fabrication, making] of the world and the structure (tarkib: composition] of man are well ordered (martabän), marvellous 
('ajayibäa), and well done (muhakamdn), then the maker of that is 
knowing-and this is [something] primary (awwaliya) in the intellect 
but it is known that it is marvellous and well ordered-and this is 
perceived by ocular vision (al-775n); hence it follows from this that 
its Maker is knowing. " Then, we ascend [progress] and say: If its 
Maker is knowing, He is living. But it is known that He is knowing 
by the preceding balance; hence it follows that He is living. " Then 
we say: "If He is living and knowing. He is subsisting in Himself and 
is not an accident; but it is known by the preceding two balances that 
He is living and knowing: hence it follows from this that He is 
subsisting in Himself. " Thus, when we ascend from the quality of 
composition of man to the attribute of his Maker, viz. knowledge; 
then we ascend from knowledge to life, then from it to the essence. 
This is the spiritual ascension, and these balances are the steps[stairs, 
ladders] of the ascension to heaven, or rather to the Creator of 
heaven, and these principles are the steps [rung] of the stairs 
[ladders]. As for bodily ascension, no power can effect it, but that is 
peculiar to the power of prophethood [or: the prophetic mission] 16 
Unlike the argument given in a! -Igtisäd, the above argument provided in a! -Qisräs 
provides us with step by step details on how the reasoning process works to deduce 
the existence of the Creator, God and some of His attributes. 
After reason establishes the existence of God, and some of His attributes, al- 
Ghazäli then proceeds to deals with how reason is able to recognise the truthfulness 
of the Apostles. Al-Ghaz . li attempts to achieve this by utilising this principle that 
"every perfection [which can ] exist in man necessarily exist in the Creator "17, and 
since speech is an attribute for the perfection of man, the capability of speech must 
necessarily exist with God. Once we have affirmed the ability of divine speech, we 
must be able to accept the possibility that God may send messengers to man. since 
15See above, Chapter Three: al-Igtisäd if a! -i'tigäd: Revelation Defined. 16a[-Oistäs al-Mustac in, edited by 
Victor Chefhot, (Beirut, 1991), 3rd edition. 63. Translated into English by Richard McCarthy in Freedom and Fullfilment 
303. In future, refered to as, al- stäs (Arabic tent page), McCarthy (translation page). 
17 
-I tisäd 115. 
230 
being a messenger means transmitting the message of the sender, which in this 
example means the Apostles transmitting the message of God to man. However, 
proving by reason that it is possible for God to send messengers is far from 
establishing that God had sent messengers, the difference between a possibility and 
proving the possibility becoming an actuality. To prove this next step, from God 
being able to send messengers to His sending messengers, al-Ghazdli resorts to 
arguing the existence of certain knowledge in the world such as the knowledge of 
medicine and of medicaments which could not have come from reason nor through 
empirical means and therefore, this knowledge must have come from another 
source. He argues that this source is a divine inspiration, the revelation brought by 
the Apostles of God to man. He says, 
And the proof of its [prophecy's] existence is the existence in the 
world of knowledge which could not conceivably be obtained by the 
intellect alone. -such as the knowledge of medicine and of astronomy. 
For whoever examines such knowledge knows of necessity that it 
can be obtained only by a divine inspiration and a special help from 
God Most High, and that there is no empirical way to it..:.. From 
this proof, it is clearly within the bounds of the possibility that a way 
exists to grasp these things which the intellect does not normally 
grasp. This is what is meant by prophecy. 18 
Although the argument presented above as proof for the existence of prophecy may 
not seem very convincing. What is more important for our purpose here is that al- 
Ghazäli felt that it was necessary for him to provide an explanation based upon 
reason as a proof, because he realised that one cannot establish the truthfulness of 
the Apostles by basing it on the authority of the consensus (al-ijmä'). This is 
because the authority of the consensus relied upon the strength of the tradition of 
the prophet which depends upon the existence and truth of the revelation. Thus, it 
would be a fallacy to try. to prove the truthfulness of the Apostles by basing it upon 
revelation. Therefore, the truthfulness of the Apostles had to be proven by another 
mean, reason. 
l al-Mungidh 89. Richard McCarthy. 98. 
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However, once reason had established the existence of God and some of His 
attributes, the truthfulness of the Apostles, al-Ghazäli curbs the role of reason, 
limiting it to judging revelation only in terms of considering what revelation brings 
as possible among possibilities. Yet in al-Qistäs, he seems to give reason a greater 
role in judging revelation. He explains the role of reason as follows: 
Similarly I have believed in the veracity of Muhammad-Peace be 
upon him! -and the veracity of Moses-Peace be upon him! -not by 
reason of the splitting of the moon and the changing of the staff into 
a serpent: for that way is open to ambiguity, and one may not rely on 
it, nay, one who believes in the changing of the staff into a serpent 
may disbelieve in the lowing of the calf with the disbelief of the 
Samaritans (a! -sdman) because there is a great deal of mutual 
contradiction regarding the sensible, visible world. But I learned the 
balances (al-muwdzin) from the Qur'än, then weighed (wazantu) 
with them all cognitions about God (al-ma'arif al-'ilahiyya), and 
even the circumstances of the afterlife and the punishment of the 
iniquitous and the reward of the obedient, as I have mentioned in my 
book Jawähir al-Qur'än (The Jewels of the Qur'än). And I have 
found they all conformed (muwäfaga) to what is in the Qur'an and 
what is in the Traditions (al-akhbär). Thus, I knew for sure that 
Muhammad-Peace be upon him! -was veracious and that the Qur' än 
is true. I did as 'Ali-God be pleased with him! - said, when he declared: Do not know (measure] the truth by men: know the truth 
and you will know its possessors [adherents]. 
Then he said: I also desire to know the Prophet as you have known 
him. But you have mentioned that can be known only by weighing 
of all the cognitions of God with this balance, and it is not clear to 
me that all the religious cognitions (al-ma'arifa al-'ilahiyya) can be 
weighed with these balances. So by what can I know that? I said: Far from it! I do not claim to weigh the religious cognitions (al- 
ma'arifa al-diniyya) only, but I also weigh with them arithmetical 
and geometrical and medical and legal and kaldm cognitions, and 
every science [cognition] which is true and not positive [conventional, based on authority]-for by these balances I distinguish 
its true from its false. 19 
I have quoted this lengthy passage to demonstrate al-Ghazäli's seemingly great trust 
in the powers of reason. Here he seems to give a far greater role to reason to judge 
not only the truthfulness of the Apostles, but also the-product that they bring with 
them, the revelation. Al-Ghazdli wants to use reason to weigh these religious 
cognitions, even such circumstances of the afterlife, as one weighs the cognitions 
19 al- istäs . 81-2. McCarthy. 316-7. 
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of every science. However, it is most likely that what he meant by that is that 
reason can judge the religious cognitions to be possible for God to create: such as 
the circumstances of the afterlife and the punishment of the iniquitous and the 
reward of the obedient. Thus, it is highly improbable that reason can arrive at the 
details of these occurrences in the afterlife, but is able to accept that such a scenario 
falls within the realm of possibility. Therefore, reason is able to accept the authority 
and truthfulness of the revelation. 
233 
Concluding Remarks 
Al-Ghazäli's quest to try to understand the role of reason by itself must be 
understood within the context of how he perceives the world, therefore, must be 
framed within the confines of these assumptions that there are neither intrinsic 
moral values nor intrinsic natures of objects.. Trying to understand the role of 
reason within these restrictions, he arrives at the conclusions that human knowledge 
is basically divisible into two broad categories, axiomatic knowledge (a! -`uldm a! - 
darnrlyya) and acquired knowledge (al-'ulnm bi-al- ktisäb). He defines axiomatic 
knowledge as that knowledge which is inherent in all men and that all men know 
instinctively without either prior effort or learning, since even a child has this 
knowledge. However, al-Ghazäli confines the category of axiomatic knowledge to 
the sphere of purely logical relationships, the logical categories of identification, 
implication and disjunction. Al-Ghazäli rejects any necessary axiomatic principles 
in the realm of the physical world, therefore, rejecting necessary causation. At least 
by al-Ghazdli rejecting any axiomatic principles in nature, he is consistent with his 
main thesis that there is no intrinsic nature of objects. However, by claiming that 
man possesses inherent in his nature axiomatic knowledge, though limited and 
confined only to realm of the pure logical relationships, he seems to allow man 
some leeway and provide him with some form of intrinsic nature. However, 
whether this leeway would break the back of his claim that there is no intrinsic 
nature in anything is debatable. He gives far more leeway to this idea of intrinsic 
nature when discussing the Sufi concept of knowledge through the means of 
remembrance. Gaining knowledge through the means of remembrance would 
totally depend on the intrinsic nature of man. If al-Ghazäli is serious about such an 
idea, then, he would have to make man an exception against his basic assumption 
denying any intrinsic nature, since the means of remembrance totally relied upon 
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man remembering from his pre-existing intrinsic nature something which he had 
somehow forgotten. 
Since al-Ghazäli has divided human knowledge into two broad categories, 
axiomatic knowledge and acquired knowledge (a1-'u1jim bi-al-iktisäb), all that 
knowledge which is not gained from axioms must be acquired knowledge. 
Acquired knowledge is any and all knowledge other than axiomatic knowledge. 
For man to acquire knowledge he has to exercise all the means at his disposal. 
Thus, acquired knowledge can be gained for example through the physical senses, 
the process of ratiocination, or others, for example the experiences of the heart 
(gaib), revelation and ilhanz. Therefore, acquired knowledge not only includes 
knowledge which reason can acquire by itself through the process of ratiocination 
in which reason deliberates on the axioms within itself but also when reason acts in 
conjunction with other means at its disposal. 
Through the process of ratiocination, reason is able to establish the existence 
of God and some of His attributes. Through the same process, reason is able to 
rationalise the possibility of God sending His- Apostles to man and weigh the 
validity of the message of the messengers in order to attest to the truthfulness of the 
messenger, the Apostle. Thus, al-Ghazal! points out that he uses reason to weigh 
all the cognitions about God, all religious cognitions such as the circumstances of 
the afterlife and the punishment of the iniquitous and the reward of the obedient. 
However, reason is limited. Reason is not able to arrive at the conclusion of the 
details of what will occur for example in the afterlife. Thus, reason's judgement is 
useful and utilised only in so far as to judge/weigh whether these events can occur. 
Thus, reason's role is primary in so far as establishing the existence of God, some 
of His attributes and the possibility of God sending messengers and al-Ghazäli even 
gives arguments for reason actually deducing not only the possibility of Apostles 
but their existence. However, in judging/weighing the revelation, reason plays 
only a secondary role. Reason's role is to judge/weigh whether whatever 
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revelation brings is within the realm of possibility. This is what al-Ghazäli meant 
when he says: 
But I learned the balance (al-muwäzin) from the Qur'an, then 
weighed (wazantu) with them all cognitions about God (al-ma `arif 
al-'ilahiyya), and even as I have mentioned in my book Jawähir al- 
Qur'än (The Jewels of the Qur' än). And I have found they all 
conformed (muwäfaga) to what is in the Qur'an and what is in the 
Traditions (al-akhbär). Thus, I knew for sure that Muhammad-Peace 
be upon him! -was veracious and that the Qur'an is true. 
20 
Once reason judges that the declaration in the revelation falls within the realm of 
possibility, reason has to accept the judgement of revelation. However, reason is 
also utilised in understanding this revelation. Therefore, for al-Ghazäli, although 
reason's role is very important vis ä vis revelation, nonetheless, it is to establish the 
existence of revelation, and henceforth, to remain subservient to revelation 
20a 
- istäs. 81. McCarthy. 316. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this work, we have narrowed the scope of its study to the epistemology of 
revelation in a specific religion, i. e. Islam. In order to best be able to study the 
epistemology of revelation in this youngest of the three Abrahamic faiths, we have 
chosen to examine two prominent scholars in the Islamic tradition, al-Faz-lbi and al- 
Ghazäli. 
In order to understand the concept of revelation, we posed these four 
questions to both these scholars: 1. what is revelation?; 2. how is revelation 
received?; 3. who receives revelation , 
i. e. prophets?; and 4. finally and most 
importantly, what is the purpose of revelation? Although both of these scholars 
believe in the same revelation, the Qur'än, the way they perceive the revelation differs 
greatly. Beginning from very different starting points, beginning with different 
perceptions of God and His creation, they reached very different conclusions. These 
different conclusions arising out of the same text should not be seen as an 
unprecedented event in the Islamic tradition. Much earlier, in the theological realm, 
raged the debates between the Jabrites and the Qadarices on the issue of free will in the 
Qur'dn reaching totally opposite conclusions because they emphasised different 
aspects of the same revelation and pushed them to their extreme logical conclusions. 
The debates between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites are in the same vein. Both 
emphasising different aspects of revelation reached very different perceptions of the 
revelation. 
Al-F räbi and the philosophers begin from the starting point that the Creator 
God is a rational God, who manifests His rationality in all creation. Since the God 
that created the world and man created the world and man is a rational manner, thus 
man utilising his reason will be able to understand the creations and actions of 
God. Revelation is a creation and action of God. Thus, man utilising his reason is 
able to understand revelation. 
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All human knowledge for al-Fdräbi is in a way 'revealed' to man. God 
indirectly via the Active intelligence is responsible for giving man knowledge through 
the actions of the Active intelligence acting upon man's intellect. Revelation is seen as 
just another means by which God conveys knowledge to man. The relationship 
between revelation and reason is certainly not antagonistic, contradictory nor 
competing against each other. Rather, revelation is the transformation of reason and 
therefore revelation and reason complement each other in conveying the same truths to 
all men. 
The unique ability of revelation to transform the highest intellectual truths so 
they can be comprehended by everyone is for al-Färäbi not only an important aspect 
but an essential factor for the fulfilment of the purpose of philosophy. The 
importance of philosophy is to benefit not just the individual but society. Thus, in 
order for philosophy to benefit not just the individual, it must pass from the theoretical 
to the practical This means of transforming theoretical truths to practical actions best 
occurs through the means of revelation. Although, at the intellectual level, the 
knowledge that revelation brings can be derived through reason by itself, reason's 
ability to convey its message is limited. Because of reasons difficult, dry and 
abstract intellectual method, it is only able to educate in a limited manner. 
Revelation, on the other hand, can reach a mass audience from the educated to the 
layman and thus fulfils an essential purpose of philosophy. 
The role of revelation should be never underrated in the al"Färdbi 
philosophical system. For at-Färäbi, the greater the philosopher has the power to 
exploit his theoretical knowledge for the benefit of others, the more perfect is his 
philosophy. Since, through the prophets, theoretical knowledge is transformed into 
revelation which is the best form of persuasion benefiting the greatest number of 
people, the prophets are the ones who must be seen as possessing the most perfect 
philosophy. Thus, for al-Färdbi, the role of the prophet and the revelation is central to 
his philosophical system. 
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Al-Ghazäli begins from the starting point that the Creator God is an all 
powerful God and acts out of His own will and is subject to nothing but His own will 
who manifests His will in all creation. Al-Ghazäli desires to place God's will and 
power above everything and thus, as he understood it, this concept requires that 
everything and every event must be subject to the subjective divine will. 
In the arena of nature and causation, al-Ghazali rejects necessary causation 
and he upholds that everything, all existence and every action are a result of the 
creation of God, decreed arbitrarily by divine action. Al-Ghazäli rejects necessary 
causation because necessary causation would necessarily entail that objects, both 
animate and inanimate, would have to possess intrinsic natural powers by virtue of 
their being objects. Objects and actions would be determined by their nature or 
essence. If one were to accept this view and apply is to everything, al-Ghazdli 
concludes that God Himself would be constrained to act is accordance with His own 
nature. All of God's actions would proceed automatically because of His nature or 
essence. God could not choose to act in any ocher way. Therefore, al-Ghazäli 
concluded that God could not then be considered a free agent. 
Carrying forward this idea that objet-. s do not possess intrinsic power and 
applying it to the ethical realm, al-Ghazäli concluded that all acts have no intrinsic 
moral value and are morally neutral before God had imposed upon these acts a value 
through His commands and prohibitions revealed in the revelation. We would have 
never been able to derive this knowledge that revelation gives us by ourselves 
because it is the subjective will of God. The revelation itself with its commands and 
prohibitions has no intrinsic value except that it is the wishes of God. The 
revelation's only worth is that it informs us of :, vhac God wants us to know and what 
actions He wants us to do or not do. 
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